ROOT AND STEM

Reaching into the depths of the Party-State hierarchy, discipline inspection agencies in China are spreading out in search of “micro-corruption” in villages. According to one definition, micro-corruption is the rent-seeking behaviour of officials and cadres at the grassroots level, facilitated by the misuse of public power in the domains of grassroots governance and people’s livelihoods, for personal gain or which causes losses to public interests. The hunt for corrupt grassroots level officials is a marked turn in the meandering anti-corruption campaign underway since 2013. Just as the fall of “tigers” like Qin Gang and Miao Hua has profound implications for elite politics, the search for “flies” is equally significant for different reasons. It signals an expansion and intensification of the anti-corruption campaign into new and uncharted territory, and contends with dynamics of grassroots administration and policy implementation.

Acting on explicit instructions from Xi Jinping at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) to “treat the rectification of unhealthy practices and corruption around the people as an important task”, the Party has decided to bring the campaign to people’s doorsteps. Investigations into village-level cadres are likely to have wide-ranging effects; from impacting the Party’s legitimacy among the masses and reinforcing the authority of the Party core, to enhancing resource controls of the Party and reinstituting top-down decision making in China’s villages.

Wading Into the Weeds

Since the "Work Plan of the Central Anti-Corruption Coordination Group (2023-2027)" was approved by the General Office of the Central Committee in September 2023, the effort to “extend the anti-corruption (campaign) to the grassroots level” has gathered momentum with various Party agencies and government ministries throwing their weight behind the directive. A Politburo meeting in December echoed the emphasis of the Work Plan, and Xi Jinping, at the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection in January 2024, explicitly called for the punishment of "petty corruption" to give the people a “greater sense of gain”. The central government followed suit with the No 1 Central Document, the first and most significant policy directive issued by China every year in February, highlighting the need to improve grassroots supervision and rectify “unhealthy practices” and corruption in rural areas.

To bring village-level cadres and units under the microscope, the Central Committee in February 2024 revised the “Regulations on the Inspection Work of the Communist Party of China” of 2017, bringing village-level party organisations under the jurisdiction of county-level party committees for the first time. It also mandated full coverage of inspections of Party organisations in local areas, departments, enterprises and institutions under county management within one term of office. Discipline inspection agencies were directed to investigate embezzlement, illegal possession, misappropriation and extortion in the domains highly relevant to people’s livelihoods and social welfare policies of the state; education and medical care, pension and social security, employment and entrepreneurship, food and drug safety and ecological and environmental protection. With over 607,000 grassroots mass organisations, 489,000 village committees and 3.929 million villagers' groups in China, a gargantuan effort by various provincial and local governments was initiated to weed out flies.

Backed by the Party centre, county-level Party committees across China initiated inspection and supervision campaigns in villages. In Henan’s Biyang county, inspections and rectifications were organised from April to October 2024, with an emphasis on issues concerning management of “three assets”, which refers to village collective funds, assets and resources. As corruption in China’s villages surfaced, it was clear that “unhealthy tendencies” typically revolved around funding for rural revitalisation projects, poverty alleviation campaigns, contracting for infrastructure projects, welfare subsidies and compensation.

For instance, in Hebei’s Zhuangtou village, the village Party branch secretary and 8 other party members were found embezzling and misappropriating 470,000 yuan of collective funds by forging materials and invoices. In Liuwenzhuang, the former Party branch secretary and his son were found to have misappropriated 2.02 million yuan of demolition compensation funds. Grassroots cadres were also illegally diverting subsidies and funds to family members and relatives. In Anhui’s Chaigang village, the former secretary of the Party Committee was charged with favouring his relatives and friends in the handling of minimum wage allowances to the tune of 14,198 yuan and in Chongqing’s Lingying village, the leader of the Villagers Group was found misappropriating compensation funds for land reclamation. By the end of 2024, inspections were carried out in 361,000 administrative villages across China, covering nearly 74% of all such units. The scale of grassroots corruption came into sharp focus when the CCDI and NSC released data on corruption in China’s villages for the first time in late 2023.

