India’s Global Role during its G20 Presidency

India’s Global Role during its G20 Presidency

India’s Global Role during its G20 Presidency

By — Ratish Mehta;

The 2022 Grouping of 20 (G20) Summit took place against the backdrop of turbulent global challenges. At the meeting in Bali, Indonesia, the members collectively concluded to confront the global challenges posed to energy and food security, amongst other measures. The Russian-Ukraine war also saw greater emphasis by member nations and found its way into the joint statement made by leaders at the end of the summit.

China’s ‘New Era’ through the lens of 20th Party Congress Work Report

China’s ‘New Era’ through the lens of 20th Party Congress Work Report

China’s ‘New Era’ through the lens of 20th Party Congress Work Report

By — Rahul Karan Reddy and Omkar Bhole;

            Xi Jinping’s opening speech at the 20th Party Congress highlighted key achievements and challenges during the tenure of the 19th Party Congress. In combination with the detailed work report, Xi also revealed key drivers of China’s behaviour for the next few years. His speech at the 20th Party Congress has struck a different tone from the one he delivered at the 19th Party Congress.

The Return of Technocracy in CPC’s Elite Politics

The Return of Technocracy in CPC’s Elite Politics

The Return of Technocracy in CPC’s Elite Politics

By — Rahul Karan Reddy;

Technocrats are set to re-emerge as a defining feature of China’s top leadership in Xi Jinping’s third term. As per the (re)emerging trend of  “red and expert” (you hong you zhuan) from the Mao era, Party members with an education in STEM fields or social sciences, work experience in the private sector or State-owned enterprises (SOEs), sufficient provincial or national-level administrative experience, and a record of loyalty to the Party ‘core’ stand a stronger chance of making it to the 20th Central Committee (CC).

<strong>Chinese Domestic Responses to Pelosi’s Taiwan Visit</strong>

Chinese Domestic Responses to Pelosi’s Taiwan Visit

Chinese Domestic Responses to Pelosi’s Taiwan Visit

The Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan on 2nd August as a part of her East Asia tour. Amid several speculations as well as Xi Jinping’s stern warning to Biden about not ‘playing with fire’ over Taiwan, Pelosi did become the 1st high-profile U.S. Official to visit Taiwan after nearly 25 years.

Change is Required in Japan Security Policy

Change is Required in Japan Security Policy

Change is Required in Japan Security Policy

By – Oktay Degirmenci;

Following the visit of the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi, the highest-ranking US official to visit Taiwan in 25 years on August 2; China’s launch of missiles into waters less than 160 kilometers from Japan on August 4 as part of military exercises will likely increase Japanese public support for the country’s defensive military buildup.

Today Ukraine, Tomorrow Taiwan?

Today Ukraine, Tomorrow Taiwan?

Taiwan is surrounded by authoritarian neighbours, as is Ukraine. Taiwan is also militarily threatened by China, its larger neighbour. Hence, Taiwan is apprehensive about falling into the same trap as Ukraine. China has publicly supported Russia’s war on Ukraine. Beijing considers Taiwan to be an integral part of China and views the matter

Understanding China’s Long-Term Strategic Vision

Understanding China’s Long-Term Strategic Vision

By – Neeraj Singh MANHAS;

Prior to the 20th Party Congress (PC) of the Communist Party of China (CPC) due later this year, the public domain preparatory materials provide a very clear image of future drives, motivations, and strategic perceptions. At least four key documents come to mind in this context. These include:

