The purge of 17 military officials during the first half of 2026 emphasises the practice of Mao Zedong’s principle that “党指挥枪” (the Party commands the gun) and Xi Jinping’s insistence that the PLA must remain the “armed wing of the Party.” The campaign to arrest corruption and enforce loyalty spans every level of the military hierarchy, from high-level Central Military Commission (CMC) officials to PLA theatre commanders. The scope of these purges indicates a calculated rectification campaign, aimed at tightening Party control, streamlining the PLA’s command structure and advancing the Party’s 2027 Centennial Military Goal.
The nature and number of officials removed from their positions in 2026 so far reveal that political commissars were purged more than operational commanders. It indicates that Xi’s emphasis might extend beyond command discipline or operational readiness to ensuring the PLA’s ideological alignment with the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) leadership core. Moreover, six of the purged officials were serving beyond the standard retirement age. Instead of being allowed a quiet exit, they were publicly exposed. This suggests that the campaign might have transitioned from routine disciplinary purges into a warning to the rooted patronage networks that political protection has limits. The timing of purge announcements further reinforces this, with concentrations around NPC Standing Committee sessions suggesting these meetings were important events for formalising and publicising disciplinary actions.
Prepared by
Arushi Sharma
Arushi Sharma is a Research Intern at Organisation for Research on China and Asia (ORCA). She is a recent postgraduate in East Asian Studies from the University of Delhi and holds a Bachelor's degree in Chinese Language from K.R. Mangalam University. She has previously worked as a Subject Matter Expert in Mandarin Language at Unacademy. Her primary research interests focus on China's domestic politics and international economic statecraft.