Impact and New Dynamics

Investigations into village-level officials has produced startling discoveries and results, mainly concerning the scale and dynamics of “micro-corruption” in China. Compared to 2023, when investigations and disciplinary sanctions placed on village-level cadres totalled 61,000, in 2024 the CCDI investigated and sanctioned 104,000 current or former village party secretaries and committee directors. More broadly, 417,000 individuals from rural areas, enterprises and other institutions faced disciplinary measures in 2023, which increased dramatically by 47%, to 613,000 individuals, in 2024.  On one hand, the scale and depth of corruption cases in China’s villages is a result of heightened enforcement by discipline inspection agencies into a well-entrenched and commonplace occurrence. At the same time, the significant rise in cases and punishments is also a function of the Chinese governments massive investments into rural revitalisation, poverty alleviation and other welfare-policy interventions. These factors have converged to intensify an anti-corruption campaign so significantly that it has produced a minor jobs boom at the county level in at least 15 provinces where discipline inspection agencies are recruiting candidates to support investigations, detentions and case work.

The impact on grassroots cadres is also manifesting in other ways; in data released by the CCDI for the township-and-below levels, the number of problems investigated increased by 77%, from 101,696 in 2023 to 180,026 in 2024. Notable increases have also surfaced in the punishments meted out to lower-level officials as well; rectification and re-education of such officials have increased by 77% from 143,490 cases to 254,530 in 2024 and disciplinary sanctions increased by an alarming 75%, from 101,696 cases to 178,559 in 2024 (Authors calculations). The scale of investigations at the lowest level has also reflected the idiosyncrasies of micro-corruption in China.

Micro-corruption is primarily concentrated in the domains of rural revitalisation and social welfare, where village officials exercise control over resources and enjoy relatively greater autonomy of decision-making. It is evidenced by increases in certain violations of the Party’s Eight Central Regulations; illegal issuances of subsidies, giving and receiving gifts (bribes), adversely impacting high-quality development, harming the interests of the masses and causing public complaints etc. For instance, the number of officials given disciplinary sanctions for illegal issuance of subsidy in China have increased by 65% in 2024, which are most likely driven by cases from China’s villages. Similarly, cases of officials who “harm the interests of the masses” and are subjects of public complaints, have increased by an alarming 118% in 2024 and disciplinary actions in such cases have increased by 99%.

These dynamics are just the tip of the iceberg. What should come as no surprise is that the Party has promised to deepen its campaign, with CCDI’s chief Li Xi, who along with Liu Jinguo has personally spearheaded the campaign, stating at an inspection planning meeting that village inspections were necessary to strengthen the political foundation of the Party’s long-term rule and ensure grassroots cadres’ political loyalty. Also, the announcement in December by the Party of more national-level checks of cadres in villages is a clear sign of the road ahead. The new conditions for cadres to navigate at the grassroots level has implications for the Party’s legitimacy, policy implementation and centre-local relations.

Causes and Consequences

Far from the eye of the Party in Beijing, village-level cadres and officials across China have enjoyed relative social and political autonomy of decision-making in day-to-day affairs. Although the central government and party have granted significant powers to village party branches and village committees, they are unable to effectively supervise them. Power is concentrated at the county-level, with county-level departments responsible for decisions relating to issuance of agricultural subsidies, investment projects and demolition reviews. As a result, townships have been relegated to the domain of implementation. With administrative and financial powers of townships governments scaled back in recent years, supervision of village level affairs remained relatively weak until recently. Consequently, the rent-seeking behaviour of village officials, along with other “unhealthy tendencies” festered without interruption.

Moreover, financial intervention of the central government, for rural revitalisation, poverty alleviation and other social welfare and rural development schemes has presented grassroots officials with many opportunities for economic corruption. Much like other sectors of the economy where China has pumped tens of billions of yuan in the form of subsidies and investment funds, like the military and high-technology industries, corruption has emerged as an unsurprising feature of policy implementation in rural China.

Presented with the opportunity to deepen its control over grassroots cadres, enhance its image and legitimacy among the masses, reinforce its top-down model of policy implementation and improve the impact of its social interventions, the Party appears determined to double down on its campaign against micro-corruption. As a result, scrutiny of the day-to-day affairs of people’s lives is likely to increase significantly. This is evidenced by the recent emphasis on rectifying management of “campus meals” and medical care in the Work Report of the National Supervisory Commission. The Party has also turned its attention to “friends and relatives” of village cadres who may be engaged in corruption or stand to benefit from it. With China’s anti-corruption campaign certain to grow wider and deeper into the grassroots, the outcomes for the Party’s legitimacy among the masses may be uncertain. But its uniform control over cadres and their behaviour will most certainly be reinforced.