FACTION POLITICS IN CHINA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 20TH PARTY CONGRESS

Introduction

Chinese leaders and officials often take pride in China’s one-party political system. Elite leaders in China make attempts to project unity amongst themselves by adopting a top-down approach and adhering to a general party line on all important decisions. However, China’s political system is not as monolithic as projected. Many scholars across the world have highlighted the presence of factional groupings spearheaded by elite leaders in China. These factions have a tremendous impact on China’s domestic politics and have often shaped the course of policymaking.

This brand of politics is often referred to as ‘informal politics’ since China’s official literature rarely acknowledges the existence of such groups at the top level. However, scholarly literature available on China’s elite politics considers factionalism as one of the integral features of its political system.2 Nonetheless, there remains a degree of confusion over what factions exist and the amount of influence they possess. For instance, Xinhua news agency once made a reference to the existence of petroleum gang (石油帮), secretary gang (秘书帮) and Shanxi gang (山西帮). However, these groups are better identified as pressure groups who work from outside the government and are mainly interested in policymaking which suit their particular economic interests. Hence, these groups do not constitute political factions which directly participate in power struggle.

In Chinese society, guanxi (关系) — which implies establishing personal connections or relations — has a significant influence. It has been a widely accepted principle for centuries and applies to all aspects of society. Extension of this guanxi principle in the political system of China is largely responsible for the development of factional groups within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). These factional groups are known by different names like bāngpài 帮派 (Gang), jítuán 集团 (Group), tuánhuǒ 团伙 (Clique) or quānzi 圈子 (Circle). These factions claim unity among members on the basis of common background, either educational or professional, similar policy orientations or by maintaining personal relations. Hence, these factions concern themselves with particular group interests which include economic or other public policy matters.

For instance, in the early 1990s, the pro-reform faction in China was further divided into those who support rapid growth led by Deng Xiaoping and those who support gradual growth led by Chen Yun. These factions had ideological differences over the structure of Special Economic Zones (SEZ). This rift led to increasing demand for the abolition of SEZs at the 8th plenum of 13th party congress in 1991 by Chen Yun’s faction. As a final resort, Deng had to undertake a famous Southern tour (南巡) to ensure that his factional colleague Jiang Zemin assumes the highest office and continue with economic reforms. Thus, factional politics has played a crucial role in Chinese politics for many years to such an extent that the political system has been called ‘one party, two coalitions.’ It is because, at any given time, there exists at least two factions in elite politics of China. This ‘Chinese style of democracy’ has a huge impact on policy making and thus, makes it an important factor to understand China’s domestic politics.

Evolution of Factions in China

In order to gain political legitimacy, CCP evolved a patronage system in which the top leader would appoint his associates to different positions. Due to good working relations between the patron and his associates, it ensured policy stability at different levels. Hence, under the patronage of a strong leader at the top, different factions were built in Chinese politics. During the Mao period and initial years of Deng Xiaoping, factions were largely based on loyalty and mutual trust rather than a common background or shared history. Often, career security and possibility of promotions guided factionalism from lower levels to top levels in politics. Hence, differences based on opposing policy orientations were largely absent during this period. Past commitments and personal relationships with the top leaders constrained the choices of cadres and thus, they usually ended up supporting policies that could benefit their factions. Moreover, factions earlier formed against a common opponent were later fragmented further. For example, Mao vs Liu Shaoqi split was followed by Mao vs Lin Biao and later a gang of four vs Deng-Zhou Enlai. Similarly, Mao’s centralized rule did not allow other leaders to strengthen their own factions. Especially after the failure of Lin Biao’s failed coup attempt against Mao, coupled with other purges during the cultural revolution, no top leader dared to strengthen their factions.

