CHINA AND PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES

While the use of mercenaries as a part of warfighting has reduced in prevalence over the past decades, recent years have seen major powers such as the United States, Russia, and China using their ‘Private Security Companies” (PSCs) for missions, ranging from providing security in warzones, training of national militaries and fighting alongside government forces in Syria and the Sahel in the case of Russian Private Military Companies (PMCs). China’s use of PSCs has not been as extensive or of the same nature as Russia’s and the USs, but as ‘grey zone’ operations become increasingly common tools of statecraft, the situation may change, and Beijing may see its PSCs as valuable power projection tools. Moreover, Chinese investments in volatile states in Africa and the Middle East provide an arena where such capabilities may be tested through the deployment of PSCs linked to or supported by them.

Despite these potential uses, there are reasons as to why Beijing may not be as keen as Moscow, as the latter has been deploying its PMCs abroad for a multitude of reasons. The potential employment of Chinese PSCs to enhance China’s power projection capabilities may add an unknown quantity to an already volatile global environment. This article explores the legal status of PMCs in China, an overview of their overseas modus operandi, how Beijing may employ these as a tool of power projection, the drawbacks of doing so and the need to strengthen international law and consensus on the use of such entities.

 Decoding the Distinction between PMCs and PSCs

The biggest difference between a PMC and a PSC is the ambit of the tasks they can undertake. PMCs generally undertake tasks which are overtly military in nature, while PSCs play a more passive role in comparison by providing security services for certain facilities or even individuals. A 2019 RAND report differentiated between the two as “the distinction between a PMC versus a PSC is the difference between a for-hire military contractor versus a security team that merely protects a single static location, like a military base, embassy, or port.”

The starkest difference between the PMCs employed by Russia and the PSCs in China is the former’s willingness and record in providing military services such as training and even participating in combat missions on behalf of Moscow or their contracting states. The Afrika Corp’s (formerly the Wagner group) involvement in the Sahel, fighting against insurgent groups and training state militaries, encapsulates the role of PMCs in Russia’s global strategy. China, on the other hand, has outlawed the formation of companies which offer for-hire military services, but allows companies to provide security services to government and commercial entities, such as site security and personnel protection.

As far as China’s PSCs are concerned, they were legalised in China in 2009 through the “Security Services Management Regulations” order of the State Council. The law is the primary regulatory framework which governs the functioning and regulations of PSCs in the country. The law defines “Security Services” as “security services companies [that] dispatch security guards to provide security guards for client units in accordance with security service contracts, including security guards, patrols, guards, escorts, personal guards, security inspections, and security technology prevention and security risk assessment services”. The law also stipulates that the Ministry of Public Security shall be responsible for the supervision and management of the activities of PSCs within China.

Importantly, the law states that a security service company engaged in armed guard and escort service should have a registered capital of not less than RMB 10 million, and “be wholly state-owned or state-owned capital accounts for more than 51% of the total registered capital”. The law was promulgated in 2009 and changes have been made to how Chinese assets and personnel overseas are now secured, which will be discussed later, but even as early as 2009 it was abundantly clear that, unlike Moscow, Beijing was unwilling to allow PSCs any level of real autonomy, making them quasi-government agencies. Additionally, most Chinese PSCs are also primarily staffed by former People’s Liberation Army (PLA) /People’s Armed Police (PAP) personnel, closely tying their personnel to the state apparatus and its extensive oversight.

The level of control exercised by Beijing over PSCs operating out of China is by design. As in the case of the party's control over the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) exercises a monopoly over the use of armed force in China. The fundamental idea that underlines this thinking is that the “party commands the gun”, tying the loyalty of the PLA to the party. Allowing PMCs similar to that of Wagner and Blackwater to operate in/out of China would greatly dilute this principle and potentially threaten the party's security and stability, which is unacceptable to the CPC and its leadership. The party’s fears of PMCs potentially threatening the stability of the state (party-state in China’s case) would’ve been reinforced, having witnessed the events in Russia. Yevgeny Prigozhin’s attempted insurrection against Putin likely served as a stark illustration of the risks associated with allowing heavily armed PMCs to operate within a state. This incident likely crystallised anxieties within the party and highlighted how PMCs can evolve into genuine threats to centralised authority and regime stability. Beyond this, there are geopolitical reasons as to why China has chosen to go with PSCs over PMCs; these are covered in the following section.

The Evolving Role of Chinese PSCs in Overseas Operations

In 2010, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce issued the “Regulations on the Safety Management of Overseas Chinese-funded Enterprises, Institutions and Personnel”. These regulations were formulated to strengthen the security of overseas Chinese enterprises and personnel and to ensure the “smooth implementation of the going out strategy”. The “going out” strategy refers to China’s policy of encouraging domestic firms to invest overseas. Article 24 of Chapter IV under these regulations states that when operating in ‘high-risk’ countries and regions, “Overseas Chinese-funded enterprises, institutions and project sites must be equipped with necessary security facilities and may hire local security guards or armed police according to the local security situation to enhance security capabilities and improve security levels”.

