POLITICAL WILL VERSUS REQUISITE POLICY

Introduction

On December 27, 2021, the National Security Committee (NSC) unveiled Pakistan’s public version of its first-ever National Security Policy  (NSP).¹ Prime Minister Imran Khan launched the document on January 14, 2022.² The stated purpose of the NSP is to assuage the international community on Pakistan’s apparent change from an overly military-oriented security policy state to one that seeks geo-economic consolidation while maintaining its security posture to meet security challenges.

As with most such documents, the public version does not provide specific details of the country’s strategic priorities, and implementation framework. The document is useful as it outlines various segments of national security and discusses in very broad outlines, the opportunities and challenges from which strategic options and policies can be alluded. Pakistan’s NSP is a short-term document that covers a five-year period, from 2022 to 2026, which is amenable to amendments in tune with any significant geo-political and geo-economic changes with impact on Pakistan’s security environment.

There are five drivers of obtaining a socio economic and security environment which has forced the Pakistani politico-military establishment to enunciate its security policy. These are:

A) Weakening social cohesion.

B) Increasingly unmanageable economic situation.

C) The China factor (particularly Pakistan increasingly being perceived as a client state).

D) Reducing political and economic cushion from traditional middle-eastern patrons, owing to change in their own geo-political and economic priorities.

E) Long-standing hostility within the immediate neighbourhood particularly with India, Iran, and Afghanistan severely impairing Pakistan’s socio-economic stability.

Within the above backdrop, this brief discussed the attempted course correction in the NSP and its possible impact.

Premise

Pakistan’s NSP is the product of seven years of detailed consultations with different arms of the state and stakeholders. This essentially means the initiative for drafting the NSP began when Nawaz Sharif was the Prime Minister in 2014 under the guidance of then National Security Adviser Sartaj Aziz. It is important therefore to take cognizance of the internal politico-security environment and strategic environment in the neighbourhood, which has changed colossally. This was a period when violence by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was at its peak and the first transition of the government in Afghanistan from Hamid Karzai to Ashraf Ghani was happening. Presently, the NSP has been released at a time when Taliban with Pakistan’s tacit support have won major victory over US-led foreign forces in Afghanistan, nevertheless violence by TTP within and from across the eastern border continues unabated and the political scenario is in flux with the Imran Khan government politically and economically on a downward trajectory. Even its chief sponsor, the Pakistani Military, is in two minds with overtures towards Imran Khan’s opponents.

Meanwhile, the country is in a deep  economic crisis marked by galloping inflation, high energy prices, mounting external debt and increasing imports which are constantly depleting foreign currency reserves.  Pressure is growing from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to show the results of economic reforms and of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to control terror financing by acting on terror groups operating within the country. This scenario is exacerbated as ethno-religious intolerance continues to rise with the Barelvi and Deobandi groups contesting each other to dominate ethnic politics. The lynching of a Sri Lankan engineer, increasing blasphemy-related killings and governments surrender to the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLPs') coercive Dharana (sit-ins for protest) politics show the state is losing its writ. Moreover, victory in Afghanistan is becoming a milestone with the rise in TTP- related violence, failure of ceasefire and differences over the boundary with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

These objective realities of the Pakistani state need to be considered while analysing the recently released NSP. It is apparent that Pakistan is using the NSP to project a more moderate national profile to assure the world that the country remains politically stable as it tries to change the course of its security orientation from proxy wars and supporting non–state actor stats with counterproductive military build-up to a more inward-looking policy aimed at economic and social corrections and consolidation, which will, in turn, benefit the wider region as well.

Such a broad thematic outlook can be discerned from the NSP’s policy focus on issues concerning social development and human welfare through economic security by “expanding national resources and a redistributive model that can transfer the benefits of greater availability of resources to” the people. Further, it states that the “country wants to move away from the traditional guns versus butter debate”. Yet, surprisingly, this argument ends with an emphasis on ‘adequate butter will get more guns.’