After Mao’s authoritarian regime ended, Deng Xiaoping aimed to introduce ‘collective leadership’ in the CCP governance. Although Deng wanted to prohibit the development of personality cult in Chinese politics, this actually provided a budding ground for different factions to come together with power-sharing arrangements. It left factions stronger than before as factionalism became more of a ‘non-zero-sum game’. After 1978, when a campaign began to eliminate supporters of the ‘Gang of four’, there were still small factions who supported the gang and opposed Deng’s policies. The opposition from these anti-Deng factions became stronger in the 1980s as Deng intensified his efforts to control the CCP. This was further aggravated when Deng 

preferred to place his associates like Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. Moreover, Deng’s active support to pro-reform policies put his faction at odds with party elders led by Chen Yun who demanded gradual reforms. This was probably the first time that the CCP was openly divided into factions based on policy preferences.

Deng indeed tried to bring some kind of institutionalization in the system of personnel appointments which may have reduced the significance of factionalism. However, top-level appointment system still remained largely under-institutionalized, leaving a way for leaders to promote their factional affiliations. In recent times, factors like age limit, qualifications (technocrats), and leadership experience have gained prominence in the personnel appointments. However, the factional affiliations still play a huge part in Chinese politics as it helps leaders benefit from informal rule-free politics.

Current Factions in China

Due to ambiguity surrounding the existence of factions in Chinese politics, it is difficult to ascertain the total number of factions in China. However, the available literature suggests that there are two main factional groups in China with significant influence over policymaking and personnel appointments. These are – Shanghai gang (上海帮) and Communist Youth League (共青团派). These are referred to as ‘elitist coalition’ and ‘populist coalition’ respectively. In the last decade, a new Xi faction (习近平派) has also emerged with Xi Jinping as their leader.

The Shanghai Gang

The Shanghai gang, led by Jiang Zemin is a faction that comprises leaders close to Jiang during his tenure in Shanghai as a mayor. Although this group is widely known as the Shanghai group, leaders in this faction came from other coastal provinces too. Thus, Xi Jinping, who was appointed to regulate Xiamen SEZ in 1985, also came under the influence of this faction. This faction has been dominant in China’s elite politics since late 1980s which is evident from the fact that seven provincial secretaries from Shanghai have been elevated to Politburo Standing Committee since 1989. After Jiang Zemin, the second most important leader from this faction was Zeng Qinghong, who accompanied Jiang from Shanghai to Beijing in the 1990s and became the head of the Organization department during Jiang’s rule. When Jiang Zemin retired in 2002, Zeng took over this faction by entering the Politburo Standing Committee and later became the Vice- President of China from 2003 to 2008. Jiang and Zeng also ensured that not only in Beijing, but top positions in other provinces are also occupied by their associates which further strengthened this faction.

Furthermore, the dominance of this faction was not restricted to personnel appointments, but also reflected in policymaking. During Jiang’s rule, Shanghai and other coastal provinces received preferential treatment, partly as efforts for China’s liberalization reforms and also due to Jiang’s trust in top level officials in these provinces.20 Such lopsided development in coastal provinces had led to many economic problems in inland regions of China.

The Youth League

The second major faction that still holds significant influence is the CCYL. Hu Jintao was appointed as the general secretary in 2002 which began the domination of the CCYL faction in China’s elite politics. CCYL was formed in 1925 as a successor of the Chinese Socialist Youth League. Although it was started with an objective to recruit youth into Chinese politics, there were hardly any CCYL leaders who rose to prominence in Beijing till 2002, with the exception of Hu Yaobang. With Hu Jintao’s rise to power, CCYL saw a rapid rise in their strength. In 2004, CCYL had 25.4 lakhs cells and 71.88 million members. Hence, the CCYL faction was created out of local and provincial officials who worked in different provinces but had a similar career trajectory which started from CCYL. Similarly, it involved other officials who had formed close connections with Hu Jintao, Li Keqiang or then General Secretary of CCYL Song Defu between 1982 to 1998. In 2005, 13 provincial secretaries and governors and seven ministers in State Council were from the CCYL faction. However, CCYL’s power consolidation had been limited due to lack of close connections within the army and SOEs.25 Rather, advantage for this faction lies in their higher educational qualifications and more professional experience than their rivals from other factions.

