China’s 2027 plan and its implications on India

China’s 2027 plan and its implications on India

By- Nichole Ballawar;

Introduction

As the world undergoes unprecedented changes, China is on the verge of a significant strategic opportunity. According to a communiqué issued at the sixth plenary session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), China has remained loyal to its initial ambition and mission of achieving happiness for Chinese people and rejuvenation for the nation since its inception in 1921. It has united and led Chinese people of all ethnic groups in fighting relentlessly to win national independence and freedom, and subsequently built an affluent and powerful country while remaining faithful to communist values and socialist convictions. Some excerpts from the communiqué also focused on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) modernisation program and China’s national security while it called for preparedness, integration, informationisation and comprehensive military training to defend national sovereignty. The focus is “ensure that the goal for which we have been striving for one hundred years is achieved”. Geostrategist Brahma Chellaney maintains that ‘China needs a multipolar world but a unipolar Asia’ which explains Beijing’s aspirations to achieve broader foreign policy goals to realise what Xi Jinping has called the China Dream, which envisions a return to China’s predominance in Asia. Chinese officials have also promoted the notion of “Asia for Asians”, a nationalistic posturing with a reference to the idea that Asians should settle disputes without the intervention of the US.

With the goal of building a modern military by 2027, China desires to refurbish the military with the capability to defend national sovereignty, safeguard against security threats posed by hegemonism in the western pacific region, and protect overseas development interests. “By 2027, the Chinese military will be able to adequately cope with challenges in the western Pacific area, including Taiwan and the South China Sea, as well as border conflicts between China and India”, according to the report US’s department of Defence 

The 2027 milestone is also a powerful propaganda weapon. In the past, CPC has repeatedly set big goals to coincide with historic milestone anniversaries, most significantly the “two centennial goals” reflected in Xi Jinping’s report to the 19th Party Congress. The first centennial aim is to “create a moderately affluent society in all areas” by 2021, the CPC’s hundredth anniversary. The second is to “create a modern socialist country that is affluent, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious” by 2049, the centennial of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) establishment.

The 2027 targets and its important components

Revealing China’s broader foreign policy objectives, an article titled VIRAL In China: Beijing Will Conquer Taiwan By 2025, India’s Arunachal Pradesh By 2040 has detailed China’s expansionist propensities in the near and long term. The piece argues that China will conquer Taiwan, Arunachal Pradesh, South China Sea, Southern Tibet, Senkaku Islands and Russia by 2060. Although the 2027 target does not alter the timeline for military modernization, it does indicate that the next few years will be critical for China’s military growth plan. Ren Guoqiang, a spokeswoman for the Ministry of National Defense, highlighted the four essential features of the new standard.

First, after achieving basic mechanisation and making significant progress toward informationisation, the focus shifts to combining and accelerating the integration of mechanisation, information technology, and advancements in intelligentization. Intelligentization, or the integration of artificial intelligence and similar technology into military capabilities, has been designated by Xi Jinping as a key component of military modernisation in the future.

Secondly, factors such as accelerating military philosophy, organisational form, military manpower, weapons and equipment modernisation have long been seen as critical. The PLA has already undergone major organisational reforms and force structure modifications under Xi Jinping, which is likely to continue in the future. Thirdly, the quality component is meant to stress the need for resource efficiency to optimise the quality and speed of modernisation. Ren particularly mentions that the globe is experiencing the acceleration of “huge developments unseen in a century,” making military modernization even more critical. Notably, this third component is connected to the fourth component, since attempts to combine economic and security plans aim to improve efficiency in sectors such as research and development.

Promoting the simultaneous strengthening of national security and economic development is the fourth major component. The CPC’s military-civil fusion plan hopes to achieve significant progress. The Military Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy is described by the US Department of Defence as “a state-wide undertaking that tries to fuse economic and social development plans with its security strategies.” Policy implementation encouraging MCF has increased dramatically in recent years as a result of high-level prioritising and is expected to be a focus area in the future. The strategy could also aim to stimulate innovation in crucial areas and deploy dual-use technology for military end-uses.

Implications for India 

India has grown increasingly concerned about its rising power imbalance with China, particularly in light of China’s fast-growing military capabilities and the consequences for the disputed Sino-Indian boundary and the Indian Ocean. Chen Hanghui of the PLA Nanjing Army Command College stated in the official PLA Daily that “the military game of great powers will become more intense” in 2022, and “major powers such as Russia, United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and India have accelerated their military transformation, focusing on key areas to enhance their high-end warfare capabilities.” As a result, the security risks associated with force modernisation of the PLA are manifold. 

