Strategic Depth in Gilgit-Baltistan is a Necessity for India
Strategic depth is that space between the frontlines or borders of a nation and its centers of gravity, essentially
Strategic depth is that space between the frontlines or borders of a nation and its centers of gravity, essentially
By – Neeraj Singh MANHAS;
Chinese leaders have accelerated their preparations for the upcoming 20th Party Congress scheduled to take place this fall. The event, which occurs every five years, is significant for China observers across
Taiwan is surrounded by authoritarian neighbours, as is Ukraine. Taiwan is also militarily threatened by China, its larger neighbour. Hence, Taiwan is apprehensive about falling into the same trap as Ukraine. China has publicly supported Russia’s war on Ukraine. Beijing considers Taiwan to be an integral part of China and views the matter
By – Dr. Swasti Rao;
As the present crisis in Ukraine is worriyingly bringing to strategic attention, the EU is a formidable economic power rather incapable of defending partner nations it sympathises with, or even its own member
By – Neeraj Singh MANHAS;
Prior to the 20th Party Congress (PC) of the Communist Party of China (CPC) due later this year, the public domain preparatory materials provide a very clear image of future drives, motivations, and strategic perceptions. At least four key documents come to mind in this context. These include:
The Historical Resolution introduced on 11/11/2021. According to the official description of the meeting’s resolution, China has “made historic achievements and undergone a historic transformation” under Xi’s leadership. It lauded Xi, Mao, and Deng for guiding the country through “the momentous shift from standing up and becoming affluent to becoming strong.”
The Communiqué of the 6th Plenum of the 19th CPC Central Committee in 11/11/2021. The Central Committee heard and discussed the report on the work of the Political Bureau, which was presented by Xi Jinping on behalf of the Political Bureau. It also considered and adopted the Resolution on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century and the Resolution on the Convocation of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.
The Joint Statement on ‘International Relations Entering a New Era and Global Sustainable Development’ of 04/02/2022 between Russia and China. At the invitation of President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir V. Putin visited China. The Heads of State held talks in Beijing and took part in the opening ceremony of the XXIV Olympic Winter Games.
The article published by Politburo Member Yang Jiezhi in the People’s Daily on 16/05/22. The article elaborated on how China, under the guidance of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, made progress this year by hosting major events such as the Winter Olympic Games, making strides in high-quality development and bolstering interactions with the rest of the world.
Under President Xi Jinping [XJP], while mechanisms have changed, the overall strategy and objectives of China’s foreign and security policy on safeguarding national independence, state sovereignty, creating an international environment favourable to its reform, opening and modernisation efforts, as well as maintaining world peace and promoting common development have remained consistent. This is the most important point to emphasise. The fundamental reasons for this include the ongoing successful layer-by-layer implementation of Deng Xiaoping’s Four Modernisations introduced in 1978; which facilitate opening to the world, with the West in particular providing positive enablement; the successful manipulation of international political, financial, and trade institutions; and China’s ability to leverage virtually unhindered technology transfers.
Clearly, CPC’s primary objective is the maintenance of its monopoly on power in China, the maintenance of domestic political stability, and the restoration of China to its self-assessed historical grandeur as the most important state and nation in the world. Similar to the “centre of the world” perspective.
Fulfilment of the targets set for 2020-2035 are an essential requirement to achieve these objectives, which once achieved would mean that by 2049, China expects to become a global leader in terms of comprehensive national strength and international influence, and to stand taller and prouder among the nations of the world.
The XJP era is also termed as “the New Era“, with each of the six phases, Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Theory of Three Represents, the Scientific Outlook on Development, and Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era; outlined in the Historical Resolution and the Sixth Plenum Communiqué adding a ‘new’ dimension to the development of the “new” China founded in October 1949.
The CPC already asserts that the Chinese nation stands tall and resolute in the East, wields a profound influence on the course of world history, and has become a significant force pushing human progress and development. China argues that its paradigm of growth (political, economic, and social) has developed a new model for human progress and widened the avenues for developing nations to achieve modernization.
China’s leadership is well aware that its continued rise would not be unchallenged for a variety of reasons. Consequently, the CPC’s assessment of problems is equally sharp, and seven characteristics stand out in particular:
First, as corruption is recognised as the greatest threat to the Party’s long-term control, the CPC cannot afford to lose this crucial political battle.
Second, the traditional growth model cannot be sustained as quality and innovation-driven growth is required, which necessitates globalisation. However, it also permits the outside world to impose hurdles.
Third, the necessity for self-reliance in science and technology as a strategic pillar for China’s development, while ensuring open access to technology and international markets in the interim.
Fourth, to secure the security of food, energy, and resources. [The emphasis on food security and rural revitalization is particularly pertinent, since it shows a potentially exploitable weakness in a crucial area.]
Fifth, can China continue to capitalise on its enormous market? Conditions must be established for this to occur.
Sixth, to ensure that China’s armed forces continue to protect the CPC’s power monopoly and China’s security and development interests. Significant progress has been achieved in modernising the PLA and revising its doctrines to meet the demands of technology-based warfare in the twenty-first century. This stems from the demand that the CPC’s primary priority be national security. Likewise, self-defined territorial integrity is essential. This correlates to China’s demand for universal, comprehensive, and indivisible security, especially in the current difficult context. This should be “fair” in the Asia-Pacific setting as well. This loaded language is used to resist the development of the Indo-Pacific architecture and the QUAD in order to defend China’s interests in the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean.
And seventh, despite its immense achievements, China is still, in its own estimation, the largest developing country in the world, with the greatest dilemma facing its society being between unplanned and inadequate development and the people’s ever-increasing desire for a better living. [In effect, a degree of accountability to the Chinese people is acknowledged.]
Clearly, security and development are China’s top two concerns. Yang Jiezhi, the high-ranking Chinese politician and diplomat, believes China has retained its initiative and advantageous position in the broader strategic framework, and China is confident in its ability to protect its sovereignty, security, and development interests.
In spite of Yang’s assurance, China assumes that substantial measures are currently underway to destroy security and stability in China’s periphery as well as to undermine China’s core and major interests. In response, XJP launched his new Global Security Initiative (GSI) on April 21, 2022 at the Boao Forum. This establishes security as the prerequisite for progress. Prior to September 2021, XJP presented his Global Development Initiative (GDI) at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The GDI and GSI are a “new” endeavour to meet and overcome the issues China faces in the significantly altered regional and worldwide environment of the present day. Several of these modifications were initiated by China.
