Senior General Min Aung Hlaing’s first state visit to China since the 2021 coup to attend the SCO summit and the World War II victory day parade carried significance beyond ceremonial diplomacy. It came at a moment when the international community is scrutinizing Myanmar’s political trajectory after the junta’s dissolution of four years of emergency rule and the new governing body- State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC). While India engaged cautiously, China swiftly endorsed the new regime, converting political backing into seven economic agreements and reaffirming its stake in Belt and Road projects like the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor. For Beijing, the SSPC ensures continuity of strategic infrastructure, buffers against Western and Indian influence, and secures access to the Indian Ocean. Yet this embrace has inflamed domestic resentment, with ethnic armed groups and civil society accusing China of interfering in Myanmar's internal politics. By betting on Myanmar’s military for short-term stability, it may be sowing the seeds of long-term volatility that could undermine its own strategic interests.

Over the past decade, Southeast Asia has become the focal point of Asia’s strategic and economic transformation, with ASEAN at the center of global trade, maritime connectivity and geopolitical competition. China and India increasingly see the bloc as essential to their regional strategies: China as a partner for trade, technology, and security, and India as the cornerstone of its Act East Policy (AEP). The AEP has evolved from a diplomatic initiative into a comprehensive framework, with India strengthening cultural, defense, and multilateral engagement across the region. Meanwhile, China has pursued an expansive agenda through initiatives like the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area and the Belt and Road Initiative, deepening economic and infrastructural integration. Beijing’s approach extends beyond economics to maritime cooperation, regional governance, and influence-building, setting a high benchmark for regional engagement. In this context, India faces the challenge of translating the AEP into tangible influence, balancing ASEAN’s developmental priorities with its own strategic ambitions, while measuring its progress against China’s extensive outreach.

To many external observers, the Chinese notion of democracy is contradictory to the country’s one-party political system and its limited space for dissent. Nonetheless, the Chinese party-state has consistently portrayed itself as a system that embodies democratic values, albeit in a form tailored to its own political and cultural context.

चीनी धार्मिक कानून के अनुसार कोई भी राज्य निकाय, सार्वजनिक संगठन या व्यक्ति नागरिकों को किसी भी धर्म में विश्वास करने या न करने के लिए बाध्य नहीं कर सकता; न ही वे उन नागरिकों के साथ भेदभाव कर सकते हैं जो किसी भी धर्म में विश्वास करते हैं या नहीं करते, लेकिन वस्तुस्थिति इतनी भी लचीलापन लिए हुए नजर नहीं आती।

The Special Issue “India’s Soft Push for Power in South Asia: Shaping A Favourable Tomorrow” was ideated keeping in mind the increasing need for Indian policymakers to mitigate challenges emerging against New Delhi’s South Asian policy. Through each chapter, contributed by emerging Indian scholars specializing in India’s neighborhood policy, the publications envisions new and existing strategies to effectively leverage India’s soft power appeal in South Asia. 

Religious exchanges, especially pilgrimages to Mount Kailash, have long symbolized the fluid cultural ties and contested sovereignties between India, Tibet, and China. The recent reopening of the Kailash yātrā reflects cautious Sino-Indian rapprochement post-Galwan. However, such religious engagement implicitly challenges Beijing’s authority in Tibet. Pilgrimage remains a subtle yet potent site of geopolitical tension and cultural assertion.