CHINA’S INCREASING INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL ASIA

• China hosted the inaugural China-Central Asia Summit on the 18^th and 19^th of May 2023 in Xi’an, in Shaanxi province. President Xi Jinping chaired the summit and delivered the keynote address. The summit was attended by the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. During his address, Xi highlighted the need for China and the Central Asian nations to work together for a China-Central Asia community. He further emphasised on the importance of sticking to the four principles, viz. mutual assistance, common development, universal security and everlasting friendship. Through this, it is clear that China is making efforts to increase its influence in Central Asia. In this context, it is important to analyse China’s interests in Central Asia and its strategy towards the region.
  
  
• The increasing influence of Beijing in the Central Asian region has been visible since the Russia-Ukraine conflict started in February 2022. With Russia preoccupied with a crisis on its Western side, China has found herself with an opportunity to fill the power vacuum in Central Asia. The change in the balance of power in the region presents China with an opportunity to replace Russia in terms of influence on the foreign and economic policies of the countries in the region.
  
  
• Beijing considers Central Asia as its ‘near abroad’. China shares a border of more than 7000 kilometres with the Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The shared borders with the Central Asian countries in the troubled regions like Afghanistan and China’s provinces like Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) also add to its concerns for securing its borders. The extremism and political instability leading to crisis conditions in its “near abroad” is bad for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) given that the security conditions in the region prove hostile for Chinese investments.
  
  

Fig: Map of Central Asia (via Nations Online Project)

China’s Interests in the Region

• China has strategic interests in the Central Asian region for many reasons. Firstly, China’s XUAR shares borders with three of the five countries in Central Asia, viz. Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Given the volatility of the region due to shared borders with XUAR and in addition to that, political and economic instability in Central Asia, it is in China’s own interests to increase its presence in the region to protect its security goals. Central Asia acts as a buffer zone between the unstable regions like Afghanistan and the XUAR. The activities of transnational criminal organisations and extremist groups further adds to China’s concerns.
  
• Secondly, China also has commercial interests in the region. The Central Asian countries are known for rich reserves of hydrocarbons and rare earth elements. China’s energy hungry domestic market has high demands for Central Asian oil and gas resources.
  
  
• Thirdly, besides energy resources, Central Asia is also important to China for other minerals and investment opportunities. China gets around 21 per cent of its zinc, 20 per cent of lead and 10 per cent of other inorganic chemical products from the Central Asian region. The data from the Ministry of Commerce shows that China’s direct investment in the Central Asian countries totalled to around $15 billion by the end of 2022.
  
  
• Central Asia’s geographical proximity as well as its cheap labour reduces the cost of production and logistics for China. Its geographical location allows it to become a land bridge and transit hub from China to Europe. Thus, in China’s pivot to Europe — in order to secure a market for its goods and a source of high technology — the Central Asian countries have a critical role to play.

China’s Strategy Towards Central Asia

• China’s strategy towards Central Asia is based on three main principles: non-interference in the internal affairs of the countries; economic cooperation; and improving its own reputation in the eyes of the Central Asian countries. China’s cooperation with its neighbours in Central Asia is also based on the “war against three evils”, viz. terrorism, extremism, and separatism. The increasing importance being given to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) also showcases Beijing’s interests in prioritising the Central Asian countries. China declared that Beijing’s agenda to fight the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism is through the SCO. Thus, China considers the SCO  of paramount importance to achieving stability in the region.
  
  
• China attaches great concern to its perceived security threats from the non-state actors in the region, like a possible spillover of “Islamic terrorism” and trafficking into the Xinjiang province, or an attack on the Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure or personnel. In this regard, China funds and trains Tajik troops on the Tajik-Afghan border. The aim is to prevent the spread of terrorism beyond the region and to prevent the spillover effects into Tibet and Xinjiang. China aims to incrementally achieve its security goals in the region through the SCO and the China-Central Asia mechanism. China views the SCO as instrumental in keeping the Uighur separatists in check. China also cooperates with these countries to combat illicit activities like trafficking of drugs, weapons, and transborder security problems.
  