Jiang Zemin extended the code of civility established by Deng for the inter-factional relations. Deng’s idea to choose both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao as successors pacified both Shanghai and the Chinese Communist Youth League faction (CCYL) factions respectively. Thus, both factions constituted a power-sharing arrangement in which both were adequately represented at the top level. This system continued even during the Hu Jintao period.

On the policy matters, CCYL leaders are considered as more inclusive than Shanghai or princeling factions. The biggest contribution of the CCYL faction lies in reorienting development to inland regions of China from coastal provinces. This ‘populist faction’ is often known for focusing on concerns of vulnerable groups like farmers and migrant workers. With regards to the split between Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, the differences between Shanghai and CCYL factions on policy initiatives is quite visible. Xi Jinping has served in relatively richer provinces like Shanghai and Zhejiang due to which his focus is largely on grand ideals like ‘Chinese dream’ and ‘great rejuvenation’. On the contrary to this, Li Keqiang has served in relatively underdeveloped provinces like Henan and Liaoning, resulting in policies being more pragmatic and effective. Thus, opposition of Xi and many of his close associates to ‘Street vendor economy’ comes from these inherent ideological differences.

The Princelings

Another major faction in Chinese politics that was dominant until few years ago was the princeling (太子党) faction. This faction comprised family members of the revolutionary veterans or other high-ranking officials. These leaders have certain advantages over others due to their proximity to the power structures. Xi Jinping, the son of a revolutionary leader and former Vice- Premier Xi Zhongxun, is himself a princeling. Such leaders are generally referred to as ‘second red generation’ (红二代) or ‘red nobility’ (红贵). These princelings have significant advantage over other leaders in their career advancements within the CCP due to networks established by their family background. Lack of political reforms in China had further made this group stronger in the 1990s and early 2000s.

At the 18th Party Congress in 2012, princelings faction which itself is closely linked to Shanghai faction, asserted its authority by appointing Xi Jinping as the supreme leader of China. On the other hand, Hu Jintao only managed to place his protégé Li Keqiang in Politburo Standing Committee.33 However, questions were raised over the effectiveness of princelings faction as most of its leaders began reaching their retirement age. Similarly, lack of ideological coherence has also led to the downfall of this faction. Moreover, with Xi Jinping’s efforts to create his own faction, this princeling faction has almost dissipated from Chinese politics. Similarly, Chinese people have also become politically more aware than before and thus, their tolerance level for undue ‘aristocratic privileges’ enjoyed by princelings, has gone down. 

Moreover, investigation groups established by Xi Jinping in 2007 concluded that the princelings group was the most severe challenge for Xi’s rise to power. Thus, after ascending the throne in 2012, Xi Jinping himself systematically removed princelings like Bo Xilai from key positions. This is evident from the fact that the number of princelings in the politburo standing committee drastically reduced from three (18th party congress) to zero in 19th Party Congress. Instead, members of Xi’s own faction gained stature.

The Xi Clique

As soon as Xi Jinping ascended power in 2012 using his princelings and Shanghai connections, there were predictions that he would follow the footsteps of his predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao to strengthen his current faction. However, Xi Jinping has succeeded in placing his close associates from Zhejiang-Fujian at important positions in different sectors of China. Even though Xi Jinping’s team has officials from Hebei, Zhejiang, Shanghai and Shaanxi, there exists some dominance of Fujian officials. This is natural considering the fact that Xi Jinping has spent 17 years of his political career in Fujian, and thus, gained more allies from that province. Some of the examples are - Huang Kunming, who is currently the Director of CCP Propaganda Department and Air Force Commander Xu Qilang from Fujian who is currently the Vice Chair of the Central Military Commission, only next to Xi in military ranks.