First, China’s Western Theatre Command, Xinjiang military district and Tibet military district are responsible for operations along the Sino-Indian border. For years China has built dual-use infrastructure to prepare for offensive and defensive operations along the border in Tibet. This includes north-south and east-west highways and the construction of feeder roads. With force modernisation and improved connectivity, the PLA has the capability to transform stand-offs into conflicts. Since 2015, the PLA has also commissioned modern weaponry and held several drills to attain “improved joint-ness and efficiency.” The Qingtongxia combined arms tactical training base simulates Chinese-occupied terrain in Aksai Chin, allowing for realistic joint training.

Second, the Academy of Military Science’s 2013 Science of Military Strategy and China’s 2015 Defence Whitepaper both call for a transition from “near seas defence” to “near seas defence and far seas protection,” which means safeguarding China’s interests in the Indian and Western Pacific Oceans. In the previous two decades, China’s presence in the Indian Ocean has grown dramatically. In 1999, there was not a single PLA Navy (PLAN) port visit in the Indian Ocean Region. Since 2011, the PLAN has made over 20 port visits every year. The PLAN can sustain 18 ships in the region based on its current military posture. It already has a naval base in Djibouti, and might acquire a few more in the near future. In 2013, a Chinese oceanographic research vessel spent 2-3 months cruising the Indian Ocean, reportedly monitoring the ocean’s hydrological parameters. Researchers estimate that such high levels of mobility in the Indian Ocean over months are for anti-submarine warfare studies, weapon development, and tracking enemy submarines. 

Third, to boost synergy across its space, cyber, and electromagnetic domains, China established the PLA Strategic Support Force in 2015. In simple terms, this force is in charge of China’s information warfare and electronic countermeasures operations, as well as cyber-attack and defence missions and psychological warfare missions.

Last but not least, China’s military forces are quickly developing space and counter-space capabilities. They have become crucial elements of China’s force projection capabilities. During the Galwan standoff with India, China is said to have placed roughly 16 DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile systems along the Xinjiang border. Given the rockets’ attack ranges, India is a likely target.

Apart from these developments, India should be concerned about China’s investments in military technology, big data, drone swarms, and other disruptive and offensive technologies, as well as its military ties with Pakistan. These developments are specifically related to India and have massive strategic and tactical ramifications for India’s border dispute with China.

Conclusion

Henry Kissinger rightly observed that “The Chinese are like compulsive students – for them, no problem is finally solved; every solution is an admission to a new problem.” China’s foreign policy objectives will continue to include provocative actions such as border breaches, a missile development programme, cyber and psychological warfare, as well as power projection capabilities for the near future; therefore, India must mitigate and manage this aggressive behaviour. India and other like-minded powers must acknowledge the dangers posed by the region’s emperor-like regime. The Quad and other minilaterals, particularly trilateral alliances with major strategic partners such as Australia and Japan, have the potential to evolve into military alliances in the future. India must also continue to pursue strategic partnerships in which likeminded partners could work together through regional groupings to promote stability in the region. Collaboration in new domains such as such as health, space, and cyber space along with deepened economic and technological cooperation remains pertinent to address the China challenge.

Nevertheless, India must rely on internal balancing to counter China in the economic sphere as well. If India maintains an annual GDP growth of 8%, it will be a $64-trillion-dollar economy in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms by 2047. Within the same time frame, if China grows at 5% per year, it will have a PPP economy worth $86 trillion. In other words, the current asymmetry will be greatly reduced. Hence, to address Chinese provocations, a judicious use of self-reliance, grounded in self-assurance, in which a confident India engages the world without fear, forms alliances with like-minded countries, and effectively leverages democracy and a skilled workforce is a necessity.

 

Nichole Ballawar is currently working as a Research Associate at the Organisation for Research on China and Asia (ORCA). Formerly, he has worked with the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS) as a Research Associate and  Janes as a Defence Analyst. He has also worked with the Ministry of External Affairs as a China Research assistant and United Nations Development Program as an Intern. He worked with organisations like NIICE, The Diplomatist, 9dashline etc. and published various research papers. He is an author of various articles related to China, Nuclear non-proliferation and arms control. He is also a visiting faculty at the Government Law College, Nagpur. 

