THE PARTY POST XI

Arguments about the future of the Party under Xi Jinping are necessarily speculative by nature, but we should at least inform such speculation by grounding it what we do know something about regarding Chinese politics, such as Xi’s track record, the party’s rules, and the history of CCP succession struggles. The most analytically rigorous response to the question of who will succeed Xi Jinping is: “We don’t know.” It is the ultimate “known unknown” of Chinese politics. It is unclear who will succeed Xi, when he will leave office and, significantly, how he will leave office. There is no certainty about how or if a successor to Xi will be chosen.  Without knowing the circumstances of Xi’s departure and his replacement, it’s difficult to predict whether the Party will continue or depart from Xi’s legacy. My argument, based on informed speculation, is that:

• Xi is unlikely to anoint a successor.

• His successor is unlikely to be predictable; and 

• His legacy will depend on China’s situation when he leaves office.

The most likely scenario is that Xi leaves office when he “goes to meet Marx”—as the Chinese saying goes—in communist heaven without anointing a successor, or perhaps after anointing a weak successor near the very end. Xi is unlikely to appoint a successor for three reasons. The first is power; Xi’s control over the Party and military makes it hard for rivals to remove him even if policies are bad. And if Xi designates a successor he will become a “lame duck” leader. Second, Xi will also look to maintain unity in the Party and choosing a successor means favoring some allies but alienating others. Additionally, choosing an outsider would alienate all allies and make Xi vulnerable. And the third reason is legacy; handing over control could put Xi and his family at risk of retribution from rival factions or even his own successor. Also, importantly, Xi believes he is the best person to achieve China’s national rejuvenation.

It is unlikely that outsiders will be able to predict Xi’s successor. However, we can inform our speculation on this subject by applying lessons from the transition from Mao Zedong to Hua Guofeng and then Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, which offers three key insights into what matters in succession struggles in Leninist one-party regimes, according to the scholar Joseph Torigian. First is prestige, wherein victory depends on interpersonal authority more than policy differences or economic interests. Today, two main sub-factions of Xi supporters are emerging in his third term that could vie for power in a near-term succession. The first is a network of officials connected to Fujian province, led by Cai Qi, while the other is a network of officials connected to Zhejiang province, led by Li Qiang. Second is coercion: victory depends on gaining the support or control of the military, police, and other power ministries to enforce the succession. The Fujian network could be well-placed to leverage power ministries, as it may include top security officials like Chen Wenqing and Wang Xiaohong, and top generals like He Weidong and Miao Hua (although Chen Yixin is affiliated with the Zhejiang network). Third is manipulation. What matters is the ability to control the process of selection rather than on playing to a defined “selectorate.” In this regard, Cai Qi and the Fujian network appear in prime position to manipulate the succession process. He leads the Central Secretariat, and he could rely on a self-serving interpretation of the Party Constitution and the Central Committee Work Regulations to convene a special Politburo meeting to convene a Plenum to decide a new General Secretary.

On the question of why Xi’s legacy will depend on China’s domestic situation and international position, the history of CCP succession suggests the Party is more likely to continue his legacy if China is doing well when he leaves office, and more likely to depart from his legacy if China is not doing well. Examples include the policy changes that followed Mao’s death in 1976 and Hu Jintao’s departure from office in 2012. More specifically, what might happen if a succession occurs soon?

In politics, when a succession does occur, Xi’s successor is highly likely to support continued CCP rule. However, they are unlikely to enjoy the same level of authority as Xi, which could diffuse power between different political networks. This may create a looser ideological environment and decentralized governance that could improve policymaking. From an economic perspective, mounting growth challenges could provide the successor with fertile ground for departing from Xi’s policies. There could be a consensus that emerges for more market-oriented policies, but the successor’s less concentrated power could make it harder to implement structural reforms like a property tax or hukou reform. Foreign policy is less likely to undergo major changes, especially due to ongoing US-China strategic competition. In fact, a new Chinese leader may feel the need for a show of force to boost their political status and prove their control of the military. An invasion or blockade of Taiwan is unlikely but heightened military actions cannot be ruled out.

In conclusion, Xi’s legacy may endure with only minor tweaks. But there’s also a risk of more militarism, instability, and control. Yet there is additionally a chance the Party moves toward a more tolerant politics, a more market-oriented economics, and a more positive diplomacy. The scholar Julian Gewirtz has warned of the need to avoid “historical determinism” about China’s future. It’s a mistake to conclude China in the future will always be like how China is today.