From China to its Footprints in South Asia
The traditional understanding of soft power is being challenged due to the impact of trade, the emerging role of sanctions and social media. Countries are recognising the advantages of using soft power tools for disinformation, propaganda, and manipulation. This has led to the blurring of lines between soft and hard power. Governments are strategically using non-coercive tactics in information, culture, and economy to achieve geopolitical goals, known as the weaponisation of soft power. China's use of this strategy has been closely examined, particularly in terms of trade and sanctions. South Asia has also seen instances of election meddling, disinformation campaigns, and AI technology being used for political advantage. The trend of soft power weaponisation is likely to continue as geopolitics becomes more complex.
Given how quickly the world is changing today, geopolitics is becoming more consequential and nuanced. The increasing prospect of weaponising soft power has caused a paradigm change in traditional characteristics of power as the traditional tools of soft power are increasingly being used as a means of coercion. With the obsolescence of weapon hoarding and arms competitions, some governments now have a more dynamic and proactive approach towards policies, which is crucial considering how quickly information and the effects of trade can reach a general population. It is now obvious that geoeconomic tools, information and technology are being weaponised to support their national interests.
Weaponising Soft Power
Popularised by Joseph Nye, the term "soft power," describes a nation's capacity to use its foreign policy, political principles, and cultural capital to influence others more subtly than with force. Nye describes soft power as the capacity of a nation to sway the actions of other governments without using force or overwhelming economic strength, but rather by attracting them with its foreign policy, culture, and political beliefs. Today countries are increasingly competing not only based on military might but also on building favourable connections and public opinion. When it comes to soft power, it is generally reluctant to coerce others and prefers to wield influence. However, Hard power, by contrast, refers to military and economic instruments of coercion. To effectively accomplish foreign policy objectives, coercive (hard) and persuasive (soft) means of influence must be blended or strategically integrated. Both appear to have similar end goals and as a result, we are witnessing the weaponisation of soft power.
Discussing the narrative and the potential threat of disinformation and AI, India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar remarked, that globalisation has been weaponised. He further labelled currency, trade, and tourism as "weapons." Thus, the strategic application of non-coercive, non-military tactics to accomplish geopolitical goals—often by taking advantage of information, culture, or the economy—is known as the weaponisation of soft power by governments. Propaganda, disinformation, trade, culture, space, and social media are a few examples of how states influence public opinion and mould narratives. Similarly, it can also be promoted through academic partnerships, scholarships, or research funding. It denotes a more calculated and occasionally coercive use of influence, moving beyond mere persuasion to actively shape international dynamics in a way that serves a country's strategic objectives.
China’s Economic Statecraft as a Tool
The narrative of soft power weaponisation has grown increasingly prominent in the field of international politics in recent years, and China's strategic application of this idea has come under close examination and discussion. Beijing has drawn attention to the merging of hard and soft power tactics, where more direct results have been obtained by playing on the nuances of influence. These dynamics have developed as a result of three aspects. The emergence of China, the ensuing Sino-American rivalry, and the emerging capabilities of digital technology are all included. The narrative has advanced, and its effects are also apparent in South Asia. In their pursuit and deployment of soft power, nations such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India have taken an unconventional approach and blended aspects of coercive diplomacy with its strategic application.
The two sensitive domains in which soft power has been weaponised are trade and sanctions which, particularly have become one of the most favoured tools for governments to respond to foreign policy challenges. The weaponisation of trade occurs when a country uses its trade leverage over another nation and coerces the other country to take action for a specific outcome. In addition to using trade and investment as instruments to boost its domestic economy, China has also used them to obtain a political advantage internationally. While China's comparative advantage plays a major role in much of its commerce, it is important to remember that trading in China goes beyond simple economics and into the area of strategy.
China’s dealings and economic ties with South Asian nations clearly illustrate the "weaponisation" of trade. China’s growing economic involvement in South Asia, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has led to concerns about economic dependence. Countries like Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Pakistan are increasingly reliant on Chinese loans, and this dependence could be leveraged by China for strategic influence. It even uses economic punishments and coercion in the form of restricting imports or boycotting goods from targeted countries. States are fighting for control over vital supply networks and economic levers, which has increased regional tensions in South and Southeast Asia due to the proliferation of small guns and light weapons. Countries also use non-tariff measures to weaponise trade in other countries. Likewise, sanctions point to a growing weaponisation of economic measures. They can include travel bans, asset freezes, arms embargoes, and trade restrictions.
Bethany Allen in her renowned work Beijing Rules: China’s Quest for Global Influence remarks that the Chinese government believes it has the ability and even the mandate to turn its domestic online surveillance apparatus outward, to disrupt and perhaps eventually even control global narratives in real-time. She remarks that Beijing has increasingly used market access and denial to shape state behaviour, security outcomes, legal regimes, and multilateral institutions on the global stage. In this case, a notable example of Beijing's new economic statecraft, illustrating the Chinese state's extraterritorial coercive reach, is the Zoom video conferencing platform. Due to its operations in China, Zoom is subject to domestic regulations that require businesses to share the personal information of users residing in China with the Ministry of State Security (MSS), the nation's main civilian spy agency. The Zoom example demonstrates how other countries are worried that data privacy might impact their business operating in China.