The emphasis on making use of local guards and police personnel is telling of how China approaches the deployment of its PSCs overseas. The launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the massive investments made under the initiative, many in these aforementioned high-risk zones such as, have necessitated many Chinese firms now turn to PSCs to shore up the security of their assets and personnel. The approach that Chinese PSCs have taken to accomplish this, however, is markedly different from the overtly military approach preferred by Western or even Russian PMCs. Chinese PSCs do not offer their services to foreign governments to carry out military operations which their domestic security forces may be unable or under-equipped to carry out. 

When operating overseas, Chinese PSCs are doing so in a legal ‘grey zone’ wherein domestic Chinese law does not apply to them, and international law remains woefully inadequate and underdeveloped. Given the situation, the PSCs need only conform to the domestic laws of the host country. This allows for room to negotiate contracts with host countries, providing the PSC in question with a broad remit of responsibilities. These PSCs also operate mainly as security consultancy groups and not hands-on guards for Chinese facilities or personnel, at least directly. Their activities largely include training Chinese personnel for times of crisis and working on contingency plans with the contracting firm. Beyond this, the firms may also provide training for local security firms and police as and when needed. A critical aspect of these operations is the general lack of an armed Chinese presence on the ground.

When needed, Chinese PSCs contract local armed guards to provide the services needed and coordinate with local security authorities in times of crisis involving their clients/Chinese interests. However, the deployment of PSCs is a globally contentious topic, but there are multiple PSC firms, mostly independent ventures, and some are jointly established with the host country, in Global South countries, where the majority of China’s overseas investments are concentrated. An armed Chinese presence may be construed as colonial, exploitative and an infringement on the host country’s sovereignty, leading to increased levels of Sinophobia and potential threats to the personnel operating in these countries. There is also the risk of a political incident occurring with the presence of armed personnel, which would cause more backlash at a time when Beijing can ill afford it. Finally, Chinese PSCs are largely staffed with military and police veterans who, while providing a professional force, are still untested in battle owing to the PLA’s lack of actual combat experience. This poses questions on how effectively they may be able to operate in a combat situation. 

Chinese operations in Pakistan, for example, primarily rely on the state’s armed forces, but when Chinese PSCs get involved, they prefer to work through locally contracted guards to avoid unwanted attention and incidents. This model of working through local security contractors and trying to avoid direct armed conflict may not always work, as seen in the case of Sudan, where armed Chinese contractors aided a Sudanese army operation to rescue 29 kidnapped Chinese workers in 2012 or in South Sudan 2016 when armed contractors from the Beijing Dewe Security Services (DeWe) PSC had to engage in a skirmish with local warring factions near the capital of Juba to evacuate 330 workers to Kenya. Despite this, Chinese PSCs operating overseas often prefer to take on a limited role for the aforementioned reasons, avoiding the deployment of armed Chinese personnel as far as can be avoided.

China’s PSCs: A Quiet Tool of Global Strategy

As has been demonstrated in the preceding section, the way Beijing has thus far used PSCs as part of its global initiatives to safeguard its investments and strategic interests under their BRI. However, China’s approach is markedly different to how Russia uses the Afrika Corps to influence governments across Africa and the Middle East. Russia's PMCs have made the Sahel an increasingly important part of their operations, driven by Moscow’s desire to exploit the prevalent frustration with French and other Western counterinsurgency operations in the region. The emergence of military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger has facilitated the movement of the Kremlin’s units into the region, allowing Moscow to project power, garner political influence and gain access to the region’s resources. This overtly military-centric strategy is in stark contrast to the one adopted by China, which prioritises economic ties and agreements with PSCs playing a supplementary security role as and when needed.

This can be seen in the footprint that Chinese PSCs have in a host country compared to Russian ones. Russian PMCs often carry out military operations and establish the needed logistical and support networks to support such operations, as seen in Libya, the Central African Republic (CAR) and Burkina Faso, where large bases serve as the base of operations for the PMCs in those countries. Chinese PSCs, on the other hand, usually operate on the premises of their employer or the facility they are required to guard. There is no evidence of these PSCs making use of large military facilities as their base of operations in the same way Russian PMCs do. 

China’s global strategy, while increasingly assertive in some places, continues to be cautious when it comes to deploying military force beyond its immediate periphery, especially in the form of PSCs. An example of this can be seen in China’s dealings with the Central Asian Republics, where military/security ties continue to be dealt with under the aegis of the respective armed forces and defence ministries. The region is a potential hotbed of what China deems the “three evils” or “three forces” of extremism, terrorism and separatism. Given these issues, the deployment of PSCs may have been an option that China looked at, especially in the aftermath of the attack on the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, which was carried out by the Turkistan Islamic Party. Despite this, China has refrained from seeking to deploy PSCs to the region, and direct cooperation between the PLA and Central Asian militaries and government-to-government arms deals remain the cornerstones of Chinese security policy in Central Asia. 