The combined effects of the GDI and GSI require additional research. Other than CPC rule, Yang argues that China possesses five strategic factors that favour its future, including a firm foundation established by China’s persistent and rapid development, long-term and enduring stability, and a tremendous drive that gives China confidence and strength. (It is notable that US Secretary of State Blinken’s May 26, 2022 address on the US Administration’s approach to the China problem follows a similar line of thought.)
China will continue to prioritise coordinating development and security, protecting its territorial integrity as it defines it, preventing regime change and containment, and expanding its regional and international network of alliances. The GSI will be utilised here. China will lead the reform and development of the global governance system in order to achieve a status quo plus position and strengthen trade, investment liberalisation, and facilitation processes by utilising the GDI framework correctly. Given its external dependence in the economic, energy, and scientific fields, the latter is crucial. China’s efforts to combat climate change and exploit cyberspace, outer space, the Polar regions, and the Deep Seas will not falter or waver. Neither will the absolute concentration on strengthening, modernising, and technologically advancing the PLA under Party rule.
China has become a powerful entity over the course of the last four decades or more, with an unmistakable desire to be at the centre of a newly minted “community of common destiny” (with China at the centre), to which end it has announced and is implementing a series of initiatives, including the BRI processes, trading arrangements, the GDI, and now the GSI. This is supported by the PLA, the world’s third-most powerful military force.
The current superpowers and those who are unimpressed by China’s protestations, enticements, and rhetoric of principles that it does not adhere to have been steadily pushing back against Chinese actions and ambitions. In addition to the COVID-19 experience of countries with China, its ongoing predatory actions in its neighbourhood and its strengthened alliance with Russia just before the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 have given the pushback more momentum.
China now fears technological and commercial denial along with containment. Its responses to the growing Indo-Pacific framework, the QUAD, and now the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework [IPEF] reveal a degree of anxiety. China is plainly frightened, but when will it yield? The result of the Ukraine-Russia conflict may provide some insight. But can and will Xi Jinping make course adjustments prior to the 20th Party Congress? It is prudent not to bank on it; course adjustments, if they occur, are more likely to be gradual than abrupt.
Neeraj Singh MANHAS is a Director of Research, Indo-Pacific Consortium, at Raisina House, New Delhi. He has authored four books under his name and has various research interests covering India-China in the Indian Ocean, India’s maritime securities, and Indo-Pacific studies. His writings have appeared in The Daily Guardian, The Hindu Business Line, China-India brief (National University of Singapore), The Diplomatist, Chanakya Forum, and The Rise, among other online platforms.
By – Brijeshwar Dahiya;
A strongman is an authoritarian political leader, whose rule according to political scientists Brian Lai and Dan Slater (2006), is characterized by an autocratic dictatorship by a leader as opposed to juntas or oligarchic dictatorships. Strongmen seek to have complete control over the political system of a country and employ various tactics including populism to justify and garner support for their rule. Since his accession to power in 2012, Xi Jinping has employed all the tactics of strongman politics to assert his control, initially over the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and gradually, over the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
In 2012, Xi by attaining powerful positions of general secretary of the CCP and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), informally became the paramount leader of the PRC. After assuming power, Xi went on to consolidate his position within the CCP, he introduced various measures to enforce discipline among the cadres. He employed populist measures to destroy any kind of dissent and garnered support for his authoritarian policies. Xi’s far-reaching anti-corruption campaign targeted his political rivals and retired several senior leaders of the CCP. The anti-graft campaign became Xi’s hallmark as a tough leader.
Under Xi Jinping’s rule observers have noted an increase in human rights violations of the regime’s critics, particularly in autonomous and ethnic minority regions, including mass surveillance and internment of Uyghur Muslims in detention camps in Xinjiang. Although the PRC, since its foundation, has been engaged in censorship and mass surveillance of its population, the practice has become widespread under Xi’s rule. His administration is also systematically destroying Hong Kong’s autonomy under “One Country Two Systems”, protests against Xi’s policies in Hong Kong have been brutally crushed. He has not only projected himself as a strong leader domestically but on the global stage as well.
Under Xi Jinping, the PRC has followed a more assertive foreign policy. China has become more aggressive and sometimes violent in asserting its territorial claims on its neighbours like India, Japan and Southeast Asian countries. Incursions in Taiwanese airspace have increased manifold under Xi’s rule, especially in 2020-21 when Taiwan reported 969 incursions into its Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). The PRC government under Xi has been alarmingly vocal about the option of using force to occupy Taiwan if “peaceful efforts” fail.
Xi Jinping has successfully created a personality cult around him. Through these efforts, Xi Jinping has completely centralized power under him. Though there are scholars who argue that this shift from collective leadership, as noted since Deng Xiaoping’s era, to strongman rule is not the result of Xi Jinping’s individual personality but a collective response of the party’s elite to the CCP regime’s weakness. Since, the period marking Deng Xiaoping’s rule till Xi Jinping’s witnessed openness in the PRC, leading to challenges to the CCP’s authority. Nevertheless, Xi has become the paramount leader of the People’s Republic of China and through his strongman politics, he has changed the politics of the PRC.
Consolidation of Power
Xi Jinping has become the most powerful leader of the PRC since Mao Zedong. Along with being the general secretary of the CCP and the chairman of the CMC, Xi became President of the PRC in 2013. Since becoming the top leader, he has shifted from the collective leadership model to the concentration of power in his hands. He created several “working groups” and “Central Leading Groups”, rendering the existing institutions and several top-ranking leaders completely powerless. Xi believed that the CCP had become corrupt and wasteful, which posed the greatest challenge to the stability of the PRC. The motive behind the formation of such groups is to integrate all the power and to increase the efficiency of administration.