Xi Jinping era has also witnessed revival of an old faction called Tsinghua clique which comprises a group of graduates from Tsinghua University in different years. Earlier, this group included leaders like Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo, Huang Zhu and others. Even during the pre- independent civil war against the Kuomintang (KMT), Tsinghua was an active place for communist student movement. In the later period, Tsinghua University had produced 280 cadres who served at provincial or central level till 2011. More importantly, 9 members from the politburo standing committee until 2011 had connections with Tsinghua University. However, this group has become more active in the Xi era. Xi Jinping himself is a graduate from Tsinghua University. Chen Xi, the current head of the Organization Department, is an important ally of Xi from their Tsinghua days.

As soon as Xi became a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, Chen Xi was also promoted to Beijing as a Vice Minister of the Education Ministry. The current deputy director of the Propaganda Department Hu Heping also belongs to the Tsinghua group and is likely to be promoted to Politburo at 20th Party Congress. His work experience under Chen Xi will probably earn him an important position. This group has become significant in Chinese politics due to the current trend to recruit more technocrats. This was made possible because the Tsinghua University administration had set up a system that identified talented students and trained them to ultimately occupy key government and party positions. The university has also maintained a strong alumni association which helps young candidates to learn faster than other young leaders. This group has become an important pool for Xi Jinping to create his own faction. Members of the Tsinghua group are recruited to provide expertise in policymaking and thus, lack a coherent ideological base. Thus, it is difficult to call the Tsinghua group a faction. However, their dominance in China’s politics cannot be denied.

Weakening of Factions in Xi Era

Although the 18th party congress in 2012 had a mix of Shanghai faction and CCYL faction, Xi Jinping ensured that the 19th congress had a majority of Xi’s factional allies. As a result, around 60 percent of Politburo members of the 19h congress have direct connections with Xi Jinping. The dominance of factionalism goes to the extent that two of these politburo members were promoted from outside the Central Committee, something which has not happened since 1992. Moreover, we can also see the dominance of Xi faction within the Politburo standing committee with 3 out of 7 members belonging to his factional group. To some extent, Xi Jinping also interfered in lower-level appointments to ensure that his proteges could occupy important positions

Moreover, Xi Jinping also employed other measures to reaffirm his factional dominance in politics. These measures included diminishing the role of collective leadership, formalising leading small groups and altering CCP’s recruitment pattern.  As another part of these efforts to undermine rival factions, the CPC mouthpiece People’s Daily recently published an article that criticized formation of factions at local level, but did not mention any factions within elite politicians. Similarly, the article also warned that anyone who tries to form factions within the CCP is severely punished. For instance, Sun Lijun, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Public Security was purged last year on the allegations of attempts to form a gang within CCP.

Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption drive was also aimed at eliminating his political rivals from different factions. Ling Jihua, Hu Jintao’s former chief of staff was prosecuted on the basis of corruption charges. However, state media later revealed that Ling Jihua was the leader of Xishan Society. This group is speculated to have leaders and businessmen from Shanxi, the largest coal producer province in China. This group was allegedly formed to oppose Xi Jinping and his associate Geng Yanbo’s policies in Shanxi which destroyed the coal industry in Shanxi. Similarly, China’s notorious ‘petroleum gang’ also became the victim of Xi’s purge in 2014. Zhou Yongkang, member of the 17th Politburo Standing Committee, was considered as the leader of this gang who had deep connections in China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). He and his close associates in the gang were severely punished under corruption charges in 2014-15.

Other than prosecuting political leaders linked to rival factions, Xi Jinping has also purged people in the entertainment sector who were closely connected to these factions. The methods included tax inspections of celebrities, regulations on online streaming and shutting down recruitment agencies. Recent examples of this include ban on famous Chinese actress Zhao Wei’s work in the name of ‘rectification’ (整风) campaign. This purge was suspected to have been largely motivated by her close connection with Jiang Zemin’s Shanghai gang. There are many such examples which indicate Xi’s determination to eliminate all links connected to his rival factions. Due to all these measures, there is a possibility that there may be anti-Xi sentiments among some top leaders, especially those who are not directly connected to Xi Jinping. However, these leaders would continue to pay lip service to Xi until he remains in control of the party. Hence, it is likely that the Xi faction will dominate Chinese politics at least until Xi remains in power.