China's increasing possibility of data control and privacy has also raised concerns about waging cyberwarfare. Beijing’s strategic use of digital technology, cyberattacks, and other online tactics targeting critical infrastructure, government systems, businesses and private organisations demonstrates the growing potential for power projection without resorting to actual military engagement. Underlying the issue, the chief of Germany's intelligence agency voiced serious concerns about allowing the Chinese corporation Huawei to use the country's 5G network. Despite being the top supplier of 5G gear globally at the moment, Huawei is governed by Chinese law and is therefore ultimately accountable to the Chinese intelligence and security agencies as well as the Communist Party of China (CCP).
Footprints in South Asia
South Asia has over 961 million social media users, consequently, the region is vulnerable to misleading campaigns because disinformation is being disseminated more and more through social media and digital platforms, frequently to upend political systems or influence public opinion. The use of the internet, particularly social media, as a means of running information operations, has grown prominently over the past decade.
In the case of Pakistan, The Chinese and Pakistani media consistently frame The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) positively, emphasising economic growth, strategic cooperation, and employment, while downplaying concerns about debt and sovereignty. According to findings, Beijing uses coordinated disinformation campaigns, trolls, and armies of bots on social media to stifle critical information. Due to its connection to the BRI, China encourages Pro-Beijing sentiment through the media in nations like Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives, as China’s network of state-satellited affiliated reporters deflect criticisms in the region. Similar to this, a lot of falsified content is produced using crude editing rather than meticulous preparation.
Artificial intelligence (AI) has become another concern as the rapid development of AI technology has seen China strategically using artificial intelligence (AI) to further its national interests across various domains. The New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (AIDP), launched in 2017, aims to position China as a global leader in AI by 2030. Consequently, the emerging use of deepfakes is one area where China has turned AI into a weapon. Deepfakes are media generated or edited by Artificial Intelligence (AI). These manipulated videos, created using artificial intelligence, can deceive viewers by replacing faces or altering voices. Given the multiethnic and multireligious population of South Asia, the use of deepfakes in disinformation campaigns is concerning.
The increasing tendency to use AI as a weapon has an impact in South Asia as well. India has emerged as a major player, as seen by its AI-enhanced weaponry and surveillance systems. Pakistan has also lately increased funding for fresh projects that make use of these technologies. Pakistan used to spend very little on AI-related projects, according to research by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. However, recent events indicate that Pakistan's priorities have changed. The National Centre of Robotics and Automation received USD $1.67 million from Pakistan in 2018 for three AI projects. The weaponisation of such technology was recently debated at the UN. More than 100 artificial intelligence community experts, including Elon Musk of Tesla, have warned that new weapons could trigger a third revolution in combat, which has prompted this debate.
Election meddling, election tampering and political financing too are frequently employed to sway results. Reports of foreign intervention in elections have surfaced worldwide and China's influence on elections and campaigns in South Asia is multifaceted, primarily driven by economic investments, strategic partnerships, and cultural diplomacy. However, Deepfakes and other AI-generated information and social media are being used more frequently by The CCP to sway elections abroad according to Microsoft. Beijing's malicious weaponisation of two social media applications to sway election results was a significant factor in the Nepal case too. The disagreement between Beijing and Kathmandu was reflected in the rising popularity of the Chinese social media platform TikTok. In Nepal, TikTok and WeChat both gained popularity. However, the platform was involved in several cases of financial fraud and cyber-attacks.
A Growing Trend
It is evident now that the conventional view of soft power has its shortcomings. With the multiplier effect of social media, nations have realised the advantages of using soft power tools, which offer helpful channels for manipulation, propaganda, and disinformation. Entry into the institutions of other states has also been facilitated via cultural diplomacy, human exchanges, student exchanges, and academic and scientific collaboration programs. Interdependence between businesses and the economy has also been turned into a platform for influence. The employment of soft power instruments is not governed by any international law. Thus, state actors and non-state actors have a vast arena at their disposal. Even though soft power has become more strategically complex, the goal of a foreign policy should always be to adapt to one's national interests in the face of a shifting geopolitical environment. As China's economy has grown more integrated with the global system over the last few years, the CCP studied ways to use its rapidly growing domestic market for geopolitical advantage. China has consequently started to weaponise soft power and its impact is felt in South Asia as well. Therefore, given how geopolitics is getting more significant and complex, the phenomena of soft power weaponisation is probably going to continue to rise.
Image: Pedestrians walk under red lanterns which was recently installed as Chinese New Year decorations, at Pudong Financial Area in Shanghai, January 24, 2014. REUTERS/Aly Song.
Rajyavishek Pradhan is an Assistant Professor at North Bengal St. Xavier's College, India. He regularly writes on geopolitics and strategic issues for national and international publications, including The Geopolitics, The Diplomatist, Nepal Institute for International Cooperation and Engagement (NIICE) and South Asia Monitor. His research interests lie in the fields of International Relations Theory, US Foreign Policy, Indo-China Relations, security studies and geopolitics.
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