ANALYSING CHINA’S NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA

Introduction

China's operational capabilities represent a serious challenge to India's security calculus. China's arsenal is almost certainly on the rise, and the country will exhibit increased preparedness as a consequence. When it comes down to it, India has the daunting task of ensuring the survivability of its nuclear weapons in the event of a first strike against two nuclear-armed neighbours, China and Pakistan.

China became the fifth nuclear weapons state in 1964 by testing its Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) under Project 596 and also pledged a no-first-use policy (NFU). Beijing undertakes “not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon- free zones at any time or under any circumstances”. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs additionally mentions that Beijing “actively promotes the international process of disarmament to safeguard world peace and security”. However, the recent episodes in China present a different picture.

In 2019, China violated the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) norms by conducting a low yield nuclear test at its Lop Nur testing site, according to the findings of the United States compliance report which further goes on to say that Beijing has broken the zero-yield standard which poses a nuclear threat. The zero-yield forbids supercritical nuclear tests but not sub-critical hydrodynamic nuclear tests. This means that any nuclear explosion that produces a self-sustaining, supercritical chain reaction, whether for military or peaceful reasons, is prohibited.

In April 2021, it was also reported that China had landed a ship carrying uranium hexafluoride in Sri Lanka's southern Hambantota port, which is located in India's backyard. It was docked due to a "mechanical emergency," however there was no mention of the cargo-carrying radioactive material. Because the vessel breached Sri Lanka's domestic law, the officials asked the vessel to leave port.

Furthermore, in July 2021, China tested a ballistic missile that has circled the globe in a lower earth orbit. The test exhibited cutting-edge space capabilities and was launched on a rocket carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle that sailed into lower-orbit space before descending to its target. Nonetheless, in September 2021; China built additional long-range missile silos in Gansu province's cities such as Yumen and Hami in Eastern Xinjiang. Beijing’s missile capabilities are also on the rise. It intends to deploy around 200 warheads on Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) over the next five years, as well as to continue building its stockpile of more than 200 DF-26 ground-launched, intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear and conventional warheads. Beijing also began deploying the DF-17, a dual-capable hypersonic glide vehicle system combined with a medium-range ballistic missile.

China’s expanding nuclear capabilities emerged as a serious threat to India's security, regional stability, and nuclear deterrence which plays a vital role in conflict de-escalation. Nuclear deterrence is a military concept that holds the potential of a country to use its nuclear weapons in retaliation and prevents an opponent from striking. India and China, both being Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), are mostly engrossed in conventional conflicts and border standoffs. To mention a few, the Sumdorong Chu Valley occurrences and military stand-offs like Doklam, Depsang, and Galwan are among the most notable ones. Similar incidents in the near future might lead to increased violence in the Indian subcontinent which may eventually affect the nuclear deterrence and strategic stability in the region. The chance of nuclear weapons being deployed is still questionable as both governments have a No First Use (NFU) policy, although many scholars and experts believe nuclear weapons might be used in Asia when push comes to shove. These dynamics are worth analysing in light of what impact China's proliferation will have on India's security? Will there be a nuclear reassessment of India's nuclear posture in light of China's nuclear aspirations and power projection? What about the efficacy of the NFU policy, which is a core tenet of both states' doctrine? The following paper will seek to address these questions

China’s Nuclear Ambitions

China refuses to formally divulge its nuclear weapons, how many it aims to create, or what it plans to do with them, despite having the world's fastest-growing nuclear arsenal. The latest advances in China's northern territories, as well as the country's growing nuclear capabilities, speak volumes about the country's growing potentiality. Former Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, accused China of being the least transparent of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council in his short piece “China’s nuclear madness”

Beijing is concurrently pursuing a nuclear triad on land, air, and at sea, and its capabilities are fast expanding with robust upgradation. China's nuclear build-up is also well supported by President Xi Jinping since the time he came to power. He defined China's nuclear-weapons command as "support for China's standing as a great power". As a part of his aim to develop a "world-class" military by 2049, Former Chinese President Mao Zedong also elevated that command to a separate service known as the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF). PLARF was previously called the Second Artillery Corps is the People's Republic of China's (PRC) land-based strategic and tactical missile force. It is in charge of nuclear and conventional missiles on land and was responsible for the country's small inventory of land-based regional nuclear missiles.

China presently has 350 nuclear warheads. But according to the 2021 US Defence Department's report, China is expediting the development of strategic nuclear weapons intending to amass 700 nuclear warheads by 2027 and 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030. Understanding the current nuclear build-up, China is attempting to pose a threat to the globe and Asia. As China refuses to reveal the number of nuclear weapons it has or plans to build, as well as what it intends to do with them, it poses a more potent threat because of the prevalent opacity with the intent. The overarching goal of China's military modernization is to reach parity and establish deterrence with the US. The nuclear thinking in Beijing intrigues her to pursue additional weapons and delivery systems to withstand an attack and defeat US missile defences. Therefore, China believes to maintain adequate defences and effective delivery systems against the pre-emptive strike. With the expansion of its nuclear arsenal and making inroads into the nuclear arms race, China is bracing for a potential conflict.

