Close on the heels of the disappearance of Admiral Miao Hua— member of the all-powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) of the People’s Republic of China —on November 28, 2024, reportedly due to an “investigation” for “serious violation of discipline”, mounting speculation now surrounds the unexplained absence of another even more senior military figure. General He Weidong, the second vice chairman of the CMC and the 3rd most powerful member of China’s politico-military hierarchy, has not been seen in public for the past month. This has led to rumours about his “investigation” – a euphemism in China’s political circles about initiating complex enquiry procedures into corruption charges.
Gen. He is not only a senior military leader but also a Politburo member - one of the 24 members that effectively rule China. His sudden disappearance, occurring in close succession to Admiral Miao’s removal, raise significant questions regarding elite political stability, internal purges, and the mechanisms of control within the upper echelons of the Chinese military establishment.
In general practice following such disappearances from the public eye, the “guilty” will be placed under house arrest and remain incommunicado even to his/her family members. Once the internal “investigation” is completed, the person is stripped of official titles, party membership and in the case of high level officials, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announces the verdict formally. In the case of Gen. He, however, no formal announcement is forthcoming so far, indicating to procedural delays or intra-elite contestations.
Factional Ties, Rapid Promotions, and Xi Jinping’s Inner Circle
Adm. Miao’s disappearance had sent shock-waves in China’s military (the PLA) as he belonged to the “Fujian” faction – very powerful as it is associated with CMC Chairman Xi Jinping himself. Xi served in Fujian province in various capacities in the provincial party apparatuses from 1985 to 2002. Xi is also associated with other factions such as “new Zhijiang Army” when he served in Zhejiang Province, “Shanghai gang” when he served at Shanghai for a brief period and to his home province Shaanxi – the “Shaanxi faction”- in the northwest. Xi’s wife Peng Liyuan, who hails from Shandong Province, and holds a Major General rank in the PLA’s cadre assessment committee, is also said to have shown interest in top-level PLA appointments. Her periodic entertainment of the PLA troops across the country is said to have endeared her to the PLA rank and file.
Both Adm. Miao and Gen. He Weidong are associated with the “Fujian faction” in the PLA as they hailed from this province. Both also served 31st Group Army deployed in the region and were both given quick promotions in the PLA/CCP apparatuses by Xi. In fact, He Weidong was unusually promoted up three levels to make him a delegate to the 20th CCP Congress in October 2022 becoming a Politburo member and CMC Vice Chairman bypassing several more senior officers.. No other CMC Vice Chairman before was nominated directly in such a fashion in the PLA history; in Chinese media, this practice is termed as “helicoptering”. Hence, if both Miao and He Weidong were close to Xi as shown via their unorthodox promotions to the high posts of the party-army, it is undoubtedly a matter of great speculation why they disappeared from the scene and lost the confidence of Xi.
A reconnaissance specialist by training, He Weidong served across the country in different PLA positions, including in Eastern and Western Theatre Commands (incidentally around the 2017 Dokhlam incident with India in Bhutan) and in the Joint Operational Command. Based on textual and contextual aspects, analysts have suggested that He Weidong may be involved in corruption scandals, specifically in allocation of posts in the PLA as he was put in charge of political and personnel affairs. Others have pointed to the lack of a political commissar at the Vice Chairman of the CMC level as both his fellow Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia and He Weidong are combat specialists with Zhang serving in Vietnam War in 1979. While this becomes a possible institutional weakness, it is an aspect that would have been considered when both Zhang and He were appointed to the post. A more politically sensitive theory suggests that Xi’s insecurities paved the way for the disappearance as He was trying to build his own independent power base in the PLA through personnel appointments favourable to him. In the absence of hard evidence, it is difficult to verify these claims. However, what is significant is the gravity of the unfolding developments due to the high and sensitive post He Weidong occupied.
He Weidong last public appearances include the enlarged CMC Discipline Inspection Committee meeting (that looks into corruption issues) on January 10 and also the “two sessions” – the annual legislative and consultative bodies of China held in March 2025. The Chinese Defence Ministry website mentions that He Weidong spoke at a March 6 group meeting focusing his remarks on “strengthening confidence in victory, strengthen mission responsibility and resolutely fight the tough battle”. He also attended the 2nd plenary session of the PLA on March 10.
However, he was absent from subsequent significant meetings such as Anti-Secession Law Memorial Conference held on March 14, the annual tree planting ceremony hosted by Xi Jinping in early April, and the April 18th Central Neighbourhood Work Conference. Also, during the press conference of the defence ministry soon after the “two sessions” on March 17, Ministry spokesman Wu Qian feigned ignorance about the whereabouts of Gen He.
