A SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION IN NEPAL: India and China in Competition

Nepal Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s recent visit to India appeared to restore a certain degree of the trust between the leaderships in New Delhi and Kathmandu. India and Nepal signed several agreements in the fields of connectivity infrastructure, people-to-people ties and cross-border electricity transmission, which PM Prachanda said restored trust at the highest level. His claim lent credence to the notion that India-Nepal relations suffered from a trust deficit over the last decade, driven by the blockade in 2015, disagreements over boundary issues and the Agnipath scheme.

Adding to existing tensions, China’s growing presence in Nepal has inserted more complexities in India’s engagement with its Himalayan neighbour. These conditions have created the perception that New Delhi’s strategic position in the country is waning. Contrary to such perceptions, a survey of public opinion in Kathmandu reveals that general public perceptions remain strongly in favour of India when compared to China.

Although relations at the level of political elites have often been marked by misperceptions and disagreements, Nepali’s maintain a positive perception of India, compared to China. The ties that bind people across borders: family, religion and language, ensure that people in Nepal continue to express a personal affinity to India. Although China’s public diplomacy strategies and development aid have increased Beijing’s visibility and influence in Nepal, the scale of India’s cultural and economic linkages are largely responsible for why India retains a more favourable public perception compared to China at least for the immediate future. This factor could be decisive for India’s foreign policy and public diplomacy as Nepal navigates the complexities of multiparty democracy and pursues strategic “issue-based” alignment.

Survey of Public Opinion: Visibility and Public Diplomacy

The opinions of Nepali citizens in Kathmandu offer several insights on how India and China are perceived on the ground. It reveals the success of public diplomacy strategies adopted by the two Asian powers and the shifting perceptions of India and China over the last decade. Surveying over 180 citizens across Kathmandu on their perception of India and China revealed that Nepali citizens feel a greater personal affinity for India, compared to China, on the basis of their familial, religious and cultural ties with India and Indians. The people-to-people linkages are reinforced across the vast open border by education, employment and other market opportunities that make India far more visible, relatable and economically accessible to Nepali citizens compared to China.

In terms of visibility in public spaces, 70% of respondents maintained that India was more visible in public spaces across Kathmandu than China, while 26% stated that China was more visible than India. Only 4% of people stated that they were equally visible. Interestingly, when respondents were asked about examples of India’s visibility in public spaces, answers were vague: “schools and hospitals in remote districts” was a common response. On the other hand, on associations they had with China, respondents most frequently mentioned large public infrastructure projects like the Kathmandu Ring Road, Pokhara airport and other connectivity projects. Yet, even though people associated China’s visibility in public spaces with specific examples, they felt India’s presence more pervasively than China’s.

The extent of visibility in public spaces could hint at the efficacy of public diplomacy strategies employed by India and China. One Nepali scholar interviewed during the survey stated that India was much less willing and active in promoting its aid and economic engagement with Nepal, compared to China. The survey results confirm this assertion. 51% of respondents stated that India was more successful in projecting a positive image to the public, but 45% stated that China was more successful. This indicates that more people found China’s public diplomacy strategy successful, even though a smaller number found China to be more visible than India. Perhaps high-profile infrastructure projects undertaken by China are associated with timely and rapid completion of projects, which could explain why China is perceived as much more successful in its public diplomacy strategy than its visibility would suggest. On the other hand, it also indicates that India’s investment in smaller projects like schools and hospitals in remote provinces, compared to China’s high-profile and expensive investments, have positively resonated more with the public than China’s highly-visible but limited footprint.

Public Perceptions of India and China in Kathmandu, Nepal: India Outdoes China

Economic Linkages

Positive perceptions of India stemmed not just from its public diplomacy efforts, but also from the realistic accessibility of market opportunities, compared to China. India retains the image of being Nepal’s primary development partner, with 60% of respondents maintaining that India has been more relevant to the economic development of Nepal than China. On the other hand, only 39% of people stated that China has been more relevant to development in Nepal than India. These results indicate the scale and intensity of Nepal’s integration with India, driven mainly by market opportunities like employment, education and other economic linkages in the form of hydrocarbon trade, railways and cross-border electricity transmission. The extent of these linkages with India outweighs those with China, which has only recently been expanding its nascent presence in the country by extending its railways, cross-border trade infrastructure and education opportunities into Nepal. Although China’s efforts have accelerated over the last decade, they have not altered the public perception of India as Nepal’s primary economic partner. 