The most influential group that Xi himself heads include “Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms”, which has undermined the power held by the State Council and Premier Li Keqiang. The newly established “Central Leading Group for Internet Security and Informatization” and “National Security Commission of the CCP”, allow Xi to control the security infrastructure and have helped him shape PRC into a panopticon state. In 2018, the National People’s Congress (NPC) amended the constitution which removed the term limits of the President and the Vice President’s tenure, a convention followed since the adoption of the 1982 constitution. This consolidated Xi Jinping’s position in the PRC and made him the paramount leader of China
After consolidating power, he proceeded toward the elimination of opposition. Corruption has been rampant in China, especially since the reforms of 1978. At the 18th Central Committee of the CCP in 2012, while handing over power to Xi Jinping, the outgoing President Hu Jintao warned about the “enemy within” while cautioning about the danger that corruption poses to the stability of the CCP. Xi Jinping, a few months after being elected at the same 18th Party Congress, listed out his “eight-point guide”, laying down the policies for curbing corruption and maintaining discipline among the party officials. He launched his campaign by promising to take out “tigers and flies”, pointing toward high-ranking and low-ranking party officials.
In the initial three years, the Central Committee for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and the National Supervision Commission (NSC), the bodies responsible for curbing corruption in China, investigated and charged more than 500 senior officials of the party. This brought the downfall of many CMC and Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) officials like Bo Xilai, who was Party Secretary of Chongqing and many others like him. Bo Xilai’s case attracted much attention because of the prevalent rumours pertaining to a coup led by him against Xi Jinping. Though the campaign has been popular within China, international human rights organisations including Amnesty International have described institutions like National Supervision Commission (NSC) which lack accountability, as a threat to human rights. The anti-corruption campaign has been used by Xi Jinping and his aides to purge any political opponents who can challenge his power. The political purge, as claimed by critics, is on a scale unseen since Mao Zedong’s time.
Since 2012, internet censorship has increased considerably in China. After coming to power, shaping the narrative and controlling the rhetoric has been a top priority for Xi Jinping. The party’s General Office circulated “Document No. 9” in 2013 which warned the party cadres against the seven dangerous western values, which included constitutional democracy, universal values, civil society, neoliberalism, media independence, historical nihilism, and challenging the Chinese style of socialism. Xi Jinping’s regime has imposed stringent restrictions on the use of the internet, invoking “internet sovereignty”, China has censored the use of international platforms like Google, Facebook, and Wikipedia.
In 2013, the Chinese government passed a law prohibiting bloggers from sharing ‘defamatory’ content on popular Chinese social media platforms like Weibo and WeChat, a violation of which will invite imprisonment for three years. By 2018, the Virtual Private Networks (VPN) of individuals were blocked by telecommunication carriers on the orders of the Chinese government. In 2018, the Disney movie Christopher Robin was not allowed to release in China following the comparisons between the animated character Winnie the Pooh and Xi Jinping on popular social media platforms, furthermore, any such social media post comparing China’s paramount leader with the character on Chinese social media were censored by the Chinese authorities.
Under Xi Jinping, the human rights status quo has worsened in China, with increased attacks on activists, lawyers, and journalists. Hundreds of activists have been arrested, including prominent activist Xu Zhiyong of the New Citizens Movement. The CCP has always considered religion as a threat to its authority; they have suppressed the religious freedom of Tibetans and the Uyghurs. One of the methods used by Xi Jinping’s regime is either to destroy the religious monuments or by putting banners of Xi Jinping in Uyghur mosques and in Tibetan monasteries. Hundreds of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries have been attacked like the Larung Gar in 2017. After terror attacks in Xinjiang, the Chinese government started the ‘People’s War on Terror’, about a million Uyghurs have been put in internment camps, which the Chinese government terms as “education camps” to assimilate them with the Han Chinese.
Assertive Foreign Policy
Since 2012, China has followed a more assertive foreign policy, a clear shift from Deng Xiaoping’s “bide your time” to a more forward “wolf warrior” diplomacy. China has increased its military budget enormously to $229.5 billion, second only to the US, and is increasing every year at a rate of 7.1%. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is today the world’s largest navy in terms of the number of vessels. With the largest armada at its disposal, the PLAN is using increasing muscle, sometimes violently, while pursuing the PRC’s interests in the East China Sea and in the South China Sea. Clashes have increased between the Japanese navy and the PLAN over the Senkaku Islands, which both China and Japan claim. In the South China Sea’s Spratly, Paracel islands and other maritime claims which fall into the hypothetically drawn Nine Dash line conflicts have increased between the PLAN and the Southeast Asian countries. Xi Jinping on a number of occasions has warned the rival claimants and has held that China’s territorial sovereignty will not be compromised.
Similarly, China under Xi Jinping has shown Brinkmanship in Ladakh without any provocation from the Indian side despite the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. On the question of investigating the origins of Covid-19, Xi Jinping has openly ordered Chinese diplomats to answer with the hawkish “wolf warrior diplomacy”. Owing to this belligerent form of diplomacy and foreign policies, China under Xi Jinping has deteriorated its relations with major powers including Australia which is currently engaged in a trade war with China. Engaged in a global competition with the US, Xi Jinping unveiled his flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a global infrastructure development strategy in 2013. Although 146 countries have signed to join this initiative as claimed by China, there are allegations of debt-trap diplomacy and neo-colonialism against the PRC.
Cult of Personality
Xi Jinping’s both domestic and foreign policies have built his image as that of a strongman. In 2021, the CCP passed its third most important resolution since its foundation which declared Xi Jinping’s ideology as the “essence of the Chinese culture” effectively putting him alongside Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping in the Chinese cultural and political psyche. Passing such major resolutions, Xi Jinping has built a cult of personality around him. Books, movies, places, and slogans have concretized his place in the popular imagination of Chinese people. Since becoming the paramount leader, Xi Jinping has been called Xi Dada (Uncle Xi) and places connected to Xi Jinping’s life have been turned into shrines by the CCP’s propaganda machinery. All this captures and consolidates the image of a ‘charismatic leader’ which is characteristic of a strongman, which Xi Jinping undeniably is. But Xi’s further tightening of control over the CCP and the Chinese people is harming China’s national interests. His war against the big tech transnational companies in China is forcing both foreign and domestic investors to look for alternative options for investment. His “Zero-Covid” policy has been a disaster for the Chinese economy. As he further concentrates more power at the 20th Party Congress, the risk of alienating people grows, which poses a greater challenge to the PRC’s stability and prosperity.