As a whole, Chinese PSCs remain a growing, but unknown quantity for Beijing when it comes to using them beyond their present limited role and as a larger, defined part of Chinese foreign policy. However, even without the deployment of large quantities of men and equipment, as seen in Russia’s case, Chinese PSCs can provide Beijing with a potent tool to advance its interests, especially with how blurred the lines are between the official state apparatus and the PSCs themselves. As mentioned earlier, these PSCs are under the radar of the CCP, and as most of the people employed are PLA and police veterans, the Chinese state can potentially use these assets, even in their current limited deployments, to gather intelligence by simply having “security eyes” on the ground in these countries.

Using PSCs as a means of carrying out intelligence gathering on projects of other states and other clandestine activities remains a possibility, especially if Beijing deems that the risk of its role being uncovered is minimal or the rewards outweigh the risks, particularly in Taiwan, which already has a history of hosting Chinese companies. Chinese clandestine operations already operate on the island to further Beijing’s goals, and often have access to high-ranking officials, as seen in the arrest of a former Taiwanese general for his involvement in a plot to overthrow Taiwan’s government. The use of personnel from these PSCs in information gathering may not always provide new information, but it can help corroborate what the national intelligence agencies may already know. It can also free up the resources of the agencies themselves to focus on other, high-priority targets, while PSC personnel act as ‘reliable eyes and ears on the ground’.

Despite the advantages, PSCs continue to play a passive role in China’s foreign policy, acting more as security consultancies in their individual capacity rather than as part of a broader push to project power far from China’s shores. Beijing is unlikely to significantly change this for three main reasons. Firstly, the potential blowback of deploying Chinese security personnel even under the flag of a PSC is significant, given the historical sensitivities around colonial exploitation and loss of sovereignty, which many of the countries that host BRI projects have. As mentioned, Beijing’s focus of engagement with these states is primarily economic, and it is unlikely to jeopardise these existing ties and agreements for the sake of deploying its own security personnel, which is sure to ruffle some feathers. Not committing to security-based agreements also allows Beijing the leeway to respond to changes in regional security situations without tying itself to one side while allowing it to present itself as a non-military power to much of the Global South.

Secondly, although the number of PSCs in China is growing quickly, and their personnel may be considered professional and disciplined, they are largely untested in the rigours of modern combat, unlike the employees of Russia and Western PMCs. This significantly hampers the ability of Chinese PSCs to operate at the same level and with the same sophistication that a Blackwater or Afrika Corps might. Finally, the CCP is extremely wary of any sort of dilution of the “party commands the gun” principle. The attempted Wagner insurrection in Russia would have reinforced the arguments against allowing potentially uncontrolled groups and individuals access to military-grade equipment. As such, the PLA is likely to remain the sole wielder of armed forces as in China’s foreign policy toolkit, under the strict control of the senior party leadership.

Way Forward: A Case for Being Proactive

While PSCs may not yet be an integral part of Chinese foreign policy, there is a strong potential for that to change as Beijing’s overseas investments encounter increasingly hostile environments, particularly in Pakistan, and as the broader security situation in Africa and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) continues to deteriorate. Africa and the MENA region are also home to extensive critical mineral and energy resources and are of critical importance to global supply chains and energy markets. Given these conditions, it becomes vital to map the current footprint of Chinese PSCs in countries with major foreign economic projects and to assess the local actors engaging with these firms, ensuring that they do not compromise the safety or continuity of legitimate infrastructure or investment initiatives. Where possible, this should be done in coordination with local authorities. However, these PSCs often function in a legal grey zone, complicating efforts at oversight and accountability, especially in the absence of binding international or enforceable domestic legislation.

This evolving landscape presents a critical window for proactive engagement while Chinese PSCs are still expanding and formalising their overseas operations. Western states such as the US and several European countries already maintain strict legislation governing private military actors, and a number of EU states have also committed to voluntary control mechanisms. Collaborative efforts between both developed and developing states will be necessary to advance a global regulatory framework that can effectively govern PSC activity. Precedents set by Russian PMC operations in Africa have illustrated the immense risks and opportunities for abuse in unregulated spaces. Without timely intervention and the establishment of a comprehensive legal regime, the unchecked spread of such actors’ risks exacerbating instability in an already volatile global security environment.

While China’s PSCs are unlikely to evolve into combat-ready units capable of semi-autonomous operations like the Wagner group, their potential uses should not be underestimated. Even without overtly kinetic functions, their potential use in intelligence gathering, destabilisation, influence operations and other clandestine operations remains significant. Even still, Beijing is likely to restrain itself from becoming too reliant on these groups, given their capacity to turn on their sponsors, as seen in Prigozhin’s failed insurrection in Russia. The PLA is likely to remain the sole executioner of the state’s military objectives in the short to medium term. The global community must take a proactive stance in ensuring that international law is adapted to regulate the activities of such groups and prevent them from acting as destabilising factors. As the nature of modern conflict and influence operations evolves and use of tools such as PMCs and PSCs becomes more common, the world’s capacity to respond to the activities of such quasi-state actors must also keep pace.

Image Credit: Tu meifei/Reuters