The Historical Resolution introduced on 11/11/2021. According to the official description of the meeting’s resolution, China has “made historic achievements and undergone a historic transformation” under Xi’s leadership. It lauded Xi, Mao, and Deng for guiding the country through “the momentous shift from standing up and becoming affluent to becoming strong.”
The Communiqué of the 6th Plenum of the 19th CPC Central Committee in 11/11/2021. The Central Committee heard and discussed the report on the work of the Political Bureau, which was presented by Xi Jinping on behalf of the Political Bureau. It also considered and adopted the Resolution on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century and the Resolution on the Convocation of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.
The Joint Statement on ‘International Relations Entering a New Era and Global Sustainable Development’ of 04/02/2022 between Russia and China. At the invitation of President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir V. Putin visited China. The Heads of State held talks in Beijing and took part in the opening ceremony of the XXIV Olympic Winter Games.
The article published by Politburo Member Yang Jiezhi in the People’s Daily on 16/05/22. The article elaborated on how China, under the guidance of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, made progress this year by hosting major events such as the Winter Olympic Games, making strides in high-quality development and bolstering interactions with the rest of the world.
Under President Xi Jinping [XJP], while mechanisms have changed, the overall strategy and objectives of China’s foreign and security policy on safeguarding national independence, state sovereignty, creating an international environment favourable to its reform, opening and modernisation efforts, as well as maintaining world peace and promoting common development have remained consistent. This is the most important point to emphasise. The fundamental reasons for this include the ongoing successful layer-by-layer implementation of Deng Xiaoping’s Four Modernisations introduced in 1978; which facilitate opening to the world, with the West in particular providing positive enablement; the successful manipulation of international political, financial, and trade institutions; and China’s ability to leverage virtually unhindered technology transfers.

Clearly, CPC’s primary objective is the maintenance of its monopoly on power in China, the maintenance of domestic political stability, and the restoration of China to its self-assessed historical grandeur as the most important state and nation in the world. Similar to the “centre of the world” perspective.

Fulfilment of the targets set for 2020-2035 are an essential requirement to achieve these objectives, which once achieved would mean that by 2049, China expects to become a global leader in terms of comprehensive national strength and international influence, and to stand taller and prouder among the nations of the world.

The XJP era is also termed as “the New Era“, with each of the six phases, Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Theory of Three Represents, the Scientific Outlook on Development, and Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era; outlined in the Historical Resolution and the Sixth Plenum Communiqué adding a ‘new’ dimension to the development of the “new” China founded in October 1949.

The CPC already asserts that the Chinese nation stands tall and resolute in the East, wields a profound influence on the course of world history, and has become a significant force pushing human progress and development. China argues that its paradigm of growth (political, economic, and social) has developed a new model for human progress and widened the avenues for developing nations to achieve modernization.

China’s leadership is well aware that its continued rise would not be unchallenged for a variety of reasons. Consequently, the CPC’s assessment of problems is equally sharp, and seven characteristics stand out in particular:

First, as corruption is recognised as the greatest threat to the Party’s long-term control, the CPC cannot afford to lose this crucial political battle.

Second, the traditional growth model cannot be sustained as quality and innovation-driven growth is required, which necessitates globalisation. However, it also permits the outside world to impose hurdles.

Third, the necessity for self-reliance in science and technology as a strategic pillar for China’s development, while ensuring open access to technology and international markets in the interim.

Fourth, to secure the security of food, energy, and resources. [The emphasis on food security and rural revitalization is particularly pertinent, since it shows a potentially exploitable weakness in a crucial area.]

Fifth, can China continue to capitalise on its enormous market? Conditions must be established for this to occur.

Sixth, to ensure that China’s armed forces continue to protect the CPC’s power monopoly and China’s security and development interests. Significant progress has been achieved in modernising the PLA and revising its doctrines to meet the demands of technology-based warfare in the twenty-first century. This stems from the demand that the CPC’s primary priority be national security. Likewise, self-defined territorial integrity is essential. This correlates to China’s demand for universal, comprehensive, and indivisible security, especially in the current difficult context. This should be “fair” in the Asia-Pacific setting as well. This loaded language is used to resist the development of the Indo-Pacific architecture and the QUAD in order to defend China’s interests in the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean.

And seventh, despite its immense achievements, China is still, in its own estimation, the largest developing country in the world, with the greatest dilemma facing its society being between unplanned and inadequate development and the people’s ever-increasing desire for a better living. [In effect, a degree of accountability to the Chinese people is acknowledged.]

Clearly, security and development are China’s top two concerns. Yang Jiezhi, the high-ranking Chinese politician and diplomat, believes China has retained its initiative and advantageous position in the broader strategic framework, and China is confident in its ability to protect its sovereignty, security, and development interests.

In spite of Yang’s assurance, China assumes that substantial measures are currently underway to destroy security and stability in China’s periphery as well as to undermine China’s core and major interests. In response, XJP launched his new Global Security Initiative (GSI) on April 21, 2022 at the Boao Forum. This establishes security as the prerequisite for progress. Prior to September 2021, XJP presented his Global Development Initiative (GDI) at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The GDI and GSI are a “new” endeavour to meet and overcome the issues China faces in the significantly altered regional and worldwide environment of the present day. Several of these modifications were initiated by China.

