XI JINPING, LOYALTY AND CORRUPTION IN THE PLA

At the Chinese Community Party’s (CCP) 20^th Party Congress in October 2022, General Secretary Xi Jinping declared victory over corruption and stated that “serious hidden dangers inside the Party, the country and the military have been removed.” At the same time, he warned that the fight against corruption continues, paradoxically suggesting that victory over corruption is far from over. This sentiment was reiterated at his speech at the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) plenary session in January 2024. As a part of his anti-corruption drive, focus has also been on eliminating corruption in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). From a broader perspective, Xi Jinping’s measures are part of his broader aim to instil political loyalty in the PLA.

Why is it important for Xi Jinping to root out corruption in the PLA? And what measures has he taken to do so? There appear to be four primary reasons. First and foremost is the fear of loss of the Party control over the military. Derived from Mao Zedong’s principle that the Party commands the gun, one of the CCP’s survival strategies is to ensure loyalty from the military. Thus, a corrupt PLA could prioritise its interests over those of the Party. The importance of a loyal and clean PLA is not lost on Xi, who has blamed the collapse of the Soviet Union on its inability to control its military. Second, a corrupt PLA hinders its warfighting capabilities and combat readiness. As one PLA officer stated, “The duty of the army is getting ready for wars. How can they battle if they are shooting on the training ground, and at the same time calculating how much money they can make from a contract they just signed?” Third, corrupt practices lead to a drain of resources. As the PLA aims to modernise in line with its 2035 goals, optimising the use of available resources is imperative and such practices could stonewall Xi’s efforts. Fourth, a corrupt military can also affect troop morale. The requirement to quell buying and selling of ranks, therefore, is a necessity to ensure troops are not demoralised by promotion prospects being linked to corrupt practices.

Ultimately, Xi Jinping wants a military loyal to the party along with being capable to ensure China’s global interests. He has thus sought to increase the CCP’s control over the military as well his own influence over the PLA and has reformed the military, purged senior officers, and regularly reiterated the party’s absolute leadership over the military through speeches and official media. Driving these decisions is the primacy of political ideology and unwavering loyalty within the military which Xi believes is of paramount importance.

Corruption in the PLA 

Corruption has been endemic within the PLA long before Xi came to power. Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform and opening up in the 1970s can be attributed for inadvertently fostering widespread corruption. The PLA was encouraged to become involved in economic activities and pursue businesses to supplement its budget, thereby significantly expanding its role in the economy. As China’s economy grew, the PLA’s involvement in such activities increased, thereby creating an environment for corruption, smuggling and embezzlement to flourish.

At the same time, buying and selling military positions and ranks has also beleaguered the PLA as a major form of corruption. In this case, a PLA officer “who sells military positions is able to help the buyer either transfer to a better position at the same grade level (lateral transfer) or gain promotion to the next level.” The opaque functioning of the Chinese system without external checks and balances, the institutional autonomy given to the PLA, and the concentration of power in the hands of senior officers encouraged this practice.

Xi Jinping’s Efforts

Since 2012, Xi has carried out a rigorous anti-corruption drive across the party and government organisations that includes the PLA “to safeguard the legitimacy of the CCP, root out corruption, improve governance, and centralize Xi and the Party’s authority.” Anti-corruption campaigns have preceded Xi. Under Hu Jintao, Chen Liangyu, former Shanghai party secretary and Liu Zhihua, former vice-mayor of Beijing, were convicted. While Chen was the highest-ranking official in over a decade to be sentenced, it is clear that Xi Jinping has elevated the urgency and thoroughness of the campaign, increased the powers of the discipline inspection committees, and emphasised loyalty on all fronts.

Reform

As part of the military reforms introduced by Xi Jinping during his first term in office that included structural measures and the introduction of advanced weapons systems, increasing Xi’s control over the military and an anti-corruption campaign were also part of the steps taken. Broadly, the reforms to reduce corruption included reducing the number of high-ranking officers, restructuring military units so that Xi could have greater oversight, and focusing on stricter discipline. The importance of anti-corruption and discipline in the military is underscored by Xi reducing the CMC from 11 to 7 members and including the Secretary of the CMC’s Discipline Inspection Commission, a position now held by Zhang Shengmin. This elevation indicates the extent of corruption along with Xi’s determination to curb it.