Australia and ASEAN: New Challenges to Cooperation

Australia and ASEAN: New Challenges to Cooperation

By – Artyom Garin;

Geostrategic expanse of the Indian and Pacific Oceans into the Indo-Pacific space and the emergence of Quad, designed to balance China, brought the importance of ASEAN to a completely new level. Southeast Asia has become an especially important part in the diplomacy of China, the United States and other actors in the region. Australia is also no exception and is trying to intensify the pace of its involvement in Southeast Asia. However, Canberra’s efforts are accompanied by mixed success, especially due to a change in its foreign policy strategy.

Australia and Quad’s Current Approach to ASEAN

With the development of the United States’, Japan’s and Australia’s visions of the Indo-Pacific, academic discourse has been filled with theses that the ASEAN countries need Quad support to counter the growing power — the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Indeed, Beijing is not standing still. The PRC strengths its defence capabilities, economic and humanitarian agenda in the region, but militarization is far from being unilateral.

The fact is that the politicized nature of this concept itself contributes to the militarization of the Indo-Pacific. For example, everyone knows that ASEAN is trying to stop any outbreaks of instability in Southeast Asia and has come a long way to move beyond from the Cold War thinking. However, during the Annual U.S.—ASEAN Summit, the US Navy and Japan Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) decided to conduct exercises in the South China Sea. They included the US aircraft carrier strike group and Japanese helicopter destroyer. As a result, the summit did not appear in most flattering light from the conflict mitigation. Rather, on the contrary.

The ASEAN countries are trying to balance between the United States and China, to benefit from the development of the region, in order to also withstand the consequences of the pandemic. The Association has also published an outlook on the Indo-Pacific, but it is clearly not interested in politicizing this issue, as well as in choosing between the United States and China. This is also confirmed by the Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Hsien Loong’s quote,  “Countries in the region want to have good relations with both, the US and China, and do not wish to take sides”.

One must admire Australia’s steps to strengthen relations with ASEAN during the pandemic, starting from the humanitarian agenda. In 2020, Canberra presented a new strategy ‘Partnerships for Recovery: Australia’s COVID-19 Development Response’, which focuses on the aid to the South Pacific countries, Timor-Leste and Southeast Asia in healthcare and economy.

However, further attempts to politicize cooperation outweighed quite promising strategy. Some experts have already noticed Australia’s statements related to the ‘China threat’ during bilateral meetings with the diplomats of some ASEAN countries. It put the Australia’s partners from Southeast Asia in an awkward position. According to Australia’s PM Scott Morrison, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam are close friends for Australia. However, the aggravation of Australia-China relations can only distance Canberra from ASEAN members.

The AUKUS Factor in Australia-ASEAN Relations

Another step towards ‘ensuring stability’ in the region was the establishment of AUKUS trilateral alliance, which includes Australia, the U.S. and the UK. According to the statements, it is aimed at deepening defence and tech cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. A lot has already been said about AUKUS, so it is better to focus here on the ASEAN members’ perception of the new alliance.

The AUKUS parties assure that it is not directed against any power. However, the nature of this alliance is based on the rivalry between the United States and China. Everyone understands this, including experts, politicians and ordinary observers. Of course, Australia can get new opportunities from AUKUS to strengthen its defence capability. The experts from the Fifth Continent have long been discussing the need of nuclear fleet. However, it will not appear in Australia soon, and it will require great technological, infrastructural and financial efforts.

Nevertheless, the establishment of AUKUS has already influenced the diplomacy. It showed that Australia can cancel previous agreements. Regardless of the statements, the countries will keep this in mind when building further cooperation with Australia – and even the US.

Nuclear submarines are very useful for defence. In the straits between the Pacific Island countries (PICs), Australia can use them imperceptibly, since PICs do not have high-tech capabilities to detect submarines. But potential presence of the Australia’s submarines in Southeast Asia may raise questions.

AUKUS has made Australia a bridgehead for military power projection against the PRC. It is important to remember that the US won’t provide technology for nothing. Probably the price is Australia’s support for the rivalry against the rise of China in the region. The potential permission for Australia’s submarines to access the straits from Indonesia, as the closest ASEAN member, would mean its support for anti-Chinese actions. But the Indonesian authorities are clearly not interested in aggravating relations with China.

