LEGACY OF LI KEQIANG

Former premier Li Keqiang has passed away due to a heart attack in Shanghai, just seven months after his retirement from active politics. Despite being considered one of the weakest premiers, Li has certainly left an indelible impact on Chinese policymaking, particularly with regards to the Chinese economy. His constant push for economic reforms amidst Xi Jinping’s overemphasis on security concerns was a notable feature of Xi-Li administration. Li’s emphasis on private economy and foreign investments often put him at odds with Xi who advocated state-led approach for economy that suited his authoritarian rule. However, Li never had effective political leverage to counter Xi directly even within or outside the Party as his supporters from ‘Youth league’ faction (tuanpai) were increasingly sidelined by Xi. Li’s premiership from 2013-2023 is also unique in the history of Chinese politics as it is rare to have two top leaders from different factional backgrounds. Thus, it will be important for Xi to manage Li’s legacy - both political and economic - in a manner that does not stimulate discontent among Li’s supporters and at the same time, demonstrates Xi’s continued dominance and control over the Party. This is clearly visible from the official obituary released by the Party which praises most of Li’s achievements while at the same time, mentions that it was done ‘under strong leadership of Xi Jinping at the core.’

End of Li’s Political Vision?

Li Keqiang’s demise puts the future of his tuanpai (团派) faction in jeopardy, especially as it has already weakened considerably in political capital over the past few years. During Li’s premiership, few of his tuanpai colleagues like Wang Yang, Sun Chunlan and Hu Chunhua occupied important positions in both Party and the government. However, these leaders were completely sidelined since the 20^th Party Congress along with Li and it will become more difficult for this faction to make a comeback after its top leader’s death.

Li is also credited for deferring Xi’s efforts to strengthen Party control over state affairs which has become a more dominant trend after the 20^th Party Congress. With his demise, a moderate voice in the Party is also lost which may discourage other like-minded leaders to express their displeasure against Xi’s policies as the top leadership is now completely filled with Xi’s ‘yes-men’. Li was also seen as an example of meritocracy that was once a dominant feature in Chinese politics. But now with Xi’s approach to leadership selection, loyalty has overshadowed meritocracy and it will continue to remain the main criterion.

Manoeuvring Li’s Mixed Economic Legacy

Unlike his political legacy, Li’s to economic approach will continue to some extent. As a Ph.D. holder in economics, Li’s economic policies had a pragmatic approach and were, to simply put, close to ground reality. He believed in private investments over government investments as the latter had led to rising government debts and dead assets. He supported the ‘street-vendor economy’ which aimed at reducing unemployment created due to the pandemic despite Xi’s crackdown on vendors under his urban governance model. He also reduced several taxes and fees levied on small and medium enterprises which allowed them to flourish. Although these policies were largely in continuation of his predecessor Wen Jiabao, his credit lies in advocating these policies without full support of the paramount leader.  

Li Keqiang was also known to talk more openly about real economic problems which existed behind the official propaganda of the Party. He revealed that nearly 600 million people in China lived with an income of less than 1000 Yuan per month and many of them did not have pensions or medical insurance. This statement, when China took pride in the success of poverty alleviation globally, was a bold move by Li. His remarks last year that “reforms will continue to move on as Yangtze and Yellow rivers will not flow backwards”, reflected his firm belief in continued reforms and opening-up when doubts were raised about the same due to Xi’s aggressive policies against foreign firms in the past few years. It was such differing economic stands between Li and Xi that often led to conceptions of a ‘rivalry’ or ‘competition’ between the two.

Nonetheless, a Li-like pragmatic approach to economic woes is likely to be missing under his incumbent Li Qiang, who is handpicked by Xi despite his inexperience at the central level. However, Li Qiang’s pro-market approach seems to suggest that he will continue with Li Keqiang’s reformist policy to some extent as long as it matches with Xi’s vision, albeit without the same zeal that Li Keqiang had for reforms. Moreover, Li Qiang will also have to tackle problems persisting from the Li Keqiang period such as calls for global de-coupling from China, US-China trade war, rising government debts, higher unemployment, weakening of consumer demand and so on. Although many of these problems may not be attributed to Li Keqiang’s policies, it is also true that they have exacerbated under his watch. Thus, Li Qiang will carry a mixed economic legacy of his predecessor, but the pragmatic approach to policymaking by Li Keqiang will now be completely overshadowed by Xi’s dominance.

Challenges for Xi following Li’s death

Deaths of China’s popular leaders have often become an avenue for common people to express their discontent towards the administration. China has already witnessed such protests in the aftermath of Zhou Enlai and Hu Yaobang’s deaths. Similar to them, Li was also hailed by Chinese citizens as “people’s leader” and was perceived to call for checks on Xi’s centralized power, at least by the international media.

Such trends are visible now as well. Many Chinese netizens have expressed condolences on Li’s death by quoting his pro-reform statements. Yet, it is also important to note that while economic problems exist today as they did at the time of Zhou or Hu’s death, the situation is not entirely comparable as the Party today is much more equipped to control public narrative through its surveillance and censorship techniques. Furthermore, Xi is effectively one of, if not the, strongest paramount leaders in PRC history, even when compared to the career highs of Mao in 1976 or Deng in 1989. Thus, it is highly unlikely that a protest-like situation will appear after Li’s death. Nonetheless, Xi will ensure that Li received a proper farewell and will avoid any opportunity for dissatisfied voices to leverage Li’s death. 

During Xi’s period, the room for deliberation and opposing views in policymaking have shrunk significantly. With Li’s demise, this process will be further accelerated. It will cement Xi’s position as an undisputed leader with no opposing forces within the Party and Li’s legacy as a reform-minded moderate voice will gradually wither away with it.   

Image Source: South China Morning Post