It was also announced that discipline inspection teams had been created and would conduct investigations across the PLA along with the establishment of hotlines to anonymously report violations. The PLA’s economic ventures were also curtailed and phased out as military units would no longer be able to undertake new projects. Fighting corruption appears to be the primary motivation for this decision and it would also support the reforms in other parts of the military, and bring back the focus on enhancing combat readiness.

Purges

Xi Jinping has been purging the ranks of the military since his ascent. Vowing to take on corruption that would include investigating both high-level “tigers” and lower-level “flies”, Xi made the unprecedented decision of arresting two former CMC vice chairmen, Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong in 2014 and 2015. This marked the first time that the PLA’s highest-level retired officers were investigated. Wang Jianping, deputy chief of the Joint Staff Department under the CMC, was the first serving officer to be arrested.

The latest serving senior officer under investigation is Li Shangfu, who is reportedly being probed over irregularities in military procurement after only seven months of becoming the defence minister and one of five state councillors in China. Li Yuchao, commander of the PLA’s Rocket Force was also placed under investigation along with his serving and former deputies, Liu Guangbin and Zhang Zhengzhong.

The investigations of senior serving officials highlights the extent of the corruption problem within the PLA that Xi has vowed to fight. The recent investigations into serving senior officials indicates the aggressive approach and seriousness of the problem as viewed by the top leadership who also views these occurrences as deviating from political loyalty towards the Party and leader. During a period when the US-China rivalry continues especially over Taiwan, tensions are high with the Philippines in the South China Sea, and a border standoff continues with India, corruption within the PLA only detracts and distracts from the force’s primary mandate to safeguard Chinese interests.

Emphasizing Loyalty and Discipline

On several occasions since becoming China’s leader, Xi Jinping has reiterated the importance of political loyalty in the PLA and its role to serve the political ends of the CCP. During his speech at the 20^th Party Congress in October 2022, Xi stated that ideological education must be strengthened within the PLA along with continuing the anti-corruption campaign within the military. During his first term in 2014, Xi convened a meeting on political work in the PLA and reminded the 420 senior officers of Mao’s principle that the Party commands the gun and connected it to his anti-corruption drive. He has also called for the strengthening of political work within the military.

In July 2023, Xi Jinping again directed military leaders that they must “focus on solving the prominent problems that persist at party organisations on all levels with regard to enforcing the party’s absolute leadership over the military.” A few days later during an inspection tour of the Western Theatre Command, he repeated the need to “ensure that the party has a firm grasp of the troops ideologically, politically, and organizationally” and stated that Party committees at all levels would promote “clean governance, discipline, and anti-corruption measures.” Subsequently, in December 2023, Chen Zuosong, director of the political work department for the Southern Theatre Command Air Force called for a culture of “absolute loyalty” to the CCP to prevent Western “ideological infiltration.”

Simultaneously, Xi has increased the PLA’s focus on political education. This has included reading and watching official texts and speeches which revolve around “Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military” under Xi’s broader ideological doctrine - “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” Xi, therefore, believes that political education is vital for strengthening loyalty within the PLA and will also support reducing corruption.

Future Impact

Despite the measures taken by Xi Jinping, corruption persists within the military, and the political leadership continues to purge its ranks and issue mandates that reiterate the PLA’s loyalty to the Party. Looking ahead, these efforts are in line with his broader anti-corruption campaign that aim to improve governance, reform, and ensure political loyalty throughout the government and Party.

Although the effect of the campaign on combat readiness remains to be seen and there is no evidence to directly support the claim, PLA Daily has highlighted that a corrupt army “will have no combat effectiveness.” At the same time, the increased focus and time spent on ideology and party building within the military does take away focus from practical on-ground training. Nevertheless, given the institutionalisation of corruption within the PLA and Xi’s campaign that has been in place for over a decade, there does not appear to be any direct effect on the PLA’s capabilities or threat to the CCP from the military, a silver lining for the Party that is paranoid with survival and asserting its legitimacy. For Xi, therefore, unwavering loyalty appears to be the paramount requirement from his military.

Image source: Xinhua