Driving Forces and Conflicting Objectives

1. The Social Order

Motivating theme of the NSP as per Prime Minister Imran Khan has been to ensure Human Security for Pakistani people and mutual coexistence with all other states while following the goal to build the Pakistan on the model of ‘Riasat-e-Madina’. Interestingly, a country that has been in search of national identity since its very inception has finally come to a juncture wherein its leader has articulated his country’s vision in just one phrase based on a vague utopian vision. That said, the document however has been welcomed in most quarters of the Pakistani State, as it provides some policy direction for a country that is rapidly drifting towards socio-economic collapse owing to a weak national character as well as lack of internal socio - political cohesion that has resulted in extreme social deprivation and inequality for its nearly 220 million citizens.

The NSP also desperately tries to build an argument explaining Pakistan’s identity in terms of ethno-religious ‘unity in diversity.’ However, it fails to recognise that its own State Machinery has suppressed its  diverse’ ethno-linguistic nationalist sentiments in an attempt to dilute them into an Islamic identity. It blames external factors for exploiting weak national cohesion while neglecting the fact that its own constitution not provide equal rights to the citizens such as Ahmadis and Pashtuns from Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The NSP suggests a four-pronged engagement strategy with these elements, such as “separating reconcilable from irreconcilable; cutting of recruitment; constricting financial resources, and addressing governance issues”.

The education system is at the core of social cohesion for the States because it is the medium which helps to maintain the national identity and evolving value system based on it. It is in this context that the NSP talks about radical changes in the education sector, aligning itself with “technological adaptation and innovation” to remain competitive in the global market. Reality is that this is hardly borne out by the policies introduced by the Pakistani government, such as ‘single curriculum’ for primary schools, which have been criticised by senior Pakistani educationists who have argued that the policy will further radicalise the youth. Additionally, thousands of Madrassas have refused to follow government guidelines, including registering themselves with the authorities. In November 2021, the Pakistani government passed an ordinance to establish the ‘Rahmatul-lil- Alameen Authority’ to monitor the curriculum and watch out for any “blasphemous” content being shared in the media, in school syllabi, and on social media platforms. This might further empower the clerics, as governments continue to play faith-based politics. These reforms contradicted NSP and its objectives.

There has been a long-standing debate in Pakistan over the preservation of its Islamic character along with diverse civilizational heritage. As far as this dichotomy dominates debate, persecution of the population will continue, and as a result, national cohesion will remain a chimera, lofty idols of NSP notwithstanding.

2. Changes in Priorities: Geo-economics will lead to Geo-politics

The core team that drafted this document was led by National Security Advisor Moeed Yusuf who comes from an academic background, a rare appearance in the Pakistan security establishment dominated by the military-bureaucratic establishment. In his message, Dr. Yusuf rightly points out that priority should be given to the revival of the economy by current and future governments and that there is a need to fill the gap between national ambitions and reality. Despite the centrality of economic reforms highlighted in the vision statement, the caveat, however, is that the policy paper throughout maintains “emphasising that geo-economic vision supplements the focus on geo- strategy”. Implication is clear: there is little change in Pakistan’s geo-political ambitions, but a change in priorities of stabilising the national economy is being sought to deal with rapidly deteriorating fiscal situation without in any manner compromising Pakistan’s strategic and security objectives.

The central discourse of the NSP remains the country’s geographical location defined to be “at the cross-roads of historic confluence and regional flashpoints provides unique opportunities amidst global competition of power”. Such maneuvering suggests thereby that Pakistan will continue its cynically opportunistic policies by exploiting regional fault lines and associated great power politics while being conscious of neutralising the adverse effect and consequences as a result thereof.

To overcome the decades of economic crisis, the NSP stresses microeconomic stability suggesting this can be achieved by implementing the second phase of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which was recently inaugurated during PM Imran Khan’s visit to Beijing to attend the Opening Ceremony of the Beijing Winter Olympic.