Australian diplomats have been working for decades to strengthen ties with Southeast Asia. They have made considerable efforts to show that Australia is one of the regional actors that is ready to cooperate with Asian countries with common future. As a result, common grounds that were established with great difficulty are being threatened in the 21st century. As Australia-China relations get worse, the ASEAN members could temporarily pull away from Canberra.

Malaysia and Indonesia have already expressed concerns about another nuclear submarine fleet. The ASEAN members believe that this makes the region more conflict-prone, not safe. This makes the countries of Southeast Asia think more about the consequences during the dialogue with Australia, which is sharply opposed to China.

Australia has a strong school of diplomacy and analysis in international relations. It’s probably on this basis that Prime Minister Scott Morrison was advised to reassure the ASEAN countries through the media that Canberra doesn’t want to aggravate the situation in the region. It’s not yet known whether his interview helped to convince the leaders from Southeast Asia.

Economy and Trade as a More Productive Way to Ensure Regional Stability

The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Australia and ASEAN could rectify the situation. But it will be difficult to get statements of friendship from one of the concrete Southeast Asian countries in the recent conditions.

The quote of the Director-General of the Department of Asian Affairs of the Foreign Ministry of China, Liu Jinsong, seemed notable. He said: “Whenever there is crisis or problem in the region, Australia looks to the West for friends, not the East. Australia tried to persuade ASEAN countries to jointly target China, but ASEAN countries won’t do it”. This accurately characterizes the current state of affairs. Notably, Asia accounts for 65,2% of Australia’s bilateral trade. 

During the pandemic era, strengthening economic and humanitarian cooperation with ASEAN members would help Australia gain diplomatic benefits. Southeast Asia needs a favorable environment for developing trade, supply chains, and healthcare. Assertive military agenda is unlikely to find a positive response, especially during the global crisis.

According to forecasts, ASEAN members’ total GDP will grow rapidly by 2050. For example, Indonesia may probably become the 4th largest economy in the world. On the contrary, the Australian economy may decrease. In order to maintain economic growth in the future, Canberra certainly needs to strengthen relations with ASEAN and right now, while the good image of Australia as a reliable economic partner that possesses technology and high-quality goods is still alive.

Recently, Quad has intensified its infrastructure rivalry with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). For this purpose, the parties will certainly combine their initiatives — Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (Japan), Blue Dot Network — the U.S., or Pacific Step-Up (Australia). Together, their capital exceeds $100 billion. For now, India wisely decided to abstain from joining and took a careful position on this issue.

Participation in the Quad have spurred Australia to action. In June 2021, together with Germany and Switzerland, it committed to provide about US$13 million to the Mekong River Commission for Sustainable Development. We may see more Canberra’s activity in Southeast Asia, but it is still more focused on strengthening its positions in the South Pacific. Besides, as in other areas, the perception of Quad infrastructure initiatives by Southeast Asian countries will still be restrained.

They will not choose political agenda instead of economic well-being. After all, Australia, even together with the United States, will not be able to compensate for the economic costs in case of the potential aggravation of relations between ASEAN and Beijing.

Conclusion

With extensive diplomatic experience, ASEAN is clearly aware of the scale of China’s rise and the US plans to counter it. The countries of Southeast Asia clearly don’t want to become part of this rivalry. They are already facing many challenges, including the impact of the global crisis, the pandemic, the current situation in Myanmar and so on.

The antagonization of Australia against China will also lead to distancing of ASEAN from Canberra. To earn trust in the region, Australia needs to take a different strategy. It’s necessary to reinforce the mutual dialogue on the basics of cooperation for the economic and humanitarian benefits. In the rivalry for ASEAN’s favour, the party that can propose more mutual interests and opportunities for cooperation will certainly win.

Of course, Vietnam, Indonesia and other ASEAN members will continue to build up their defence potential and host politicians from China, the United States, Australia and other countries. However, in the short and medium term, ASEAN will prefer to use the strategy of careful and prudent balancing.

Artyom Garin is a Research Assistant of the Center for Southeast Asia, Australia and Oceania at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He is interested in multilateralism in the Indo-Pacific, as well as in Australia-China relations. His research interests also include defence and aid policies of Australia, as well as politics and history of the Pacific Island countries.