BRICS AND THE UNDERLYING DYNAMICS OF INSTITUTIONAL OUTCOMES

The 16^th BRICS Summit held in Kazan, Russia concluded on 23^rd October with the adoption of the Kazan Declaration that has reiterated the group’s strategic commitment to reforming the international order. While the summit also reaffirmed the BRICS’ commitment to economic cooperation, security and institutional reform, the underlying great power dynamics of its member states present a different picture. The diverse political trajectories, economic priorities, and strategic goals of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa continue to challenge the group’s ability to produce cohesive institutional outcomes.

To some observers, BRICS may appear to be propelled only by anti-Western sentiments and a desire to replace the existing international order with one hostile to the West. But, behind the sprawling canvass of issues BRICS members discuss, a logic of competing strategies to achieve converging interests employed by great powers like China, India and Russia explains the dynamics and operation of BRICS, clearer now in its expanded avatar. Even as the Kazan Summit showcased renewed commitments, the gap between rhetoric and institutional outcomes remains wide. As the world watches the BRICS evolve, the real test lies in whether the bloc can overcome its internal fractures and deliver meaningful results in the face of a fragmented global order. The promise of multipolarity has long sounded appealing to BRICS, but it has risked remaining elusive without genuine alignment of the group’s core interests. Has Kazan marked a true turn of the tide for a brighter future for BRICS?

A Milestone Declaration?

The Kazan Summit is a significant milestone in the history of BRICS, marked by the participation of four new members – Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and Saudi Arabia. The inclusion of new members has given BRICS greater currency as an inclusive forum for countries of the developing world. Additionally, the grouping has remained consistent in its approach to cooperation, retaining the focus on the three pillars of politics and security, economic and financial, and cultural and people-to-people issues. In a similar vein, the grouping’s position on the Israel-Palestine conflict also remained unchanged at Kazan, sticking to the criticism of Israel’s military offensive first mentioned in the joint statement by BRICS Foreign Ministers in June 2024.

Its consistent approach to these issues suggests great powers within the grouping have reached a consensus on the treatment of sensitive security issues and found a sustainable equilibrium for cooperation. Although cooperation may appear forthcoming on a wide range of issues, the BRICS Summit and its outcomes have an underlying logic of great power competition between China, India and Russia to articulate and differentiate their individual interests under the BRICS framework.

This dynamic is also evident in the case of balanced multipolarity, emphasised in the Kazan Declaration. Russia, China and India are united in their interest for a multipolar world, but have competing visions and strategies for actualising the same. For Russia, the creation of a multipolar world order is already underway and “irreversible”, and Russia-China relations are the foundation for global stability. BRICS in this regard is a vehicle for signalling to the West that Russia remains an important power that cannot be isolated. On the other hand, India’s multipolarity is not rooted in an anti-West agenda, but rather the development of its own material capabilities and those of developing countries in what New Delhi calls a ‘multipolar Asia’. Moreover, its multipolarity is driven by strategic autonomy which was highlighted by Delhi’s discussion with Moscow on securing regular supplies of coal and fertilizers. China’s articulation of “equal and an orderly” multipolar world is presented in contrast to U.S-led alliances and a “cold war mentality”. China-led institutions like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Global Security Initiative (GSI) and others are the cornerstone of China’s strategy for multipolarity. BRICS is one part of Beijing’s approach to cultivate multipolarity via institutional arrangements.

Competitive Strategies for Converging Interests

The Kazan Summit demonstrated that on various significant issues, China, India and Russia articulated their competing and differentiated approach to converging interests. For instance, although India, China and Russia converge around the need for reform of Bretton Woods institutions, they differ in subtle but meaningful and competing ways of how they go about achieving this reform. India’s approach, as stated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, was (for BRICS) not to replace global institutions, but for it to play the constructive role of reforming and adapting the existing order. New Delhi’s approach reveals its interest in balancing India’s participation in Western and non-Western institutions, without appearing to revise the international order.

China’s approach is similar, but involves challenging and rejecting U.S dominance of the international system. President Xi Jinping’s speech at Kazan is full of references to China-led initiatives like the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and GSI, signalling its interest in replacing U.S created institutions. Beijing has also created its own network of institutions like the BRI and various development banks that challenge the Bretton Woods institutions. Russia, on the other hand, has openly called for the IMF and World Bank to be replaced with an alternative, with the Russian Finance Minister going so far as to say that these institutions are “not performing their roles”. These varying strategies for articulating reform of global governance institutions employed by China, India and Russia is the underlying logic that dictates outcomes in BRICS.

The Global South is another major part of the BRICS framework. India and China are competing for influence in the Global South and operate within BRICS to further their status as partners of the developing world. PM Modi presented India’s proposals to advance the development of the Global South at Kazan, like Digital Public Infrastructure and International Solar Alliance, while pointing to the continuous effort by New Delhi to include the Global South in development platforms; inclusion of African Union at G20 and the Global South Summit. Similarly, China has taken advantage of BRICS to present its development offerings like the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and Global South Think Tanks Alliance, while also offering high-quality development and common prosperity. India and China’s competition for influence is converging in positive outcomes for the Global South, which is increasingly the focus of diplomatic and development outreach via multilaterals like BRICS.

Moreover, both countries are positioning themselves as peacemaker, with India engaging with Iran over the need for stability and de-escalation of tensions in the region, and China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi positioning China as intermediary in the Russia-Ukraine conflict during his visit to Russia last month. These competing strategies, executed at the Kazan Summit within the framework of BRICS, reveal India and China’s differing but converging solutions for development in the Global South. Additionally, the Modi-Xi meeting on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit confirmed a diplomatic reproachment after several years of bilateral tensions, signalling the relevance of BRICS as a platform for great power engagement.

The great power dynamics and competition underlying engagement within the BRICS framework has resulted in progress on some issues related to development, trade and security. The New Development Bank and the Contingency Reserve Arrangement are examples of tangible outcomes delivered in the domain of development finance. For example, the NDB has provided 32 billion USD for 96 infrastructure and development projects in BRICS countries since 2015. Moreover, the BRICS grouping has created a channel for India, China and Russia to execute competing strategies for advancing converging interests in a manageable manner.

Hinging Success on Navigating Geopolitical Tension

The BRICS Kazan Summit, much like previous gatherings of the bloc, was marked by grand declarations of unity and aspirations for a more multipolar global order. Yet, beneath the veneer of solidarity lies a complex web of competing national interests and evolving power dynamics. For instance, although BRICS countries have expressed an interest in undertaking cross-border trade in local currencies, the grouping has been unable to make significant headway in this regard. Similarly, although previous BRICS Summits have called for the creation of a common credit ratings methodology, it has not established a joint BRICS rating agency yet. Even the idea of a BRICS Bridge payments system, which has been discussed before, is yet to take shape. Besides multilateral efforts, two of the largest members of BRICS, India and China, have seen their economic relationship suffer due to bilateral disputes and tensions. Overcoming these roadblocks and actualising mechanisms for which there is consensus would enhance the groupings efficacy.

In this regard, the competitive energies of India, China and Russia within the framework of BRICS are a positive force. The competition for influence centers developing countries and their priorities in the efforts of great powers, offers them the best possible deal and increases their collective bargaining power. As BRICS membership expands, this dynamic is likely to steer the grouping toward more tangible, meaningful and development-centric outcomes. For great powers, competing to deliver and implement development, security and trade solutions offers great benefits for countries eagerly vying for influence. This would be highly rewarding not just for India, China and Russia, but also for countries of the Global South and would elevate BRICS as a platform that delivers meaningful outcomes.