This involves a revolution in agriculture and developing more special economic zones across the country, focussing on improving North and Westward connectivity, while blaming India for holding Pakistan hostage to its Eastward connectivity projects. Given the dwindling trade and growing costs of imports, there is an opportunistic debate within the Pakistan policy circle over separating its economic relations with India from the other strategic issues.  Pakistan is economically isolated within the South and Central Asian region and has the lowest trade with the regional countries.

The NSP refuses to accept the mistakes of its political leadership and the military in the past and blames external factors for exploiting its fault lines. Unless the basic rationale of why Pakistan finds itself in its present position of near-total economic collapse, there is hardly any scope for a course correction and the gap between the reality and the objectives will persist.

Foreign Policy: Old wine in the new bottle

Pakistan foreign policy has primarily centred around its major adversary India and closest strategic ally China. The latest NSP does not indicate any major shift in the foreign policy except towards the US with which it maintains a transactional relationship.

1. Persisting Indian Obsession

The NSP considers India as a primary conventional threat for Pakistan, with Jammu and Kashmir at the core of this conflict. According to the NSP, Pakistan will continue to pursue its current policies on Jammu and Kashmir as “it remains a vital national security interest for Pakistan” by underscoring growing asymmetry in military power. Furthermore, it threatens that in case “India pursues unilateral actions on outstanding issues”, this can result in “negative consequences for regional stability”. The NSP uses the Indian threat as the driving rationale for:

a) The obsessive militarisation of the Pakistani state.

b) Use of terrorism as a weapon of proxy war.

c) Continuation of nuclear force modernisation.

d) Upgradation as part of its “full-spectrum deterrence” includes investments in asymmetric domains such as space and cyber security.

Importantly, despite the NSP maintaining Pakistan not wanting to get involved in an arms race, the reality is that it continues to spend large sums on arms purchases that include FC-31 aircraft, advanced conventional submarines, drones, cruise missiles and more at great cost. All this is justified in terms of “maintaining a cost-effective and adaptive military……and optimisation of force structure”.

However, the NSP suggests amending differences with India without resolution of the Kashmir issue. This is in cognisance of the economic needs of Pakistan which India can fulfil including food security, medicine, supply of cheap raw materials for the industries and market access for Pakistani products. There is in fact a tacit recognition that without taking India onboard Pakistan may not be able to attain its ambitious projects such as Central Asian connectivity, including Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline (TAPI) which is imperative for Pakistan’s energy and economic security and full exploitation of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The fact that Central Asian Republics (CARs) are increasingly attempting to align their economic and trade

future with India through Iran is apparently disconcerting for Pakistan economic planners. With India’s stated position that terrorism and talks cannot go together, duality of Pakistan will not be able to achieve what the NSP is signifying vis-à-vis its relations with India.

2. Rise of China and Policy Contrast for Pakistan’s Bipolar World

Until last decade it was easier for Pakistan to maintain the balanced relationship with the US and China much like other states. But as the balance of power started shifting in favour of China, contestation between the established power and emerging power was inevitable. In such a situation, maintaining strategic autonomy requires political and economic stability. For a country like Pakistan which lacks both —and is a client state of both the powers— there were difficult policy choices to be made. However, till now, clear direction on this front has been amiss

The NSP is upfront on its relations with China, which is described as based on ‘shared interests, mutual understanding, and strategic convergence’. Despite the narrative, as recent reports suggest, the military leadership is not too comfortable with distancing from the US political and military establishment and solely depending upon China for strategic and economic support. However, NSP criticizes the US’s ‘camp politics’, in an allusion to its growing strategic partnership with India at the exclusion of Pakistan. It blames the US for its transactional approach towards Pakistan and calls for broadening its “partnership beyond narrow counter-terrorism focus”. Such remarks imply the failure of Pakistan to find a middle ground with the US even as it remains politically untouchable for the Biden Administration.