The combined effects of the GDI and GSI require additional research. Other than CPC rule, Yang argues that China possesses five strategic factors that favour its future, including a firm foundation established by China’s persistent and rapid development, long-term and enduring stability, and a tremendous drive that gives China confidence and strength. (It is notable that US Secretary of State Blinken’s May 26, 2022 address on the US Administration’s approach to the China problem follows a similar line of thought.)

China will continue to prioritise coordinating development and security, protecting its territorial integrity as it defines it, preventing regime change and containment, and expanding its regional and international network of alliances. The GSI will be utilised here. China will lead the reform and development of the global governance system in order to achieve a status quo plus position and strengthen trade, investment liberalisation, and facilitation processes by utilising the GDI framework correctly. Given its external dependence in the economic, energy, and scientific fields, the latter is crucial. China’s efforts to combat climate change and exploit cyberspace, outer space, the Polar regions, and the Deep Seas will not falter or waver. Neither will the absolute concentration on strengthening, modernising, and technologically advancing the PLA under Party rule.

China has become a powerful entity over the course of the last four decades or more, with an unmistakable desire to be at the centre of a newly minted “community of common destiny” (with China at the centre), to which end it has announced and is implementing a series of initiatives, including the BRI processes, trading arrangements, the GDI, and now the GSI. This is supported by the PLA, the world’s third-most powerful military force.

The current superpowers and those who are unimpressed by China’s protestations, enticements, and rhetoric of principles that it does not adhere to have been steadily pushing back against Chinese actions and ambitions. In addition to the COVID-19 experience of countries with China, its ongoing predatory actions in its neighbourhood and its strengthened alliance with Russia just before the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 have given the pushback more momentum.

China now fears technological and commercial denial along with containment. Its responses to the growing Indo-Pacific framework, the QUAD, and now the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework [IPEF] reveal a degree of anxiety. China is plainly frightened, but when will it yield? The result of the Ukraine-Russia conflict may provide some insight. But can and will Xi Jinping make course adjustments prior to the 20th Party Congress? It is prudent not to bank on it; course adjustments, if they occur, are more likely to be gradual than abrupt.

Neeraj Singh MANHAS is a Director of Research, Indo-Pacific Consortium, at Raisina House, New Delhi. He has authored four books under his name and has various research interests covering India-China in the Indian Ocean, India’s maritime securities, and Indo-Pacific studies. His writings have appeared in The Daily Guardian, The Hindu Business Line, China-India brief (National University of Singapore), The Diplomatist, Chanakya Forum, and The Rise, among other online platforms.


Strongman Politics and Xi Jinping

Strongman Politics and Xi Jinping

By – Brijeshwar Dahiya;

A strongman is an authoritarian political leader, whose rule according to political scientists Brian Lai and Dan Slater (2006), is characterized by an autocratic dictatorship by a leader as opposed to juntas or oligarchic dictatorships. Strongmen seek to have complete control over the political system of a country and employ various tactics including populism to justify and garner support for their rule. Since his accession to power in 2012, Xi Jinping has employed all the tactics of strongman politics to assert his control, initially over the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and gradually, over the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 

In 2012, Xi by attaining powerful positions of general secretary of the CCP and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), informally became the paramount leader of the PRC. After assuming power, Xi went on to consolidate his position within the CCP, he introduced various measures to enforce discipline among the cadres. He employed populist measures to destroy any kind of dissent and garnered support for his authoritarian policies. Xi’s far-reaching anti-corruption campaign targeted his political rivals and retired several senior leaders of the CCP. The anti-graft campaign became Xi’s hallmark as a tough leader. 

Under Xi Jinping’s rule observers have noted an increase in human rights violations of the regime’s critics, particularly in autonomous and ethnic minority regions, including mass surveillance and internment of Uyghur Muslims in detention camps in Xinjiang. Although the PRC, since its foundation, has been engaged in censorship and mass surveillance of its population, the practice has become widespread under Xi’s rule. His administration is also systematically destroying Hong Kong’s autonomy under “One Country Two Systems”, protests against Xi’s policies in Hong Kong have been brutally crushed. He has not only projected himself as a strong leader domestically but on the global stage as well. 