Brijeshwar Dahiya did his Masters in International Relations and Area Studies with a focus on China from School of International Relations (SIS), JNU. He has written on Chinese Communist Party’s politics and on People’s Liberation Army’s role in Chinese foreign policy. He can be reached @BrijeshwarDahi2 on Twitter.
By – Albin Thomas;
The foreign policy formulation in China is entirely different, particularly from western and democratic countries. Numerous actors and decision-makers are involved in this process, and most of the time, the role of the foreign affairs minister is negligible and minuscule compared to other countries. Leading Small Groups (LSGs) are unique to Chinese foreign policymaking and have a significant role. The LSGs function as a mechanism to incorporate different government and party functionaries to implement their interests and opinions to government machinery. The LSG’s primary function is ministerial coordination and make consensus among government, party and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) systems. The formulation and its work come from Chapter IX of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China. The current regime under Xi Jinping made some critical changes regarding foreign policy formulation and implementation. He created the Central Foreign Affairs Commission in 2018 to formulate the foreign policy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs comes under the purview of the newly established Central Foreign Affairs Commission for formulating and implementing foreign policy. The Central Foreign Affairs Commission is currently chaired by Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) General Secretary and President Xi Jinping, and Premier Li Keqiang as its deputy leader. This structural change under Xi Jinping will strengthen the role of the CCP in China’s foreign policymaking, sidelining the government agencies in charge of foreign policy, and concentrating more power in his hands.
Leading Small Groups (LSGs) helps in the policy formulation and coordination among the party, government and military. They are subordinate to the party secretariat and report to the politburo and standing committee. Most of the information regarding the small leading groups is not available to the public domain largely. It was only one time the PRC media listed the current members of any of these LSGs. In 2003, the PRC controlled Hong Kong newspaper Wen Wei Po published a complete members list of the Central Committee Taiwan Work Leading Small Group. It was first created in 1958, and it considerably influenced the policymaking of different departments. The primary function of LSGs is to control the fragmentation and fraction within the party and government. The influence of Small Groups in Chinese politics is well noted from Mao’s times itself. The leading Small Groups played significant roles in all the historical incidents in China, especially with the cultural revolution and economic reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping.
The number and the role of leading small groups increased in the late 1970s. There were 39 SLGs known to the outside world in 2015 and within these, 21 worked under the government’s State Council and 18 under the Central Communist Party of China (CCP). The Comprehensively Deepening Reform Leading Small Group and Cybersecurity and Information SLG established by Xi Jinping in 2013 are newly established central CCP Small Leading Groups. Xi Jinping has chaired both the SLGs since their establishment. All other Leading Small Groups are headed by a Politburo member, the premier, a vice premier, or a state councillor. In most cases, the President of China chairs the key Small Leading Groups. In the case of Xi Jinping, he chairs the CCP Finance and Economy LSG, Foreign Affairs LSG, and Taiwan Affairs LSG. Unlike his predecessors, Xi Jinping directly controls the LSGs related to foreign policies and uses these LSGs for his ambitious projects and assertive foreign policy. But still some of the key Leading Small Groups are headed by the party politburo members and the State Council members related to their official responsibilities. For example, the propaganda and ideology LSG is headed by Liu Yunshan, and ten LSGs related to the economy are headed by Zhang Gaoli, Particularly the One Belt, One Road initiatives.
It is complicated to understand the role of Leading Small Groups in foreign policy formulation. Seven important Leading Small Groups work to formulate foreign policy or try to find a collective decision and avoid conflicts with different groups. The Leading Small Groups related to foreign policy are indicated in Table 1. Before 2018, the Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALG) was a commission associated with the Communist Party of China (CCP) that formulated and discussed matters related to foreign policies. In 2018, Xi Jinping created the Central Foreign Affairs Commission (FAC) and scrapped FALG. The FAC replaced FALG, and it became a substantial body for the foreign policy formulation since its origin. President Xi Jinping currently chairs the FAC, and premier Li Keqiang is deputy leader of the same. The membership includes CCP politburo members Yang Jiechi, foreign minister Wang Yi, and some selected people from CCP Politburo and government. The Foreign Affairs Commission generally collects different analysis views of the various departments and bureaucracies related to foreign affairs. FAC tries to avoid conflict by bringing all the departments together and making concise decisions. It is also alleged that the formation of FAS leads to more power concentration in the hands of Xi Jinping respective of foreign affairs.
Table 1: Leading Small Groups related to Foreign Policy
|Leading Small Groups||Chaired by||Members|
|Foreign Affairs CLGS||General Secretary/Premier||Vice Premier,State Councilor, Full membership is not available.|
|State Security||General Secretary||PBSC members in charge of State security and public security affairs.Senior military intelligence officer.Representatives from state council officers on Taiwan affairs and Hong Kong and Macao affairs.|
|Overseas Propaganda||Current leader Wang Huning.||Heads of the party’s Propaganda and United Front Work department and the leaders of the party central news office, Xinhua, People’s Daily, and the ministry of culture|
|Taiwan||General Secretary||PBSC members on Taiwan, The state council Taiwan affairs office. The PLA general staff’s intelligence department.|
|HK and M||No Information available||No Information available|
|Finance and Economics||General secretary/ Premier||No Information available|
|Energy||Premier||No Information available|
The role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not change under the Xi Jinping regime also. It is mainly responsible for the day-to-day work. It represents the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the international arena and takes several diplomatic decisions. Different think tanks under the government of the PRC and CCP help the ministry of foreign affairs in this process.
The supreme leadership plays a significant role in all the critical matters, particularly foreign and security policy decision-making in China. Xi Jinping has been general Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Chairman of the Central Military Commission since 2012, and President of the PRC since 2013. He has an inalienable and pre-eminent role in decision making like Mao, Deng and Jiang Zemin. Former President Hu Jintao did not enjoy tremendous power compared to his predecessors and the current President Xi Jinping. At the time of Hu Jintao, more actors had involved in decision-making, and decentralisation of power happened through LSGs. When Xi Jinping became the President of the PRC, he tried to concentrate more power and decision-making in his hands. He also has chaired several LSGs like the CCP Finance and Economy LSG, Foreign Affairs LSG, and Taiwan affairs LSG since 2012.