Even as India was perceived as more relevant to Nepal’s economic development, respondents viewed both countries as performing the same roles. Respondents had nearly identical expectations of India and China for economic engagement with Nepal. In the case of India, respondents stated that development aid (29.4%) and trade (29.4%) ought to be prioritised, followed by education (25.5%) and only 15% felt that the overall bilateral ought to be expanded in all sectors. In the case of China, they maintained that development aid (32.7%) and trade (28.8%) should be emphasised, followed by education opportunities (25%) and only 12.7% of respondents felt that the overall relationship ought to be expanded uniformly across sectors. The expectations of the public with respect to India and China suggest that both countries are expected to perform nearly identical roles in Nepal’s economic development, which also indicates India-China will be competing for the same limited opportunities and influence in Nepal. 

Notably, respondents expected China to play a slightly larger role as a provider of development aid compared to India, which is perhaps the result of China’s efforts to undertake large infrastructure projects in the country. Additionally, respondents were slightly keener on stability and the holistic development of bilateral relations with India than with China, indicating that citizens perhaps view Nepal’s engagement with India in a much more dynamic way than Nepal’s engagement with China.

Reflecting the importance of balancing between India and China, most respondents felt that developing economic relations with India and China equally was crucial. 56% of respondents stated that Nepal ought to develop relations with India and China equally in the future, while 28% felt that relations with India ought to be prioritised and 15% felt that relations with China should be prioritised. The responses suggest the importance of balancing for Nepal, driven mainly by the domestic priority of economic development. Notably, Nepali citizens feel that, compared to China, India will be more relevant to economic development and prosperity in the future. However, the key takeaway in this regard is people’s preference for developing relations with both India and China equally for economic opportunities, essentially allowing India and China to compete for presence and influence, which results in the best outcomes for Nepal.

The Way Ahead

Even though India-Nepal relations are increasingly fraught with tensions at the political level, they have not resulted in the public perception that ties with India are weak or unstable. When respondents were asked to rank the strength and stability of India-Nepal relations on a scale of 1 to 10, 50.5% of respondents gave India a score between 6 and 8. For China, 42% of respondents ranked the strength of China-Nepal relations between 6 and 8. The results indicate that the public appears to perceive Nepal’s relations between India and China as stable. Interestingly, at the extreme ends of the scale, respondents scored China marginally better than India. 11% of respondents gave relations with China a score of 9 or 10 compared to 7.1% for India. Similarly, only 1 % of respondents gave China a score of 0 or 1, compared to 3.3% for India. Overall, public perception of the bilateral relationships suggest that citizens feel Nepal’s relations with India are stronger and more stable than those with China in spite of the numerous frictions and tensions that punctuate India-Nepal ties at the bilateral level.

The impression of India among citizens in Nepal appears to hinge mainly on the sense of relatability that stems from cultural-historical basis of shared identity. This foundation of cultural connection is overlayed by large scale economic linkages and market opportunities associated with India. Over the last decade, China has expanded its economic relations with Nepal, thus signalling its role as an economic alternative to India. But its economic overtures are limited to a few sectors of the economy and Beijing lacks the depth of historical and cultural relationships that could make China relatable to citizens. As Nepal persists with the ups and downs of a democratic system and discovers greater leverage in issue-based alignment, the intensity of competition for influence between India and China will be heightened. To outmanoeuvre China, India’s foreign policy will be forced to undertake public diplomacy efforts that unify its outreach under a clear framework than endorses India’s greater relatability to Nepali citizens. 

The author would like to acknowledge the contribution of Ms. Eerishika Pankaj, Mr. Kasam Pokhrel, Mr. Saroj Deo and Dr. Pramod Jaiswal for their assistance and warm hospitality, which have made this research and report possible.