Under Xi Jinping, the PRC has followed a more assertive foreign policy. China has become more aggressive and sometimes violent in asserting its territorial claims on its neighbours like India, Japan and Southeast Asian countries. Incursions in Taiwanese airspace have increased manifold under Xi’s rule, especially in 2020-21 when Taiwan reported 969 incursions into its Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). The PRC government under Xi has been alarmingly vocal about the option of using force to occupy Taiwan if “peaceful efforts” fail. 

Xi Jinping has successfully created a personality cult around him. Through these efforts, Xi Jinping has completely centralized power under him. Though there are scholars who argue that this shift from collective leadership, as noted since Deng Xiaoping’s era, to strongman rule is not the result of Xi Jinping’s individual personality but a collective response of the party’s elite to the CCP regime’s weakness. Since, the period marking Deng Xiaoping’s rule till Xi Jinping’s witnessed openness in the PRC, leading to challenges to the CCP’s authority. Nevertheless, Xi has become the paramount leader of the People’s Republic of China and through his strongman politics, he has changed the politics of the PRC.

Consolidation of Power

Xi Jinping has become the most powerful leader of the PRC since Mao Zedong. Along with being the general secretary of the CCP and the chairman of the CMC, Xi became President of the PRC in 2013. Since becoming the top leader, he has shifted from the collective leadership model to the concentration of power in his hands. He created several “working groups” and “Central Leading Groups”, rendering the existing institutions and several top-ranking leaders completely powerless. Xi believed that the CCP had become corrupt and wasteful, which posed the greatest challenge to the stability of the PRC. The motive behind the formation of such groups is to integrate all the power and to increase the efficiency of administration.

The most influential group that Xi himself heads include “Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms”, which has undermined the power held by the State Council and Premier Li Keqiang. The newly established “Central Leading Group for Internet Security and Informatization” and “National Security Commission of the CCP”, allow Xi to control the security infrastructure and have helped him shape PRC into a panopticon state. In 2018, the National People’s Congress (NPC) amended the constitution which removed the term limits of the President and the Vice President’s tenure, a convention followed since the adoption of the 1982 constitution. This consolidated Xi Jinping’s position in the PRC and made him the paramount leader of China 

After consolidating power, he proceeded toward the elimination of opposition. Corruption has been rampant in China, especially since the reforms of 1978. At the 18th Central Committee of the CCP in 2012, while handing over power to Xi Jinping, the outgoing President Hu Jintao warned about the “enemy within” while cautioning about the danger that corruption poses to the stability of the CCP. Xi Jinping, a few months after being elected at the same 18th Party Congress, listed out his “eight-point guide”, laying down the policies for curbing corruption and maintaining discipline among the party officials. He launched his campaign by promising to take out “tigers and flies”, pointing toward high-ranking and low-ranking party officials. 

In the initial three years, the Central Committee for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and the National Supervision Commission (NSC), the bodies responsible for curbing corruption in China, investigated and charged more than 500 senior officials of the party. This brought the downfall of many CMC and Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) officials like Bo Xilai, who was Party Secretary of Chongqing and many others like him. Bo Xilai’s case attracted much attention because of the prevalent rumours pertaining to a coup led by him against Xi Jinping. Though the campaign has been popular within China, international human rights organisations including Amnesty International have described institutions like National Supervision Commission (NSC) which lack accountability, as a threat to human rights. The anti-corruption campaign has been used by Xi Jinping and his aides to purge any political opponents who can challenge his power. The political purge, as claimed by critics, is on a scale unseen since Mao Zedong’s time. 

Since 2012, internet censorship has increased considerably in China. After coming to power, shaping the narrative and controlling the rhetoric has been a top priority for Xi Jinping. The party’s General Office circulated “Document No. 9” in 2013 which warned the party cadres against the seven dangerous western values, which included constitutional democracy, universal values, civil society, neoliberalism, media independence, historical nihilism, and challenging the Chinese style of socialism. Xi Jinping’s regime has imposed stringent restrictions on the use of the internet, invoking “internet sovereignty”, China has censored the use of international platforms like Google, Facebook, and Wikipedia.