Xi Jinping became more active and visible on the international stage, and he introduced several foreign policy concepts like major country diplomacy and a community of shared futures. Domestically, he created new institutions involved in the foreign and security decision-making and managed all of them himself. In 2013, Xi Jinping created the National Security Commission (NSC), and he has chaired the NSC since then. The NSC particularly aims to deal with domestic security issues, but it also has some international responsibilities like border control and counterterrorism. In the same year, he created two more LSGs: they are the Comprehensive Deepening Reform Leading Small Group and the Cybersecurity and Information LSG. He has been chairing both SLGs since their establishment.
It is not easy to closely analyse the PRC’s internal structure and policy formulations due to its opaque nature. However, it is visible that LSGs have a notable role in the foreign policy formulations in China. President Xi Jinping tries to establish his dominance in foreign and security decision making by concentrating his influence on the LSGs. Xi Jinping introduced some structural changes in the formulation of foreign policy especially related to LSGs. He established small leading groups for deepening reforms after he became the president of the PRC. The establishment of the LSGs by Xi Jinping is viewed as a symptom of centralization and concentration of power, and indicates his emphasis on “top-level design”. The LSGs also help to overcome the governance issues of the Party-state, and coordinate different segments in bureaucracies, government and CCP in policy-making processes.
Xi Jinping introduced the Central Foreign Affairs Commission (FAC) in 2018 by replacing the Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALG). FAC became the paramount agency related to foreign affairs after its establishment. There are seven Leading Small Groups related to foreign affairs currently active in the PRC, and each has a significant role in foreign policy. The precise details about LSG’s membership and meetings are unavailable to the general public and the international media. The participation of Leading Small Groups in foreign affairs is well noted and tremendous in nature. Foreign affairs involve the participation of different departments, and LSGs play a significant role in coordination and concise decision-making among these departments.
Albin Thomas is a research scholar at the Centre for East Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), India. He is doing research on “Economic Diplomacy of China under Xi Jinping”. He has published an article for Australian Institute of International Affairs. He is having keen interest in Chinese foreign policy, foreign policy of Xi Jinping, economic diplomacy, cross-strait relations. He can be contacted at firstname.lastname@example.org, email@example.com and reached @albinthomas_ on Twitter.
By- Siddhant Nair;
What is RSCT?
In their book titled “Regions and Powers: The Structures of International Security,” Barry Buzan and Ole Waever coined the term ‘regional security complex (RSC)’. A regional security complex is a group of regionally clustered states where each state is interdependent for their national security concerns, with each regional security complex consisting of a unique security-based interaction with one another. The security dynamics present in each RSC are unique and cannot often be changed.
Furthermore, they categorize states into three categories: superpowers, great powers, and regional powers. A superpower is a state capable of defining the polarity of the world; a great power is a “state that is more powerful than a regional power and can project their power into a region outside their home region, but is not yet a superpower”, and regional powers are the states that influence the polarity of their regional security complex.
How does it apply to Indo-China relations?
Since India’s independence, the South-Asia complex consisted of Pakistan and India and the subsequent hostilities and rivalry. The two countries’ security concerns closely interacted with their policies directly formulated to counter each other. The two countries also engaged hostilities in wars fought in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971.
After the conclusion of the Cold War and the liberalization of the Indian economy in 1991, Indian power and influence was far superior to Pakistan’s. Due to India overshadowing Pakistan as it could no longer balance India in the South Asian complex, India’s primary security concern shifted from Pakistan to China. While India and China went to war in 1962, China far exceeded India to even consider India a competitor in the region. On the other hand, while wary of the threat China posed, India was mainly occupied with Pakistan and worked to stabilise and improve ties with China.
Great powers, East Asia and West Asia
As India started to grow into the role of great power, its status as a rising power was recognized globally. China, on the hand, downplayed India’s great power status, borrowing arguments from Michael Pröbsting, the author of “Is India a New Emerging Great Power?”. Using India’s socio-economic characteristics, China argued that due to India’s high rate of social inequality, a small contribution to the global GDP (at 3.2%, compared to China’s 14.5%), the largest poorest population in the world, increasing indebtedness and low per-capita income did not qualify India as a great power. Therefore, China did not see India as a competitor or a strategic concern. For the large part, Chinese scholars and political elites believed that India was an important neighbor, despite having bilateral issues. This perception changed as China became wary of India when New Delhi grew closer to the United States.
After India’s economic liberalization, it outgrew Pakistan in the South-Asian complex, compelling United States to change its stance towards India. The “Agreement for Co-operation concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy” was signed between the two countries (2007) as the US also halted its military support to Pakistan. In 2011, the Obama administration announced the US pivot to Asia policy. While China and US shared good ties, China saw this as an attempt to contain China’s rise and growing influence in the region. Coupled with BJP’s rise to power in 2014 and its previous experience with BJP in power in 1990, China grew increasingly wary of India and the growing Indo-US relations. Under Prime Minister Modi, India grew increasingly assertive and outspoken about its dissatisfaction with China’s proposed China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). China was also under the impression that India had long abandoned its non-alignment policy by choosing to ally itself closely with the west to become a great power in the region and counter China’s influence.
Through its “Act East” initiative, India started interacting with the Southeast Asia complex, promoting economic, cultural, and strategic ties in the region. Through its Act East Initiative, India launched and built multiple institutional mechanisms to expand, strengthen and cooperate on energy, cyber security, counter-terrorism, and maritime rights. Indian scholars argue that India’s Act East was aimed at containing China’s growing economic and military influence in the region.
India’s economic growth since liberalization, followed by India growing into a great power, the United States of America’s changing ties with India, and its announcement of the “Pivot to Asia” are all factors that contributed to changing Indo-China ties. While under Modi, there were moments of India-China cooperation, S. Jaishankar notes that Indo-China ties are characterized by collaboration and competition. He also pointed out that even before the Galwan valley clash, India had restricted access to Chinese markets, China opposed India’s membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, blocked attempts at adding Pakistani non-state actors involved in the 2009 Mumbai attacks on the UN terrorist list and has faced increasing trade deficit from China.
Iran’s role in India-China competition:
As India and China are globally recognized as great powers, both have looked at neighboring Regional Security Complexes to project their power. West Asia has proven to be the next realm of Indo-China competition.
For India, West Asia is an essential source of oil and remittances. The percentage of Indians in West Asia grew exponentially after the “oil boom” in the 1970s, leading to the creation of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs. India also increased its engagement with Israel, Iran, and other Gulf countries under its “Look West” policy.
