The 2026 Afghanistan–Pakistan crisis places China in a complex strategic dilemma, highlighting the limits of its diplomatic outreach and economic leverage in managing regional tensions. Beijing must carefully balance its close partnership with Pakistan and its growing engagement with Taliban-led Afghanistan, even as the conflict threatens key projects like CPEC and planned connectivity initiatives. At the same time, rising instability has intensified China’s counterterrorism concerns, particularly regarding ISKP, ETIM, and repeated attacks on Chinese assets. China has adopted a cautious and calibrated approach—calling for ceasefire, maintaining ties with both sides, and using platforms like the UN, SCO, and BRICS to project itself as a responsible stakeholder while managing competing regional priorities.

US-China intelligence competition is intensifying, with the CIA’s recent targeted recruitment efforts signaling a deepening struggle for strategic advantage. As Washington seeks to exploit internal vulnerabilities within China’s security apparatus, Beijing has simultaneously reinforced its counterintelligence framework. However, these efforts unfold amid increasing structural constraints on US intelligence capabilities. Policy shifts under the Trump administration risk weakening the institutional depth required for sustained clandestine operations. Consequently, the effectiveness of current US strategies remains uncertain, raising questions about whether they reflect long-term intelligence strategy or symbolic pressure in an enduring intelligence rivalry.

As India assumes the BRICS presidency in 2026, the grouping it chairs is considerably larger, more consequential and more internally contested than when it last held the chair in 2021. This piece assesses the nature and depth of India-China divergence across BRICS, particularly on membership expansion, governance of the New Development Bank and approaches to de-dollarisation and alternative payment systems. India's 2026 chairmanship offers real but time-limited agenda-setting authority; how New Delhi uses it will shape not only this presidential cycle but the terms on which China approaches its own chairmanship in 2027.

The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute between Japan, China, and Taiwan reflects unresolved historical legacies of the First Sino-Japanese War, contested post-WWII settlements, and competing legal interpretations of sovereignty and maritime boundaries in the East China Sea. The issue intensified after the 1968 discovery of potential hydrocarbons and Japan’s 2012 nationalization, leading to sustained maritime patrols, legal assertions, and strategic signalling by all sides. Today, the dispute represents not only a territorial disagreement but a broader contest over regional order, alliance politics, sea lane security, and the interpretation of international maritime law in East Asia.

This is the fifth of a six-part series analyzing the Taiwanese TV series ‘Zero Day Attack’ for the Organisation for Research on China and Asia’s (ORCA) ‘Reviewing Chinese Culture’ segment.

भारत के ‘चेयर’ संभालने से पहले चीन के कूटनीतिक संकेत से पता चलता है कि वह जो चाहता है, उसमें ब्रिक्स प्राथमिकताओं में शुरुआती मतभेदों को रोकना; भारत के 2026 के लीडरशिप के दौरान आसान सहयोग पक्का करना; और शीघ्र तर्कशील सामान्य जमीन तैयार करना। यह सक्रिय समन्वयन कम से कम समझौते के लिए एक व्यवहारिक आधार दिखाता तो है लेकिन कितना सर्पोटिव होगा ये कहना फिलहाल मुश्किल होगा।

The Special Issue “India’s Soft Push for Power in South Asia: Shaping A Favourable Tomorrow” was ideated keeping in mind the increasing need for Indian policymakers to mitigate challenges emerging against New Delhi’s South Asian policy. Through each chapter, contributed by emerging Indian scholars specializing in India’s neighborhood policy, the publications envisions new and existing strategies to effectively leverage India’s soft power appeal in South Asia.