BEIJING'S SYSTEMIC CONFRONTATION WITH NORTH AMERICA

China’s competition with the United States and the emerging clash between Pax Sinica and Pax Americana are increasingly apparent. These two terms refer to competition between two visions of international order, or more accurately, orders, referring to a collection of sub-orders: economic, security, multilateral, normative, and others. Pax Sinica and Pax Americana are at odds to different degrees depending upon the issue and order.

At its most basic, Pax Americana, or the existing international rules-based order describes a mix of liberal post-war institutions, norms, and rules led by the United States. As such, the US strategy is predominantly status quo against revisionism. It aims not to contain China but to manage a longterm competition with it and deter coercive efforts to undermine this system. In defending, and in some cases, updating, the rules-based international order, the United States is joined by its longtime allies, such as Japan, Australia, and South Korea in the Indo-Pacific and NATO in Europe. Most importantly, the United States has worked to repair neglected relationships in the Indo-Pacific and foster new partnerships with India, Vietnam, and others.

Beijing views the current rules-based order and US leadership within it as inimical and an unfair constraint to its rise. Fundamentally, the Communist Party of China (CPC) is deeply insecure, increasingly viewing the world through the lens of threat from foreign sources, most importantly the United States. This insecurity is reflected in Xi Jinping’s “Comprehensive National Security” concept. China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI), Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), and Global Development Initiative (GDI) effectively translate that insecurity into a view that the state should have predominance over liberal norms and outside interference.

The Chinese leadership is convinced that the United States presents an existential threat to CPC rule, and that Beijing must alter international order and disrupt the US alliance system to secure its regime, what it views as lost territory, and a predominant position in the region. 

What would Chinese-dominated order, or Pax Sinica, look like? At its most basic level, China wants to advance norms of state sovereignty above international law and privilege state-guided economic development above liberal notions of human rights and democracy. The GDI, GCI, and GSI mean a state-centric international order. On its face, a state-centric order would appeal to many in the Global South. But, importantly, China’s vision in practice is not a system that privileges state sovereignty for all states, but rather one that allows a select few powerful states to dominate smaller ones. As we see in Ukraine, smaller states would be in the firing line. In the Indo-Pacific, Beijing’s rejection of the International Court of Arbitration’s ruling on the South China Sea in 2016 encapsulates this rule-bylaw dynamic.

Without Washington and its system of military alliances, Beijing is confident it can employ economic carrots and sticks, as well as the threat of military action, to pursue its interests within a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific. Yet, for all its faults, Pax Americana still appeals to many for this reason. As described in the 2022 US National Security Strategy, US-aligned democracies are joined by many autocratic ones that foreswear revisionism. However, this “New Cold War” framing should be nuanced with six further takeaways.

One, China is not alone, it is merely the most powerful of a group of aggrieved, revisionist actors. It is joined by other powers like Russia, North Korea, and Iran, along with a few smaller countries dependent upon them. Two, the two powers are and will be interdependent economically, even amidst “derisking”. They are also seeking guardrails, as seen in the recent high-level US-China bilateral meetings. Three, the world is increasingly multipolar and defined by a rising and hedging Global South. The US and China will compete for influence and the attractiveness of their orders amongst a growing number of unaligned states who in turn balance ties for their own interests. For the revisionists, alignment is even less locked in. Four, while ideology matters and contributes to competition, it is not totalizing — one only has to look at the new US-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership to see that. Five, Pax Sinica is not the absence of order but a reworking in China’s favor and a removal of constraints on certain larger states. As the order is complex, some elements are up for more revision than others. Beijing desires the stability and prosperity of economic order in particular. Sixth, we are witnessing a growing chorus of voices in the Global South dissatisfied with Pax Americana and elements of American hypocrisy. Washington will need to incorporate new voices, such as India, into existing institutions to meet growing demands for reform. If it makes competition solely about the status quo, the United States may find itself struggling to attract nonaligned countries in the Global South.

In sum, this is a much more complex and sustained competition than the first cold war, but walking it back is not an option. Beijing and Washington’s respective visions for “Pax Sinica” and an updated “Pax Americana” are simply incompatible.

These remarks were presented by Mr. Lucas Myers at Global Conference for New Sinology (GCNS), 2023