Therefore, on the one hand Pakistan needs China as a close ally to deter India vis-a-vis strategic support while on the other hand, Islamabad wants to use the US and eventually the EU to leverage more economic gains to bypass Chinese debt trap. As a neighbour, Pakistan cannot avoid China’s influence on its policies, particularly in South and Central Asia. The credibility of the US led western alliance is rapidly depleting in the international community spurred further by recent decisions it has taken like the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan. At the same time, China is providing assurance to countries like Pakistan as seenduring the visit of Prime Minister Imran Khan to Beijing for the opening ceremony of Winter Olympics. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that “China firmly supports Pakistan in safeguarding its national sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, firmly supports Pakistan in achieving national prosperity and revitalization, and firmly supports Pakistan in safeguarding the country's legitimate rights and interests.” Such an ‘iron brotherhood’ relationship will continue unless China faces the brunt of Pakistan’s self-inflicting policies like supporting terrorism and tolerating extremist ideologies.

3. Policy Dualism

The pressing test case of policy dualism that is haunting Pakistan is midwifing Taliban 2.0 into an Islamic Emirate. Increasing attacks by terrorist groups like TTP and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s narrative of Durand Line as not an acceptable border despite being fenced is becoming an intractable dispute as indeed the use of Afghan territory for cross border attacks. Despite the NSP’s assertions that the future border policies will be focused on newly “instituted border management initiatives”, skirmishes continue with casualties on both sides. Adding to the above is the growing ideological nexus between the Taliban and TTP which could aggravate both bilateral relations as also the internal security situation in Pakistan. Despite the catastrophic effect of such policies, the internal political ecology and military are not ready to give up while continuing to persist in the same mindset. This has also affected their relationship with the US, and now China is also started realising the nature of the Pakistani State after multiple attacks on Chinese workers in Pakistan and large demonstrations in Gwadar against the state policies.

NSP emphasizes new evolving partnerships with CARs, Russia, and maintains close cooperation with West Asia, particularly Turkey which is emerging as its key international supporter and source for advanced weapons. Underlying motivation for deepening relations with Russia lies maintaining peace and stability post-Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. In addition, the growing India – US strategic partnership, has given Pakistan a Machiavellian common cause to reassess their bilateral ties with Russia. For Russia, developing relations with Pakistan is a low-cost option for stopping radical forces from Afghanistan to its backyard in CARs and North Caucasus.

Traditionally Pakistan has aligned itself with Sunni West Asia, although it has been Iran from whom it has received ideological support. The NSP has just a passing comment on Iran limited to border management while focusing upon gaining strategic support and legitimacy for its policies from the regional organisations, specifically Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

To survive in this environment of geopolitical flux, NSP blandly suggests “bolstering traditional political diplomacy” for economic gains, to attain its strategic interests. This is to be achieved by leveraging Pakistan’s geo-economically pivotal location “as a melting pot of regional and global economic interests”. For this, the NSP emphasises projecting a ‘positive reality.’ It highlights that Pakistan has thus far received negative publicity due to disinformation campaigns by adversaries. This is at best a self-fulfilling perspective, in the backdrop of Pakistan increasingly turning to a highly radicalised society with the increasing role of radical Islamist forces, a weak economy, and continued domination of the armed forces over national security and diplomacy.

Conclusion

The NSP is a primary document meant to guide policymakers and remind them of the country’s national interests. The timing of unveiling this document suggests that Pakistan, which has been surviving on the brink of socio-economic collapse, cannot go any further with the same coercive policies. In a sense, it suggests a structural shift from geopolitics to geo-economics, without providing any clarity on its strategic objectives which may be outlined in the hidden part. Another major shortcoming has been that there are no efforts to build a possible consensus on the suggested policies as they are neither discussed in the National Assembly nor passed by it. It now needs to be seen if the NSP will bring the country out from the crisis or will this be just another political tool like the National Action Plan (NAP) as a short crisis management policy.