On the other hand, China has been increasing its economic cooperation in the region. China’s economic cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) stood at US$170 billion in trade in 2020. China has also expanded its ties with the GCC to include defense, nuclear technology, and health. China has also expanded its Belt and Road Initiative, a global strategy, to include the Gulf countries. So far, seventeen countries in West Asia have joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Iran has been the latest country in West Asia to become a part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, joining its regional Arab rivals. For both India and China, Iran is a crucial source of cheap oil and is central to accessing Central Asia. For China, specifically, Iran was the last key member in West Asia to be inducted into its Belt and Road Initiative. China bought more than 850,000 barrels of crude oil per day from Iran in 2021 alone. Experts point out that China underreports the exact number of oil imports due to the current US sanctions on Iran. On the other hand, India was forced to wean off Iranian oil and trade with Iran in 2019 after the waiver issued to it by the US expired. India has also partnered with Iran on the Chabahar Port project.
As highlighted, the Gulf (and Iran) are essential to both India and China’s foreign policy. As Sebastian Goulard points out, by bringing Iran into BRI through its $400 million, China hopes to “present itself as a possible peace-broker,” bringing together Shia and Sunni majority countries to work on projects that will be introduced through BRI. China is hoping to change the security dynamics of the region. However, as the theory points out, each RSC has its unique security dynamics. During the Cold War, security dynamics remained unchanged despite superpowers directing interacting and interjecting themselves into the region.
Competition between India and China in the Gulf region for regional influence will likely be at the forefront of Indo-China relations. While China through the creation of a global strategy, has solidified its influence in the region, India, on the other hand, could struggle to employ its “Link West”. Unlike India’s “Act East” policy was based on concern over China’s growing increasing assertiveness and influence in the region. “Link West”, could be created to establish and expand bilateral ties, however, it is unlikely that it will be used as means to counter China’s influence. West Asia, and more specifically the Gulf, are not aware of a Chinese threat, instead welcome the economic investments it brings in.
Siddhant Nair is a post graduate student in Interdisciplinary Studies and Research, specializing in International Relations. He has previously interned in ORCA, The Gateway House and Chennai Center for China Studies. You can find him on twitter @siddhant__nair
By Dara Cheick;
According to Chinese political scientist Lanxin Xiang, there are three objectives of Chinese politics: the restoration of the past glory of China and the state; recalling the age-old desire for a rich and powerful modern China and maintaining social stability. Seen from Beijing’s point of view, Africa remains a political and economic question rather than a military and security issue, despite the mantra of “security and development”. However, the security dimension does exist and is even tending to increase, particularly because China is worried about the protection of its nationals in Africa, whose number is estimated today at one million people. In terms of resources (such as oil, zinc, iron, cobalt, copper, titanium, etc.) as well as from the commercial point of view, the development of the Chinese economy depends on Africa and therefore its stability is very crucial for China. The deployment of Chinese military forces in Africa responds to a growth in both security supply and demand.
The Sahel comprises a geographical area that covers five countries of West Africa including Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Chad, working as an organization at the sub-regional level called G5-Sahel, created on December 16, 2014, in Nouakchott. The region is largely covered by sand and is in the grip of a security crisis that threatens the lives of the people struggling with forced displacement, and massacres with a very heavy toll on human life. This instability has also affected the industrial infrastructure of the region which has reached the brink of collapse, especially since the Malian disaster of 2012.
China’s Sahel overtures:
For a very long time, Chinese policy was based on significant economic investments in the manufacturing industries of the Sahel countries. To this end, the creation, two decades ago of a mixed company between the Government of Mali and the Chinese Light Industry Company for Techno-Economic Cooperation with Abroad (SUKALA s.a) was set up which is today one of the largest industrial companies in Mali and has generated more than 35 million dollars for the Malian State in taxes and duties.
During the1980s China was strongly involved in Sugar Complex of the Upper Kala (SUKALA), Malian Textile Company (COMATEX), Mali Tannery Company (TAMALI), Malian Pharmaceutical Factory (UMPP), Popular Pharmacy of Mali (PPM) were subject to this type of intervention.
In Niger, the main areas of investment are energy ($5.12 million); mining ($620 million) and real estate ($140 million), other aspects of cooperation include: the construction of stadiums and schools, medical missions, military cooperation, infrastructure (roads, bridges, rolling stock, thermal power plants).
Malis still struggling to have a legitimate democratic leader elected through free and transparent elections and is floundering in a transition that is the result of two military putsches. In Burkina Faso, the power of President Rock Marc Kaboré succumbs to a great social protest and a soldier’s mutiny on January 23, 2022, under the leadership of Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo DAMIBA, president of the junta that took power on January 24, 2022. Among all these countries mentioned above, only Niger remains the one that maintains a “relative stability”, with its successful democratic alternation on February 21, 2021, which carried Mohamed Bazoum as President of the Republic with a foiled coup attempt on the night of 30 to 31 March 2021 even.
Nevertheless, without being as weak as their neighbours in the Central Sahel, the capabilities of the Mauritanian and Chadian armies are far from exceptional. Renowned for the quality of its intelligence services and rapid intervention units, Mauritania has still not been directly involved in significant fighting for four years. This is important to note as these are the two countries of the G5 Sahel organization that have a certain capacity to respond to the terrorist threats, hence for four years, they have not been directly involved in this scourge.
However, amidst such terse geopolitical realities in a situation of rejection and lack of coordination and results, France and the other European partners are in a situation of weariness and attempting to decide whether or not to reduce their footprints with the G5-Sahel joint force. This will only open further room for Chinese entry.
On the military and security front, China generally contributes to UN peacekeeping operations, for example in Mali as part of MINUSMA where it deployed 403 peacekeepers, including one killed and 12 others wounded in an attack in Gao in the north of the country.
China pledged more than $45 million to the G5-Sahel joint force in early 2019 and $1.5 million for the operation of the permanent secretariat, in other cases it allied with Russia to block some resolutions initiated by other UN Security Council members on Mali, in addition to the supply of several military equipment respectively to the countries of the G5-Sahel and more generally to those of the African Union.
