China’s 2026 Government Work Report (GWR), presented by Premier Li Qiang at the Two Sessions, outlines Beijing’s strategy to manage the deceleration of China's economy, while advancing long-term structural transformation. Setting a GDP growth target of 4.5–5 percent, the report emphasizes a shift toward high-quality development, boosting domestic demand, and addressing deflationary pressures through more proactive fiscal and monetary support. It positions innovation and the development of new quality productive forces, including AI and advanced technologies, to enhance competitiveness and self-reliance. At the same time, the GWR highlights rural revitalization, social welfare expansion, and governance reforms to maintain stability during China’s economic transition.

The ongoing West Asian conflict presents a strategic dilemma for China as it seeks to expand its regional influence without assuming security responsibilities. While Beijing has deepened economic ties with Iran and the Gulf through energy trade and Belt and Road connectivity, it continues to avoid direct military or security commitments in the region. China’s response, driven by its energy security concerns, has focused on diplomatic rhetoric, calls for political settlement and limited mediation efforts, reflecting its emphasis on stability without strategic entanglement. However, this cautious approach exposes the limits of China’s influence and highlights a broader tension in its rise as a global power—balancing expanding economic interests without assuming corresponding security responsibilities.

As India assumes the BRICS presidency in 2026, the grouping it chairs is considerably larger, more consequential and more internally contested than when it last held the chair in 2021. This piece assesses the nature and depth of India-China divergence across BRICS, particularly on membership expansion, governance of the New Development Bank and approaches to de-dollarisation and alternative payment systems. India's 2026 chairmanship offers real but time-limited agenda-setting authority; how New Delhi uses it will shape not only this presidential cycle but the terms on which China approaches its own chairmanship in 2027.

The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute between Japan, China, and Taiwan reflects unresolved historical legacies of the First Sino-Japanese War, contested post-WWII settlements, and competing legal interpretations of sovereignty and maritime boundaries in the East China Sea. The issue intensified after the 1968 discovery of potential hydrocarbons and Japan’s 2012 nationalization, leading to sustained maritime patrols, legal assertions, and strategic signalling by all sides. Today, the dispute represents not only a territorial disagreement but a broader contest over regional order, alliance politics, sea lane security, and the interpretation of international maritime law in East Asia.

This is the fourth of a six-part series analysing the Taiwanese television series Zero Day Attack for the Organization for Research on China and Asia’s (ORCA) “Reviewing Chinese Culture” segment.

The Special Issue “India’s Soft Push for Power in South Asia: Shaping A Favourable Tomorrow” was ideated keeping in mind the increasing need for Indian policymakers to mitigate challenges emerging against New Delhi’s South Asian policy. Through each chapter, contributed by emerging Indian scholars specializing in India’s neighborhood policy, the publications envisions new and existing strategies to effectively leverage India’s soft power appeal in South Asia.