For India, Japan’s expanding commitments are an opportunity to inject new energy into its diplomatic and institutional outreach to South and Southeast Asia.
This piece was originally published on Tokyo Review. Read it here.
Since Japan and India announced their intention to undertake third-country cooperation in 2020, the two countries have become closer than ever to undertaking projects in countries across the Bay of Bengal region. The foundation for third-country cooperation in South Asia had already been laid, given that India has been the largest recipient of Japan’s Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) since 2003, particularly for the road network of India’s North-East.
Yet the significance of these projects goes beyond simply connectivity, and with Beijing betting against Japan’s involvement in India’s North-East, extending development cooperation to countries across the Bay of Bengal region takes on a geopolitical significance. Such third-country cooperation in South Asia will shape competition for influence in the developing world, the balance of power along India’s border regions with China, and demonstrate the Quad’s ability to initiate flexible minilaterals providing development aid. For India, Japan’s expanding commitments are an opportunity to inject new energy into its diplomatic and institutional outreach to South and Southeast Asia.
Strategic Dimensions of Engagement
Japan’s infrastructure investments in India’s North-East are primarily driven by the development of an industrial cluster/corridor in the Bay of Bengal region that could operate as a base for Japan’s overseas manufacturing. Moreover, Japan is also keen to enhance the connectivity of the untapped markets in the region to gain an early mover advantage amidst the broader drive to reallocate supply chains. The Indian government identifies the road networks in need of improvement and invites financing from JICA for specific projects.