Significance for 20th Party Congress

The 19th Politburo standing committee has a clear dominance of the newly emerged Xi faction. Even the CCYL faction has somehow held the ground till today. Xi’s efforts to eliminate CCYL has not succeeded completely since Li Keqiang and Wang Yang, both from the CCYL faction, continue to hold important positions in the 19th Politburo Standing Committee. With the possible retirement of Li Keqiang, he is likely to be replaced by Hu Chunhua who is also considered as the member of CCYL faction. Such a replacement from a non-Xi faction could be made possible due to Hu’s biaotai (political signalling) in favour of Xi, showing that despite being from a different faction, he can be identified as a loyalist. He is also being touted as Xi’s successor, if traditional regime change norms are to be followed.

In any case, Hu Chunhua is likely to earn an important position in Chinese politics and continue to represent the CCYL faction. Wang Yang is another standing committee member from the CCYL faction who is likely to be retained and has experience of managing agriculture and foreign trade as a Vice-Premier. His continuation is important for the smooth implementation of policies initiated by China for the post-pandemic recovery. Beyond these changes, there is a very distant possibility that Xi will allow any member from CCYL or Shanghai faction to enter the highest decision-making body of China.

Further, Wang Huning and Han Zheng who were once close to the Shanghai faction, seem to have defected to the Xi faction. Thus, the influence of Shanghai faction has nearly dissipated from China’s elite politics. Although there are speculations that the Zeng-Jiang group (Shanghai faction), also known as ‘Iron cap princes’ is leading an anti-Xi group, it is highly unlikely that this group will pose a challenge to Xi’s authority. Unlike his predecessors, Xi Jinping does not have to face the political necessity to balance other factions in the political system. Thus, Xi’s absolute control over the CCP and its important bodies will also intensify his efforts to appoint members from his faction to lower levels of governance.

Hence, with people from only the Xi faction at important positions, we may say that factionalism will cease to have significance at least in personnel appointments at the 20th party congress. However, its significance in policymaking is likely to continue as both Xi faction and CCYL represent different economic interests. China’s post-pandemic recovery initiatives and its poverty alleviation programmes need to be implemented by CCYL leaders who usually have more grassroot experience than Xi’s faction members. Thus, we would likely see the existence of the CCYL faction even after the 20th party congress. However, this group would not be as strong as before which can challenge Xi’s authority. On the other hand, one of the members of Shanghai faction Guo Shengkun is likely to be retired due to the age limit norm. With this, the Jiang faction will cease to exist in elite politics of China considering the trend that most members from this faction have pledged their allegiance to Xi due to fear of purge. Similarly, a new trend to employ more technocrats from diverse backgrounds will be crucial to tone down the role of factionalism. Thus, Xi’s campaign against rival factions and China’s present national interests suggest that factionalism would become a less reliable factor to gauge China’s future domestic politics.

Conclusion

Recent studies show that factional ties highly increase the chances of career advancements up to the CPC Central Committee. A study conducted by Francois and others infers that the members of a factional group have more than 10 percentage higher chances of promotions than a neutral member. If a leader of that faction is in the top leadership, this probability further increases. With Xi at the top, this proportion is likely to increase as Xi’s intolerance towards rival factions has been evident through his anti-corruption campaign and other similar measures. Moreover, with the rise of technocrats in China’s political system in recent years, it is likely that the relevance of factionalism will reduce and personnel appointments will become more institutionalized. This may again shift the focus from factional affiliations to meritocracy with regards to personnel appointments. Further, there is a high possibility that Xi Jinping’s policy preferences like common prosperity, technological self-reliance, etc. will gain more momentum with Xi’s proteges in charge of implementing these policies. As for the 20th Party Congress, Xi faction leaders are most likely to occupy important positions. It will be interesting to see whether Xi’s successor in future would follow his footsteps and create a separate faction against his political master. Otherwise, factionalism would certainly become a less reliable factor to gauge Chinese politics in the near future.