EUROPE'S STRATEGIC CALCULATIONS IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

In a new geopolitical and geoeconomic reality, the European Union (EU) is rethinking its ability to defend its interests and strengthen its global influence. As a bloc of 27 countries, the EU is also working on reducing its strategic dependencies and on increasing its resilience by working closely with like-minded partners. In this process, the EU has courted the developing world, or the Global South as developing countries are commonly, but loosely referred to. This has been driven by the fear that Europe is “losing the Global South” to other emerging powers, such as China or India. Both have strengthened their influence in the developing world, albeit to different degrees and in different ways. 

Some European observers have argued that there is a crisis in the EU’s approach to the Global South, while others have urged that the EU needs to rethink its approach. Internal debates in the EU have therefore intensified on how the EU could best contribute to empowering developing countries to shape their own future. There is a wider agreement across member states that this would require a shift away from the EU’s pursuit of traditional development aid in the Global South to securing its strategic investments. 

In 2019, the EU committed to becoming a “geopolitical” actor, largely but not exclusively driven by the need to respond to an assertive China and address the growing imbalance in EU-China trade. The EU labelled China a “systemic rival” promoting an alternative governance model. Yet, Europe is divided on its approach to dealing with China. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has reinforced member states to converge, although Europe’s fragmentation persists. The EU continues to be alarmed, seeing China’s support to Russia further grow since the attack on Ukraine and Russia becoming China’s junior partner.

Europe has also focused its attention on narratives, fearing efforts of authoritarian regimes to shape global governance narratives while undermining the rules-based international order. Disinformation has been a powerful tool for these countries, in particular Russia and China, to increase their influence in the Global South.

In 2024, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell outlined the four tasks on the EU’s geopolitical agenda: support Ukraine more and quicker; put an end to the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza; improve relations with the Global South; and finally, strengthen the EU’s defence and security. Questions however remain on how effectively the EU can win back the trust of the Global South, and work together with developing countries in this process.

The EU is interested in working closely with India in this process and sees India as a like-minded partner. The two have reinforced cooperation, including in security and defence. As its top leadership has maintained, India is not “anti-Western”, but “non-Western”, and this is also what has reinforced Europe’s interest in working closely with India as the “Voice of the Global South”, in contrast with China. Europe dislikes Beijing’s narrative that seeks to build on the anti-Western sentiment that many countries in the developing world share. This is the reality that the EU needs to address, as much as it must push back against Beijing’s assertiveness.

These remarks were presented by Dr. Zsuzsa Anna Ferency at the Global Conference for New Sinology (GCNS), 2024.