Beijing is also reluctant to join hands with U.S and Russia in entering into a new arms control agreement and has also repeatedly rejected Trump administration's demand to join trilateral arms control talks with Russia and repudiated previous calls by the Biden administration to open a bilateral strategic stability dialogue. On the occasion of the United Nations' 75th anniversary, China resisted participating in “trilateral arms control negotiations" with the United States and Russia and urged the two states to significantly reduce their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable, irreversible, and legally binding manner. China is seen to be indifferent in developing and reshaping security partnerships with the United States, Russia, and even India. So far, there has been no bilateral conversation even between India and China concerning their nuclear weapons and how they affect their bilateral relationship and security. Because China engaged in vertical proliferation, it is skeptical towards arms control and consequently unwilling to engage in any dialogue with its neighbours and with the nuclear weapon states.

What Motivates Beijing's Vertical Proliferation?

Vertical proliferation refers to nation-states that already have nuclear weapons but are growing their stockpiles, enhancing the technical sophistication or dependability of existing weapons, or developing new weapons.

In Indian context, China does not feel that the mainstream narrative about New Delhi’s nuclear program, referring to the belief that India built nuclear weapons in reaction to China's own nuclear program, is complete without including India's own desire to become a great power. China feels that India's domestic politics have always influenced its policy options when dealing with other foreign entities such as Pakistan and the United States. As a result, due to the capacity — particularly technological—disparity and the no-war bottom-line intention criterion, China does not perceive India as a security concern. On the other hand, India developed its nuclear program to ameliorate China’s nuclear threat. In October 1962, India's defeat by China in the Himalayan border conflict gave New Delhi administration the impetus to build nuclear weapons as a deterrent to prospective Chinese attack soon.

Concurrently, the Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang triangle is also vital to the geopolitics of not only Northeast Asia, but the whole world. In the case of North Korea, Pyongyang’s continuing perusal of nuclear weapons has increased the security threat to the Korean Peninsula. North Korea’s vertical proliferation has ranked among the top security challenge and therefore in dealing with the North Korean nuclear situation, China and Russia worked closely together. This collaboration was one of the most prominent pieces of evidence of the countries' growing closeness in recent years. But what encourages China’s nuclear thinking in particular?

China's evolving assessments of its geopolitical environment occur at a time when the country's leadership has the financial means to spend heavily in the country's nuclear capabilities due to decades of rapid economic growth. Moreover, the burgeoning cold war between US and China has led Beijing to reassess its arsenal quantitatively.

During the Cold War era, Soviet Union considered that it was important to maintain nuclear weapons on par with Washington to establish real political equality. A situation similar to this is relevant in the context of China. Beijing sees Washington as a security risk and a nuclear power. It also examines global power shifts and the collapse of the Pax Americana, or US dominance over the world. As a result, rather than giving up its nuclear weapons anytime soon via arms control discussions, Beijing is engaged in vertical proliferation of its arsenal.

Strategic Implications for India

The ramifications of China's vertical proliferation for India are manifold. Traditional conflicts with China such as border disputes, stand-offs, ideological differences, economic competition, the balance of power politics and external influencers are the key reasons that continue to affect the existing relationship and induce nuclear conflict. As a result, an overture to nuclear diplomacy is becoming increasingly vital in order to reduce the threat and avert conflict. There is an absence of nuclear talks between India and China unlike the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War. As China's arsenal is growing with greater readiness, New Delhi's anxiety towards deterrence stability will eventually increase. India faces a dilemma on the size and extent of its arsenal. This anxiety would in due course intrigue New Delhi to work on its command structures and to assure the survivability of its arsenal in the event of a first strike.

A nuclear rivalry is strategic between two nuclear-armed states. It has the potential to drag India economic resources into a nuclear arms race in the subcontinent, which might provide an effective deterrence to China while draining the nations' resources. But the challenges that New Delhi faces go beyond merely deterring China. India is burdened by the fact that China has a larger nuclear arsenal than India. As India adheres to an NFU and an assured retaliation posture, the endurance of its nuclear assets is crucial. Hence, if China proliferates, building up the nuclear arsenals might be a dominant theme in India’s nuclear thinking.

India must also keep a close eye on the extent and potential scale of Beijing's nuclear capabilities. Since March 2021, the development of a nuclear missile silo field in China's western Xinjiang province (north of Indian Territory) implies that China is deploying a greater nuclear force based on fixed land-based capabilities. The facility is thought to house 110 silos. The most likely reason for China's nuclear arsenal growth is to maximize and ensure its survival chances against the first strike by its nuclear foes.

The newest silos development has troubling sets of ramifications for India. Firstly, this might spark new nuclear arms races and jeopardize deterrence stability in South Asia. It would also intrigue New Delhi to continue to grow its nuclear weapons to provide it with the capability to target China- something India now lacks. Secondly, the growth of China’s nuclear arsenal could also have a direct impact on India, considering the region's proximity to China’s testing sites in Xinjiang region.