Corruption, Purges, and the Fragility of Civil-Military Relations
Gen. He is not the first high ranking person to face such ignominy. Previous purges have seen the dismissal of high ranking PLA officers such as CMC Vice Chairmen Guo Boxiang and Xu Caihou, defence ministers Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, chief of Joint Staff Fang Fenghui, strategic rocket forces leaders Li Yuchao and Xu Zhongbo, defence industry leaders Wu Yansheng, Liu Shiquan and Wang Changqing.
Corruption in the PLA is a major issue since Jiang Zemin’s opening up of the defence sector for civilian conversion in the 1990s. In the process, indiscriminate selling of assets to the highest bidder and lack of accountability led to many PLA officers becoming wealthy overnight. While the commercial activities of the PLA were banned in 1998, it has become an illicit practice to buy promotions to the next rank, sell transfers to coveted places and condone smuggling. Under this context, Xi’s internally lauded anti-corruption drive — though ostensibly targeting malfeasance —has also been a cover for netting rival factional leaders. However, it has now taken the form of countering those whom Xi once considered as loyal. This is due to the feeling that the recently promoted generals are carving out alternative power centres or promoting their factional leaders to the higher echelons, at the cost of Xi.
While corruption or insubordination among the ranks is detrimental to the PLA, it may not have major impact on the combat capabilities of the troops, which has been the main focus of Xi’s reforms in the military since 2015. Nonetheless, it remains quite possible that the command-and-control structures may be in disarray at the higher levels, as the CMC is depleted of three members, and given the time to replace and re-adjust personnel due to these anti-corruption campaigns is uncertain and long. He Weidong’s disappearance may also dent potential Taiwan invasion scenarios as He served as the Commander of Eastern Theatre Command from 2019-2022 overlooking operations in the Straits. The frequency of these dismissals on a large scale under Xi Jinping underscore the uncertainties in CCP-PLA relationship. The disappearance of He Weidong may also impact on the current dis-engagement process on the India-China borders since October 21, 2024 as he was considered to be the higher official in charge of Indian operations as well.
Mao Zedong’s dictum that “power flows from the barrel of the gun” catapulted the communist party to seize state power in 1949 — and has long defined the CCP’s reliance on the military for regime security. However, in order to preserve and sustain CCP’s rule since then, the slogan of “gun should be controlled by the party” and “absolute leadership of the party” over the PLA have highlighted the struggle for balance between personalist rule and institutionalized control. The latter is repeated ad nauseum, indicating to the tentative connection between the party and army. Lack of long-term and stable institutional process in the PLA and in China poses serious challenges to the stability of the region, specifically as China has become the 2nd largest economy and 3rd largest military in the world, assuming a more assertive role on the global stage.
Author
Dr. Srikanth Kondapalli
Srikanth Kondapalli is Professor in Chinese Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University. He was former Dean of School of International Studies, JNU from 2022-24; Chairman of the Centre for East Asian Studies, SIS, JNU from 2008-10, 2012-14, 2016-18, 2018-20 and in 2022. He is Chair Professor under the Chair of Excellence of Ministry of Defence since August 2022. He learnt Chinese language at Beijing Language & Culture University and was a post-Doctoral Visiting Fellow at People’s University, Beijing from 1996-98. He was a Visiting Professor at National Chengchi University, Taipei in 2004, a Visiting Fellow at China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, Beijing in May 2007, an Honorary Professor at Shandong University, Jinan in 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2019; at Jilin University, Changchun in 2014 and at Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming in 2016 and 2017, a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at People’s University since 2014 and a Fellow at Salzburg Global Seminar in 2010. He is the author of 2 books: China’s Military: The PLA in Transition in 1999 and China’s Naval Power in 2001 as well as two monographs and six co-edited volume and a number of articles in journals and edited volumes – all on China. He is a guest faculty at Indian armed forces units, including at the National Defence College, Army War College, College of Air Warfare, College of Naval Warfare, and College of Defence Management. He is a distinguished fellow at several think-tanks including Vivekananda International Foundation and Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies. He has supervised more than 30 Ph.D. researchers at JNU and is also an academic advisor for Ph.D. researchers at Al Farabi Kazakh National University and Ablai Khan University at Almaty and Tamkhang University (Taipei). He was the Editor of JNU SIS International Studies Journal (being published by the Sage).