• China engages multilaterally with its Central Asian neighbours in institution building, commerce and trade. Several friendly military-to-military exchanges and military confidence-building measures (CBMs) were established with the Central Asian countries through the Shanghai Five and the SCO. The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) military diplomacy towards Central Asia accounts for a total of 5 per cent of its interactions. Besides the PLA, the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) also plays an important role in China’s military diplomacy, where they are involved in the training and exercises with the local police forces of the Central Asian countries. With China being a major exporter of military equipment, the Central Asian countries are a big market for China’s military and military-related equipment. As a case in point, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan possess Chinese-made drones while Turkmenistan possesses advanced air defence systems from China. China also provides the countries with assistance in acquiring Chinese military technology and in professional military education.
  
  
• In the recent China-Central Asia summit, China signed several agreements with the Central Asian countries. With Uzbekistan, cooperation in the areas of trade, energy, agriculture and digital technology was agreed upon. The China Railway Construction Corp (CRCC) and State Power Investment Corp have agreed to invest in a 1,000-megawatt power plant project in Kyrgyzstan. China Oil and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO), the Chinese state-owned food giant, will work with the agriculture ministry in Kazakhstan. With Kazakhstan alone, China signed 47 agreements that amount to $22 billion.
  
  
• A new regional security mechanism was initiated in 2016 that consists of China, Tajikistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan aimed to maintain stability in the region. Under this mechanism, the chiefs of general staff of the four countries meet regularly. Furthermore, under the “Cooperation 2019”, a new format of military exercises launched in 2019, China conducts military exercises with the paramilitaries of the countries. In this series of exercises which mainly focus on counter-terrorism operations, the Chinese PAPF engaged with the local police forces of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
  
  
• Traditionally Central Asia has been “central” to the geopolitics of the broader Eurasia region. China has changed the game by centering Central Asia for its geo-economic imperatives by giving the region a crucial role in its Belt and Road Initiative that aims go beyond the region to reach the Middle East and Europe. China’s trade with the Central Asian countries has increased exponentially to US$70.2 billion by 2022. By the end of March 2023, the foreign direct investment in the Central Asian countries had crossed US$15 billion. Another key area of cooperation between China and Central Asia includes the gas pipelines that have been operational even before the launch of BRI, which led to a smoother cooperation under the BRI. Several railway projects (which also extend to reach Iran and the Caucasus) that connect China to the Central Asian countries have also been initiated by China. The aim of such projects is to provide access to the sea to the landlocked Central Asian countries.
  
  
• China also displays its soft power diplomacy in its engagements with the Central Asian countries. China aims to create a positive image of itself on the global stage. The same applies for its strategy towards Central Asia as well. The Confucius Institutes are highly symbolic in this respect. China has 37 branches of the Confucius Institutes in Central Asia. In Kazakhstan alone, there are more than 10,000 students studying in the Confucius Institutes. China also issues scholarships and educational grants for the students from Central Asia through the Education Ministry and the Chinese Language International Council.

Challenges

• Despite several strategic measures undertaken by China, there are some challenges that China’s relations with Central Asia. A major challenge to China’s strategy in Central Asia is the growing resentment against the Chinese investments due to the concerns over China’s debt trap tactics. The Central Asian countries experience a trade deficit vis-a-vis China which adds to their apprehensions about the Chinese debt trap. With around 50 per cent of external debt coming from China, both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are at high risk of the debt trap. The rest of the countries in Central Asia including Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan also owe China 16.9 per cent, 16 per cent and 6.5 per cent of their GDP respectively.
  
  
• The current global anti-China perceptions also become a challenge to China’s pursuit for influence in Central Asia. While the governments of the Central Asia countries engage positively with China, the public perceptions of China in these countries is concerning for China with the Sino phobic protests in Kazakhstan in 2016 as a case in point.
  