THE GEOSTRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF CHINESE COOPERATION IN THE SAHEL
The relationship between the Sahel countries and China has evolved over several years of cooperation through investments in various fields whose interests continue to benefit all the different parties. For the former, it allows them to have diversified diplomacy and cheap goods and for the latter to establish its economic and political power in these developing countries. For China, thanks to globalization which has allowed it to liberalize its economy as well as the new law of 2015 that allows the Chinese military and police to intervene abroad as part of so-called “anti-terrorist” missions to protect its economic and human interests, Beijing has created strong political clout in the region that it has transformed into infrastructure according to the needs of these countries (as in Djibouti) under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
In addition to these donations, it has carved out a significant share of the public procurement of these States compared to other powers in the West within the framework of bilateral agreements; several achievements have been carried out mutually that continue to benefit the interests of each party thanks to the low cost of Chinese products.
Beijing’s goals in Africa are threefold, with the first being to get acquainted with uncharted territory. These operations allow it to improve its operational capabilities and test new weapons, such as infantry fighting vehicles and 95-1 assault rifles. Exercises are also being conducted at its military base in Djibouti, inaugurated in 2017, covering several terrains: such as the desert of sub-Saharan Africa, urban areas and sea lanes.
“This is one of the least threatening ways for the Chinese military to practice in real theatres of armed conflict,” says Obert Hodzi, an international relations researcher at the University of Helsinki and author of The End of China’s Non-intervention Policy in Africa”.
This is why the Chinese government is seeking to consolidate ties between the PLA and the African General Staff. At the beginning of the summer, the first China-Africa Security and Defense Forum organized in Beijing by the Chinese Ministry of Defense was an opportunity to define the axes of this cooperation and in particular the issue of “mutual assistance for security”, terms that appeared in 2015 in the second white paper on Africa, which now includes the training of soldiers and the sale of arms.
China’s influence in the regional security atmosphere
China has even gone so far as to use its economic power to force governments to give it special treatment, as was the case in Zimbabwe, or to defend politicians favourable to its interests as in Zambia or Zimbabwe with the fall of Mugabe. China behaves there like many Western countries that it has previously criticized.
The reason is the defence of its military-industrial lobby. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has interests in hotels, banking and real estate. With it, China cannot help but mix trade and politics. Companies, such as ZTE or Huawei in telecommunications, are likely to have to respond to requests or orders from the PLA or the party if the need arises. Beijing is thus drawing its new diplomacy, multilaterally via the UN, and bilaterally by maintaining privileged relations with the Sahelian states or political parties sensitive to its arguments to shale up traditional powers such as France and especially the United States in the region.
Dara Cheick is a student at the Faculty of Administrative and Political Sciences of Bamako (Mali) and a research assistant at the Timbuktu Center for Strategic Studies for the Sahel. He can be reached on Twitter @DaraCheick
By – Tanishk Saxena;
Sun Tzu’s ‘Art of War‘ is seminal Chinese military treatise that looks to forecast victory or defeat. China under Xi Jinping has followed his suggestions and satisfactorily executed Sun Tzu’s Military Treatise that have bolstered confidence and built a moral consensus within China to legitimize his decisions. This opinion piece analyses contemporary endeavors by China (domestically and internationally) that fall in line with Sun Tzu’s Military Treatise on laying plans, waging war and attacking by stratagem.
Sun Tzu mentioned that “morality makes the population comply with the ruler regardless of conditions.” (Pg.1) Herein, we see that Xi Jinping has enforced his thoughts on the people by embedding his thoughts in the education system and running re-education camps in the supervision of the Propaganda Department and Education system to build a moral consensus.
Sun Tzu has also stated that “he could predict victory by analyzing the General’s ability, advantages derived from occupying strategically important grounds, discipline enforcement, increasing the strength of an army, training of officers and men and constancy both in reward and punishment.” (Pg 2). We see that China trains its generals to uphold the spirit of fearlessness and indomitable courage. PLA comrades endure rigorous training under extreme conditions which includes training to use NunChaku, spears and other non-lethal weapon fighting tactics, especially along the India-China LAC wherein firing of weapons is prohibited. It adds to the strength of the forces in hand-to-hand combat. Such training programs boost commanding and fighting capabilities to foster excellent conduct. During the Beijing winter Olympics 2022, Qi Fabao, the regiment commander of the People’s Liberation Army who fought during the Galwan Valley clashes, was made the torchbearer as a reward for his bravery. Concurrently, harsh punishment to officers for indiscipline is a common practice in PLA. China has worked extensively on gaining high grounds and places of strategic importance through its BRI projects, investments and loans globally. These strategic locations include Hambantota port in Sri Lanka and Gwadar Port in Pakistan which adds to the strategic depth of China.
Sun Tzu notes that “deception is at the core of warfare. Strategies should be formed as one is capable and prepared to conduct an attack- must seem unable; and while during aggression- must seem inactive; when close to conduct an attack must make the enemy feel far away; when far away, make him believe to be near.” (Pg 3). During the reign of Mao Zedong, China had limited military capabilities and didn’t hold significant economic might or stature in international politics. At that time, China claimed to reunify Taiwan in coming 10 years. China was very far away from its goal at that time as the presence of western powers and support for Taiwan was certain. Later during the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China was in better condition after opening up its economy and had made a place in the international system. Deng Xiaoping during his tenure expressed the willingness to reunify Taiwan but changed it from ten years to hundred years. As China got closer to reunification; China made the world perceive it is moving away from its goal through statements of its leaders. Xi Jinping stated in his comment on Taiwan said that ‘China is still willing to reunify Taiwan but did not mention the exact time or year for his plans. Though China seems much closer to its goal to reunify Taiwan with its economic might, maintains a gigantic military, can write international rules and challenge the global governance, it has made its stance that it is outlying away from its plan of reunification. From Mao’s time to now, China has maintained its stance that China will use only peaceful means to reunify Taiwan also seems a deceptive move as it sends regular flights, fighter jets and bombers close to the island.