In 2013, the Chinese government passed a law prohibiting bloggers from sharing ‘defamatory’ content on popular Chinese social media platforms like Weibo and WeChat, a violation of which will invite imprisonment for three years. By 2018, the Virtual Private Networks (VPN) of individuals were blocked by telecommunication carriers on the orders of the Chinese government. In 2018, the Disney movie Christopher Robin was not allowed to release in China following the comparisons between the animated character Winnie the Pooh and Xi Jinping on popular social media platforms, furthermore, any such social media post comparing China’s paramount leader with the character on Chinese social media were censored by the Chinese authorities. 

Under Xi Jinping, the human rights status quo has worsened in China, with increased attacks on activists, lawyers, and journalists. Hundreds of activists have been arrested, including prominent activist Xu Zhiyong of the New Citizens Movement. The CCP has always considered religion as a threat to its authority; they have suppressed the religious freedom of Tibetans and the Uyghurs. One of the methods used by Xi Jinping’s regime is either to destroy the religious monuments or by putting banners of Xi Jinping in Uyghur mosques and in Tibetan monasteries. Hundreds of Tibetan Buddhist monasteries have been attacked like the Larung Gar in 2017. After terror attacks in Xinjiang, the Chinese government started the ‘People’s War on Terror’, about a million Uyghurs have been put in internment camps, which the Chinese government terms as “education camps” to assimilate them with the Han Chinese.

Assertive Foreign Policy

Since 2012, China has followed a more assertive foreign policy, a clear shift from Deng Xiaoping’s “bide your time” to a more forward “wolf warrior” diplomacy. China has increased its military budget enormously to $229.5 billion, second only to the US, and is increasing every year at a rate of 7.1%. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is today the world’s largest navy in terms of the number of vessels. With the largest armada at its disposal, the PLAN is using increasing muscle, sometimes violently, while pursuing the PRC’s interests in the East China Sea and in the South China Sea. Clashes have increased between the Japanese navy and the PLAN over the Senkaku Islands, which both China and Japan claim. In the South China Sea’s Spratly, Paracel islands and other maritime claims which fall into the hypothetically drawn Nine Dash line conflicts have increased between the PLAN and the Southeast Asian countries. Xi Jinping on a number of occasions has warned the rival claimants and has held that China’s territorial sovereignty will not be compromised. 

Similarly, China under Xi Jinping has shown Brinkmanship in Ladakh without any provocation from the Indian side despite the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. On the question of investigating the origins of Covid-19, Xi Jinping has openly ordered Chinese diplomats to answer with the hawkish “wolf warrior diplomacy”. Owing to this belligerent form of diplomacy and foreign policies, China under Xi Jinping has deteriorated its relations with major powers including Australia which is currently engaged in a trade war with China. Engaged in a global competition with the US, Xi Jinping unveiled his flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a global infrastructure development strategy in 2013. Although 146 countries have signed to join this initiative as claimed by China, there are allegations of debt-trap diplomacy and neo-colonialism against the PRC. 

Cult of Personality

Xi Jinping’s both domestic and foreign policies have built his image as that of a strongman. In 2021, the CCP passed its third most important resolution since its foundation which declared Xi Jinping’s ideology as the “essence of the Chinese culture” effectively putting him alongside Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping in the Chinese cultural and political psyche. Passing such major resolutions, Xi Jinping has built a cult of personality around him. Books, movies, places, and slogans have concretized his place in the popular imagination of Chinese people. Since becoming the paramount leader, Xi Jinping has been called Xi Dada (Uncle Xi) and places connected to Xi Jinping’s life have been turned into shrines by the CCP’s propaganda machinery. All this captures and consolidates the image of a ‘charismatic leader’ which is characteristic of a strongman, which Xi Jinping undeniably is. But Xi’s further tightening of control over the CCP and the Chinese people is harming China’s national interests. His war against the big tech transnational companies in China is forcing both foreign and domestic investors to look for alternative options for investment. His “Zero-Covid” policy has been a disaster for the Chinese economy. As he further concentrates more power at the 20th Party Congress, the risk of alienating people grows, which poses a greater challenge to the PRC’s stability and prosperity.

Brijeshwar Dahiya did his Masters in International Relations and Area Studies with a focus on China from School of International Relations (SIS), JNU. He has written on Chinese Communist Party’s politics and on People’s Liberation Army’s role in Chinese foreign policy. He can be reached @BrijeshwarDahi2 on Twitter.

