MYANMAR AS A STRATEGIC PARTNER IN CHINA'S MARITIME SILK ROAD

On 11 December 2024, Gu Wung, a member of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC), met with N'Ban La, the Chairman of the political wing of Myanmar's Kachin Independence Organisation, in Kunming. According to media reports, Wung urged the rebel forces to stop fighting the military Junta and reaffirmed China's commitment to restoring stability in Myanmar. This meeting follows two crucial developments: one, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army appealed to China to broker mediation with the military junta government. Two, the Chairman of the military government - Senior General Min Aung Hliang - met Chinese Premier Quiang Li in Kunming and guaranteed to advance the construction of Belt and Road Infrastructure (BRI) projects in Myanmar.

Myanmar's pivotal geography is at the crossroads of South Asia and Southeast Asia. It is crucial to China's Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) - a core component of BRI. After the military takeover in 2021, Myanmar has been in political turmoil, which was further exacerbated with the launch of Operation 1027 in October 2023. Since then, China has repeatedly appealed to the military Junta and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) to end the political unrest. But, both sides are hesitant to retreat from their respective advantageous positions. The recent political shifts in Myanmar have given China a new opportunity to be a peace broker and end the political turmoil in the country. However, the extent to which Beijing will use its leverage to further its BRI projects in Myanmar is yet to be seen. 

Myanmar's Inevitable Role in China's Maritime Silk Route Initiative

Being a neighboring country with a coastline of around 1200 miles on the Bay of Bengal, Myanmar perfectly fits in advancing China's MSRI. China lies to the North of Myanmar and shares an international land boundary of around 1323 miles with the country. To capitalise on this geography, China launched numerous projects in Myanmar even before the BRI in 2013. The most crucial projects commenced under BRI are the Kyaukphyu Sea Port and the Special Economic Zone in Rakhine State and the gas and oil pipeline project connecting the Kyaukphyu Seaport in Rakhine and Kunming in China's Yunnan Province. Chinese scholars believe these MSRI projects in Myanmar would boost Beijing's "Westward Opening Up strategy." This strategy hopes that by increasing connectivity with Myanmar through the Kyaukphyu Sea Port and the proposed railway line connecting Mandalay and Yunan, China's under-developed landlocked western provinces -Yunnan, Sichuan, and Guizhou- would gain direct access to the Indian Ocean and boost their economy. This would reduce the developmental gap between the economically backward Eastern province and industrialist Western provinces in China. 

Beijing's BRI investment in Myanmar has long-term geopolitical and geoeconomic intentions. In the past two decades, the Bay of Bengal region has become a point of geopolitical competition among significant power countries, especially the US, India, and China. The recent operationalisation of India's Sittwe port, which is only 100 miles from China's Kyuakphyu port, has made Beijing anxious. Chinese analysts have also pointed out that Beijing is aiming to realise Xi Jinping's two Ocean objectives through the infrastructure development within Myanmar and the acquisition of a naval presence in the Bay of Bengal in Myanmar.

China also perceives that the US and its allies have managed to get a foothold around the Strait of Malacca, making it vulnerable to maritime security threats from hostile powers. As a result, Beijing aims to build seamless land and maritime pathways to ensure smooth trans-shipment of its trade routes and an undisrupted flow of goods to fuel its economy. China seeks to build an alternate route to the Strait of Malacca using infrastructure projects in Myanmar. Additionally, with rising tensions in the South China Sea between Beijing and the claimant states- the Philippines and Vietnam, China is hoping to use the MSRI projects in Myanmar as an alternative maritime route to avoid over-reliance on the Strait of Malacca. 

Myanmar's political instability and challenges for China

However, Myanmar's political instability since the military takeover in 2021 has impeded the implementation of China's MSRI projects. Since the 2021 coup, Beijing has considered the military Junta a legitimate government and supported it politically, economically, and militarily. Still, Xi Jinping's government is not happy with the military government's incompetence in ending the violence.

For instance, while the pipeline connecting the  Kyaukphyu Port and Kunming was operationalised in 2013, it is supposed to be a game changer for China once the Kyuakphyu Port is constructed and operationalised. However, the construction of the port is halted because of the ongoing turmoil, thereby hindering the full potential of the MSRI projects. Similarly, the New Yangon City project has also been paused due to thecontinuingg situation. Despite repeated assurance from both the Junta and EAOs that they would protect China's BRI projects and Chinese nationals currently stuck in Myanmar's cyber scam camps, Beijing remains concerned. As a result, China recently decided to even establish a collaborative security company in Myanmar to manage the BRI projects. 

Moreover, ever since the EAOs captured the Myanmar border region with China in December 2023, the closure of the Sino-Myanmar border gate has taken a toll on the border trade volume, a 41% decline compared to 2023. This has impacted the Chinese populace residing along the border region, which depends on border trade for their economic aspirations. According to a report, the local government in Lincang City of Yunan province aims to increase the border trade by 17% and GDP growth by 7% in 2024. Likewise, other local governments in Yunan province aim to achieve similar aims, but all these goals can be achieved only if border trade resumes. 

The way forward

China has engaged with the military Junta and EAOs since the exacerbation of violence in Myanmar. Beijing has chaired peace talks many times and managed to broker two temporary ceasefires between the Junta and the EAOs in the past year, underscoring China's leverage on both sides. China's proactive strategy in Myanmar has made them the most influential foreign actor in the ongoing political turmoil. The recent appeal from the two main EAOs based along the Sino-Myanmar border region to broker a peace deal with the Junta further shows how they see China as a dependable ally- a leverage no other country has. 

However, the larger question is to what extent China would use its influence to bring stakeholders to the mediation table and broker a peace deal. According to past events in Myanmar, there have always been conflicting views between the Junta and the EAOs regarding territory and the management of power. It would be in China's interest to end the political instability in Myanmar, but it depends on how far the military Junta and the EAOs will compromise on their demands and cooperate with China. Also, how far China would negotiate with both stakeholders to safeguard its BRI projects in Myanmar is yet to be seen.