Sun Tzu has also suggested that “an opponent with a choleric temper should be irritated and then should pretend to be weak against that same opponent so that the opponent may develop arrogance.” (Pg. 3). During the Trade War with the USA, China had used all means to irritate the former President of the USA – Donald Trump, through various means. Donald Trump taking the America First campaign forward – was willing to bring back manufacturing industries from China back to the USA with a key objective to refrain China from taking unreasonable benefits of the international system, but the chronic temper of Trump was also a well-known fact. Xi Jinping imposed retaliatory taxes on the USA products that received retaliation with even more tariffs on Chinese products. Xi Jinping used to flatter Trump during the dinners and unofficial meetings telling him how grateful he is. John Bolton (Former National Security Advisor of USA) writes in his book ‘The Room Where It Happened’, that Xi Jinping’s personal relationships mean next to nothing to him if it is inconsistent with the interest of the CCP and then China. This consistent cyclic retaliation during the trade war and flattering during personal meetings built up arrogance in Trump. His arrogance grew to a level where he started competing with Xi Jinping and stated ‘People are talking about repealing the two-term limit for him. The Trade deal with China that Trump projected to his domestic audience as success went into a hoax. China used this tactic to build up arrogance into Trump so much that he later fired his National Security Advisor Jon Bolton and Defense secretary Mark Esper over Twitter and could not accept his defeat in elections by the Democrat candidate Joe Biden leading to Capitol Riots.
Next, Sun Tzu’s statement that, “at the time of war: the expenditure is enormous both at home and on the front and suggests to account money required to pay for the entertainment of guests and other miscellaneous expenses” is noteworthy (Pg. 4).
China has increased its military and defense budget by 7.1 per cent to USD 230 billion from last year’s USD 209 billion. Xi Jinping has paid extra attention to modernizing China’s defense equipment with self-reliance to sustain long wars. The recent session of the Fiscal and Economic Committee of the Thirteenth National People’s Congress emphasized food security, bringing fiscal and taxation reforms. China imports a significant amount of food from outside, purchasing wheat from Russia and pork is imported through a long channel from Brazil. Having a stockpile of food beforehand during time of uncertainty acts as a tool to mitigate the risk of food security. China’s domestic spending is not standardized and lacks detailing during execution. The use of budgetary funds remains low and allows China to have backup plans/funds in the instance of any black swan event.
Sun Tzu stated that the objective should be victory and, prolonging warfare campaigns must be avoided. (Pg. 4) We see that China has entered the conflict zone strategically and has always made it on top of its checklist to abstain from entering prolonged warfare. China had strategic plans in Afghanistan and Pakistan attached to its China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and broadly Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Despite strategic goals, China has abstained from directly entering the conflict zone or situation despite being a direct threat to its investments and interests for prolonged nature. On similar lines, Russia sent its forces to support the current leadership of Khaskasths against the coup. China also supported the existing regime of Kazakhstan but did not send its armed forces on the ground, sensing a fear of prolonged war. The pattern observed in various conflict zones where China abstains from entering despite high stakes and interests is for a reason being of prolonged nature. In all these conflicts, the objective of China remained to be victorious even without firing a bullet itself. Moreover, China’s support remained unaffected by the kind of regime it is dealing with.
Sun Tzu prioritized bringing the other state as a whole and intact within the sphere of direct influence. (Pg. 6). China’s strategy to extend loans through AIIB and under its BRI project provides an irresistible bait for any economy struggling. Ambitious leaders willing to bring a huge change within a short span tend to be caught easily into the trap as a desire to project growth is used to gain support, popularity and acceptance to their people the kind of development brought. China offers loans without any requirement of restructuring the economy as often mandated by Institutions from the Bretton Wood System. The loans extended are offered at a cheaper price but takes tactically important assets for lease or mortgage. Through these means, China maintains the leadership of the state in control and in case of default takes over the assets of strategic importance to China. China under Xi Jinping has used this tactic in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and many other African states. This tactic is also referred to as salami slicing and debt trap diplomacy where loans and investments are provided as bait. These adhere to Sun Tzu’s strategy of bringing a state completely under its sphere of influence intact.
Lastly, Sun Tzu mentioned that if you know yourself and your enemy well, you will surely win every battle, but if one fails to do so, he will suffer defeat. One who neither knows his strength nor weakness will surely scramble on the battlefield. (Pg 8). China runs extensive surveillance within the country through cameras that can even identify and report the ethnicity of a person and location. It also engages in using artificial intelligence and maintaining strong control over social media outlets. Along with this China maintains strict surveillance over its military leaders, capitalist class, social media influencers, journalists and members of the CCP. China also extensively reviews its domestic projects, population, military capability and situation of various provinces and autonomous regions. This helps China to identify its strength and weakness so that it never crumbles on the battlefield. Chinese companies like Huawei, ZTE, other applications and social media platforms are accused of stealing user data that is further refined and used to acknowledge the actions and to extract vital information from the user whose information is compromised without any consent. China has extensively built Confucius institutes globally along with the Embassies apart from their role in cultural exchange, act as a medium to gather vital information that helps to know more about a potential adversary. China has installed its surveillance equipment in various countries and withholds technological backend data for service and other purposes that can be used for surveillance as and if needed.
China under Xi Jinping, one of its most powerful leaders since Mao, has effectively implemented the strategies provided by Sun Tzu. Building a Communist Socialist Society with unique Chinese Characteristics, and restoring glory lost during imperialism are key objectives of Xi Jinping. Sun Tzu, being an ancient Chinese philosopher best suits Xi Jinping to protect the national interest. As he uses the tactics of Sun Tzu in international politics thereby becoming a part of the normal thought process and being used in domestic politics or to pursue his personal ambitions has high possibility. The work of Sun Tzu effectively bolstered the confidence of Xi Jinping while making strategies and taking decisions. Reading Sun Tzu’s work along with the contemporary actions of various state and non-state actors could help better understand and decode contemporary geopolitics.
Tanishk Saxena is Executive Outreach Head at Organization for Research on China and Asia (ORCA). Mr. Saxena is also Project Associate with Asian Pathfinders and is pursuing his PGDM with specialisations in International Marketing, Advertising and Public Relations. Mr Saxena was associated with Mitkat Advisory Ltd. – Information Services Department, Mahindra Rise – Mahindra Construction Equipment as a Management Trainee and as a Mentor at Teach for India (TFI). He has a Masters degree in International Studies from Symbiosis School of International Studies and a BBA-LLB (Hons.). He previously practised as a Criminal Advocate in District and Sessions Court. His research interests include Chinese politics, Private Military Contractors, International Relations, Security Studies and Business Continuity Management. He can be reached on Twitter @tanishk007.