The Importance of Leading Small Groups and Formulation of Foreign Policy in China

The Importance of Leading Small Groups and Formulation of Foreign Policy in China

By – Albin Thomas;

The foreign policy formulation in China is entirely different, particularly from western and democratic countries. Numerous actors and decision-makers are involved in this process, and most of the time, the role of the foreign affairs minister is negligible and minuscule compared to other countries. Leading Small Groups (LSGs) are unique to Chinese foreign policymaking and have a significant role. The LSGs function as a mechanism to incorporate different government and party functionaries to implement their interests and opinions to government machinery. The LSG’s primary function is ministerial coordination and make consensus among government, party and People’s Liberation Army (PLA) systems. The formulation and its work come from Chapter IX of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China. The current regime under Xi Jinping made some critical changes regarding foreign policy formulation and implementation. He created the Central Foreign Affairs Commission in 2018 to formulate the foreign policy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs comes under the purview of the newly established Central Foreign Affairs Commission for formulating and implementing foreign policy. The Central Foreign Affairs Commission is currently chaired by Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) General Secretary and President Xi Jinping, and Premier Li Keqiang as its deputy leader. This structural change under Xi Jinping will strengthen the role of the CCP in China’s foreign policymaking, sidelining the government agencies in charge of foreign policy, and concentrating more power in his hands.

Leading Small Groups and their Significance in Chinese Internal Politics

 Leading Small Groups (LSGs) helps in the policy formulation and coordination among the party, government and military. They are subordinate to the party secretariat and report to the politburo and standing committee. Most of the information regarding the small leading groups is not available to the public domain largely. It was only one time the PRC media listed the current members of any of these LSGs. In 2003, the PRC controlled Hong Kong newspaper Wen Wei Po published a complete members list of the Central Committee Taiwan Work Leading Small Group. It was first created in 1958, and it considerably influenced the policymaking of different departments. The primary function of LSGs is to control the fragmentation and fraction within the party and government. The influence of Small Groups in Chinese politics is well noted from Mao’s times itself. The leading Small Groups played significant roles in all the historical incidents in China, especially with the cultural revolution and economic reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping.

The number and the role of leading small groups increased in the late 1970s. There were 39 SLGs known to the outside world in 2015 and within these, 21 worked under the government’s State Council and 18 under the Central Communist Party of China (CCP). The Comprehensively Deepening Reform Leading Small Group and Cybersecurity and Information SLG established by Xi Jinping in 2013 are newly established central CCP Small Leading Groups. Xi Jinping has chaired both the SLGs since their establishment. All other Leading Small Groups are headed by a Politburo member, the premier, a vice premier, or a state councillor. In most cases, the President of China chairs the key Small Leading Groups. In the case of Xi Jinping, he chairs the CCP Finance and Economy LSG, Foreign Affairs LSG, and Taiwan Affairs LSG. Unlike his predecessors, Xi Jinping directly controls the LSGs related to foreign policies and uses these LSGs for his ambitious projects and assertive foreign policy. But still some of the key Leading Small Groups are headed by the party politburo members and the State Council members related to their official responsibilities. For example, the propaganda and ideology LSG is headed by Liu Yunshan, and ten LSGs related to the economy are headed by Zhang Gaoli, Particularly the One Belt, One Road initiatives. 

Leading Small Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation

It is complicated to understand the role of Leading Small Groups in foreign policy formulation. Seven important Leading Small Groups work to formulate foreign policy or try to find a collective decision and avoid conflicts with different groups. The Leading Small Groups related to foreign policy are indicated in Table 1. Before 2018, the Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALG) was a commission associated with the Communist Party of China (CCP) that formulated and discussed matters related to foreign policies. In 2018, Xi Jinping created the Central Foreign Affairs Commission (FAC) and scrapped FALG. The FAC replaced FALG, and it became a substantial body for the foreign policy formulation since its origin. President Xi Jinping currently chairs the FAC, and premier Li Keqiang is deputy leader of the same. The membership includes CCP politburo members Yang Jiechi, foreign minister Wang Yi, and some selected people from CCP Politburo and government. The Foreign Affairs Commission generally collects different analysis views of the various departments and bureaucracies related to foreign affairs. FAC tries to avoid conflict by bringing all the departments together and making concise decisions. It is also alleged that the formation of FAS leads to more power concentration in the hands of Xi Jinping respective of foreign affairs.