More importantly, it is likely to have an impact on the on-going border de-escalation talks between the two countries in Eastern Ladakh region. Beijing's nuclear build up in India's northern part may provide coercive force, allowing the Chinese to secure their territorial gains in Depsang, Demchok, and Gogra Hot Springs, which is likely to have a suppressive effect on any traditional military escalation. The most severe and negative implication for India is that New Delhi will be forced to accept China's fait accompli.

The efficiency of the NFU policy will also be a major subject of debate. Many political scientists have argued that if push comes to shove resulting in failing the deterrence, small skirmishes might evolve into a full-fledged war, potentially leading to nuclear war. This might circumvent the government's "no-first-use" policy with wide-ranging consequences.

Firstly, qualitative improvement and a comprehensive rebuilding of new nuclear arsenals and recalibrating them into hair-trigger alerts will be of utmost importance. This will necessitate entirely new command and control structures, as well as new postures. Second, to avoid mishaps during the nuclear conflict, nuclear weapons will require a very sophisticated and advanced delivery mechanism. Thirdly, large arsenals with counterforce capabilities need to be built. Currently, India follows a counter-value targeting wherein the nuclear retaliation would be targeted toward the adversaries' prominent cities. Counterforce ability requires a more agile deployed force to target the arsenals and military establishments. Lastly, it would give rise to the ‘use or lose dilemma’, both sides, during a potential conflict, with hair-trigger command structures, will be unaware of which side will use the nuclear weapon first. This might put India in a delirious position. Nonetheless, the pressure from Indian civil society would be immense, with the backlog on repairing the embedded nuclear technology attracting the attention of many Indian researchers and opposition parties. It would impose mental coercion on the political elite to coerce nuclear thought.

Finally, fully operationalizing India's arsenal comes with its own set of risks. Even if India attempts to equal China's quantitative capabilities, it risks jeopardising the conflict's stability. Indian officials and strategists would have to examine the implications of any potential expansion on each of India's current conflicts. Apart from that, if international pressure builds, the combined pressures, coupled with China's and Pakistan's expanding arsenals, will make it more difficult for New Delhi to resist expanding its arsenal.

As a result, if China builds its nuclear capabilities in a more robust manner, the economic, political, diplomatic, and domestic repercussions for India are manifold.

Conclusion

It may be reasonably assumed that China's aspirations are linked with her ultimate aim of making the country great again by 2049. China believes that the United States is a retreating power and China is a revisionist power, but what about a responsible power?

If claimed for the big power status, responsibilities must be met. A careless power might endanger everyone in its path. China's irresponsible behaviour during the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak and the aggressive strongman polity on the mainland makes the whole world concerned about her nuclear developments.

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) paraded nuclear-capable missiles in Beijing in 2019. The exhibition was about 3 miles long—roughly ten times the length of the same part a decade before, and only a fraction of the whole arsenal. The parade also included the Dongfeng-41 missile, which has a 30-minute range and could target America's borders. According to the US Department of State, China will deploy those missiles in silos and on mobile platforms in the near future, and if current trends continue, China's entire nuclear arsenals will more than double in the next decade.

Conversely, India is a rising economic superpower with a strong democratic polity. India, as the responsible nuclear state since 1998, advocates for total nuclear disarmament. At the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1998, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi advocated that a world free of nuclear weapons be attained through an 'Action Plan for Ushering in a Nuclear-Weapon- Free and Non-Violent World Order.' Nuclear deterrence, according to Rajiv Gandhi, is the "ultimate embodiment of the mentality of terrorism, keeping humanity hostage to the imagined security demands of a few." He suggested a three-stage approach to total disarmament, with the emphasis on a worldwide, universal, and non-discriminatory system.

History should not teach us the wrong lessons. During the cold war, the US and the Soviet Union were at odds, but they realized long ago that those big nations must act responsibly with the world's most destructive weapons as must China, which proclaims to be a major nation today. India's nuclear capabilities in comparison to China are not where they should be, and they may develop if Beijing continues to weaponise its nuclear programme; as a result.

A s the nuclear issue will continue to challenge the policymakers in New Delhi, India must work on a discourse that aids in the stabilization of India- China's military-strategic relationship and strike a dialogue leading to a new nuclear diplomacy.

India and China have forged a complicated relationship. To mention a few, the border conflict in Galwan in 2020 has brought military patience to an end and future incidents of terrible violence on the horizon. The military struggle became lethal for the first time in forty-five years, and bullets were fired. The military and political decision-making sectors are becoming increasingly interwoven as a result of the challenge of time compression in crises.

This needs more contact between civilian and military leaders, as well as awareness of the organisational implications of this integration in both peacetime and crisis situations. Both sides must proceed with prudence, since if engagement fails and deterrence breaks down, we may be thrust into a new world with new command structures aligned with new nuclear postures on hair- trigger alerts. To keep up with the changing world, India may need to reassess its nuclear posture and supplement its current arsenal with strategic capabilities such as cyber, electronic, and space weapons to deliver more effective credible deterrence.