  
• China’s interests in Central Asia are driven by its interests like resources, market etc. While that is there, the identity factor has an important role to play in reception of China in Central Asia. The controversial and alleged detentions of people in Xinjiang have been the reason for protests at the Chinese embassies in Central Asia. While identity related issues may not be an immediate cause of concern for the geoeconomics interests, it may however hamper the economic cooperation in the long run.
  
  
• The transborder activities in the region like terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking along with the political instability in the region adds to the concerns of the parties involved. The vacuum left by the withdrawal of United States of America from Afghanistan increases the probability of spill over of such challenges into the Central Asian countries.
  
  
•  However, despite several challenges, China and the Central Asian countries are becoming closer than ever before with closer cooperation in diverse sectors ranging from trade and economy to military and defence, as it can be witnessed in the numerous steps being undertaken by both the sides to cultivate such cooperation. One such step is the recent China-Central Asia summit that was hosted by China during May, 2023

The China-Central Asia Summit, 2023

• In this light, the recent China-Central Asia summit has witnessed several positive steps towards the direction of cooperation. In the Summit, economy and trade remained the key priorities of the discussion. China presented several proposals for economic cooperation wherein BRI forms an important part. China is also pushing for greater security cooperation due to the increased militancy in the Xinjiang province. The summit resulted in several long-term agreements and the creation of a number of platforms for multilateral cooperation and development. Several of these initiatives have been agreed upon by the highest levels of authorities of all the participant countries. Therefore, there are lucrative opportunities for investors, especially for Chinese investments. This also provides opportunities for countries beyond Central Asia and China to engage in the region. Besides the states’ cooperation, the people-to-people exchanges are also expected to see a rise due to the agreements on visa-free travel and encouragement by the states.

China’s Increasing Influence and Its Implications

• China is eager to engage in multilateral mechanisms to enhance economic cooperation, given the increasing geopolitical significance of Central Asia. With its diplomatic efforts, China is trying to build a positive image for itself and secure the confidence of the Central Asian countries. Central Asia is of great importance to China for both the resources and also because it could act as a transit hub for goods from China to Europe. Central Asia’s stability is also critical for China’s national security. In this backdrop, the recent Xian summit leaves China with a major role to play in Central Asia as it looks to fill the power vacuum in the region. China is also important for the Central Asian countries in the absence of a security provider. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan adds to the security concerns while also leaving space for China. Therefore, Beijing finds itself with both a necessity and an opportunity to engage in Central Asia and increase its footprint in the region.
  
  
• China is establishing the foundations for a Pax Sinica order in Central Asia by making inroads in the key sectors of the economy, including defence sector as well as through its military engagements with the countries in the region. Beijing’s readiness to play an active and stabilising role in Central Asia also signals the emerging Pax Sinica in Central Asia. With Russia busy with its war on Ukraine, China is exploiting the power vacuum in Central Asia to replace Russian influence.
  
  
• While China and Russia may collide in their race for supremacy in the region, China’s growing presence in Central Asia must also be closely watched by India given its strategic interests in the region. China’s increasing security footprint in the region also holds strategic implications for India as it would limit the autonomy in the policies of the Central Asian countries. While China’s presence in the region worries India, it can also be seen as an opportunity as the Central Asian countries try to strategically engage with India to counterbalance China. India has been closely engaging with the Central Asian countries in the recent years, which is witnessed in India’s efforts to expand security cooperation with the Central Asian countries. It can be said that the presence of India in the region will act as a major balancer against China’s influence in the region.

Conclusion

• It is thus clear that Central Asia as a region holds geopolitical and geo-economic significance for China. China places a great importance to the region as it was witnessed in its BRI strategy as well as in the recent China-Central Asia summit of May 2023. In line with its interests, China is gradually increasing its presence in the region. Russia being busy with a conflict on its East made China’s job easier to replace Russian influence. Such alarming presence of China has also been viewed with suspicion by countries like India, that are developing their own strategies to tackle China’s increasing influence in the Central Asian region.