Table 1: Leading Small Groups related to Foreign Policy

Leading Small GroupsChaired byMembers
Foreign Affairs CLGSGeneral Secretary/PremierVice Premier,State Councilor, Full membership is not available. 
State SecurityGeneral SecretaryPBSC members in charge of State security and public security affairs.Senior military intelligence officer.Representatives from state council officers on Taiwan affairs and Hong Kong and Macao affairs.
Overseas PropagandaCurrent leader Wang Huning. Heads of the party’s Propaganda and United Front Work department and the leaders of the party central news office, Xinhua, People’s Daily, and the ministry of culture  
TaiwanGeneral Secretary PBSC members on Taiwan, The state council Taiwan affairs office. The PLA general staff’s intelligence department. 
HK and MNo Information availableNo Information available
Finance and EconomicsGeneral secretary/ PremierNo Information available
EnergyPremierNo Information available

The role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not change under the Xi Jinping regime also. It is mainly responsible for the day-to-day work. It represents the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the international arena and takes several diplomatic decisions. Different think tanks under the government of the PRC and CCP help the ministry of foreign affairs in this process.

Xi Jinping and Concentration of Power

The supreme leadership plays a significant role in all the critical matters, particularly foreign and security policy decision-making in China. Xi Jinping has been general Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Chairman of the Central Military Commission since 2012, and President of the PRC since 2013. He has an inalienable and pre-eminent role in decision making like Mao, Deng and Jiang Zemin. Former President Hu Jintao did not enjoy tremendous power compared to his predecessors and the current President Xi Jinping. At the time of Hu Jintao, more actors had involved in decision-making, and decentralisation of power happened through LSGs. When Xi Jinping became the President of the PRC, he tried to concentrate more power and decision-making in his hands. He also has chaired several LSGs like the CCP Finance and Economy LSG, Foreign Affairs LSG, and Taiwan affairs LSG since 2012.

Xi Jinping became more active and visible on the international stage, and he introduced several foreign policy concepts like major country diplomacy and a community of shared futures. Domestically, he created new institutions involved in the foreign and security decision-making and managed all of them himself. In 2013, Xi Jinping created the National Security Commission (NSC), and he has chaired the NSC since then. The NSC particularly aims to deal with domestic security issues, but it also has some international responsibilities like border control and counterterrorism. In the same year, he created two more LSGs: they are the Comprehensive Deepening Reform Leading Small Group and the Cybersecurity and Information LSG. He has been chairing both SLGs since their establishment. 


It is not easy to closely analyse the PRC’s internal structure and policy formulations due to its opaque nature. However, it is visible that LSGs have a notable role in the foreign policy formulations in China. President Xi Jinping tries to establish his dominance in foreign and security decision making by concentrating his influence on the LSGs. Xi Jinping introduced some structural changes in the formulation of foreign policy especially related to LSGs. He established small leading groups for deepening reforms after he became the president of the PRC. The establishment of the LSGs by Xi Jinping is viewed as a symptom of centralization and concentration of power, and indicates his emphasis on “top-level design”.  The LSGs also help to overcome the governance issues of the Party-state, and coordinate different segments in bureaucracies, government and CCP in policy-making processes. 

Xi Jinping introduced the Central Foreign Affairs Commission (FAC) in 2018 by replacing the Central Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALG). FAC became the paramount agency related to foreign affairs after its establishment. There are seven Leading Small Groups related to foreign affairs currently active in the PRC, and each has a significant role in foreign policy. The precise details about LSG’s membership and meetings are unavailable to the general public and the international media. The participation of Leading Small Groups in foreign affairs is well noted and tremendous in nature. Foreign affairs involve the participation of different departments, and LSGs play a significant role in coordination and concise decision-making among these departments. 

Albin Thomas is a research scholar at the Centre for East Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), India. He is doing research on “Economic Diplomacy of China under Xi Jinping”. He has published an article for Australian Institute of International Affairs. He is having keen interest in Chinese foreign policy, foreign policy of Xi Jinping, economic diplomacy, cross-strait relations. He can be contacted at, and reached @albinthomas_ on Twitter.