CHINA'S STRATEGIC ENCROACHMENT IN INDIA'S NORTHEAST

The Northeastern Region (NER) of India occupies a strategic position at the crossroads of South and Southeast Asia, sharing both a land and maritime boundary with the politically volatile Bangladesh and Myanmar. In the past few years, both countries have been grappling with social and political instability, with Bangladesh experiencing political turmoil and Myanmar struggling with ethnic conflicts and military rule. Tensions in these regions have also invariably resulted in severe cross-border repercussions on India’s northeastern states, especially in Mizoram, Manipur and Nagaland. These include mass influx of refugees, arms trafficking and financial aid for the insurgent groups along the borders, all of which further strain the region’s economic and social stability. However, these issues are not confined to local and cultural dynamics alone; they have also been significantly impacted by broader political undercurrents shaped by an increasingly assertive China. Beijing has leveraged its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to expand its influence in the peripheral regions of India’s Northeast, including Bangladesh, Nepal and Myanmar. This strategic expansion raises concerns for New Delhi, as it could potentially undermine both its initiatives for the NER and its Act East Policy (AEP). 

That said, Beijing’s steady expansion of influence in India’s Northeastern periphery through strategic engagements with neighbouring countries like Bangladesh, Nepal, and Myanmar is not only limited to economic investments, but has also extended to security, infrastructure, and geopolitical manoeuvrings. Through projects like the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor in Myanmar, hydropower developments in Nepal, and infrastructure and military investments in Bangladesh, China is on the path of creating a network of dependencies that could disrupt India’s regional ambitions and drastically impact its flagship  AEP.

Against this backdrop of evolving regional dynamics, this paper undertakes an in-depth exploration of three key aspects. First, it examines the securitization of China’s engagement in India’s periphery, particularly its support for infrastructure and connectivity projects with far-reaching geopolitical ramifications. Second, it analyses China’s strategic use of cultural engagements in the region and their broader implications in a region that faces volatile socio-economic conditions. Third, the paper assesses the potential policy responses India can adopt to counterbalance Beijing’s expanding foothold while reinforcing its own vision of the Northeast as a gateway to Southeast Asia.

In this context, how should India effectively counter China’s growing influence in its Northeastern neighbourhood? The path forward lies in a strategy that goes beyond immediate reactive measures; a multifaceted approach that combines accelerating domestic infrastructure development in the NER, strengthening external partnerships and promoting socio-economic development in India’s Northeastern states. In addition to these aspects, an effective determinant of this response lies in integrating a policy synergy between two of New Delhi’s most important initiatives — its overall Northeast Policy and AEP; a coordinated effort that ensures domestic development priorities are strategically aligned with the broader regional engagements. 

China’s Triadic Strategy of Disruption:  Infrastructure, Security and Soft Power

The NER holds immense strategic significance for New Delhi. As India strives to enhance its connectivity with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) through its AEP, the Northeast serves as its primary gateway. It represents the sole land route for establishing connectivity with ASEAN countries. However, China’s growing footprint in the region, particularly in Myanmar, has increasingly challenged India’s strategic ambitions of engaging with ASEAN.

New Delhi has long been concerned about China's growing assertiveness along the Northeastern frontier due to its implications for India's territorial integrity and strategic security. Two key factors heighten these concerns. First, the Siliguri Corridor, also known as the Chicken’s Neck Corridor, serves as the only land route connecting the Northeastern states to mainland India, making it a critical yet highly vulnerable point. Any disruption to this corridor could severely impact India’s military mobility and logistical access to its eastern territories. The 2017 Doklam standoff underscored this vulnerability. The crisis erupted when Chinese forces attempted to construct a road in the Chumbi Valley, a contested area in the Doklam Plateau near the India-Bhutan-China tri junction leading to an elongated stand-off between both Indian and Chinese forces. Any further Chinese military presence in the plateau would significantly alter the security calculus, allowing Beijing to enhance its offensive positioning along the ridgelines overlooking the Siliguri Corridor. Given its terrain advantages, China could use this vantage point to monitor Indian troop movements and, in a worst-case scenario, threaten the severance of India’s access to the Northeast.

Secondly, there has been a long-standing territorial dispute over India’s Arunachal Pradesh since the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Even last year, the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs announced Arunachal Pradesh as part of their Zangnan region (Southern Tibet). In response, India’s External Affairs Minister, Jaishankar, reaffirmed the sovereignty, dismissed China’s claims, and reiterated that the state would always be a part of India. This counterclaim of Arunachal Pradesh between China and India has also exacerbated India’s strategic discomfort with Chinese influence in the region and beyond. 

The ongoing territorial dispute not only heightens military tensions but also intersects with broader security concerns, particularly in the realm of internal security. For decades, insurgency in the NER has been a persistent issue, fuelled by economic underdevelopment and historical grievances. Numerous insurgent and militant groups operate across Northeastern states, with varying objectives ranging from seeking complete secession to greater autonomy. While the Indian government has managed to broker ceasefire agreements with certain powerful militant groups like the National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Isac Muivah (NSCN-IM) and United Nation Liberation Front (UNLF), others like the People's Liberation Army of Manipur remain active and continue to engage in insurgent activities. Despite repeated denials from the Chinese side,  multiple reports indicate that China has supplied weapons to Myanmar’s ethnic armed organizations like the United Wa State Army and the Arakan Army, which have then been smuggled across the porous Indo-Myanmar border to insurgent groups in India’s Northeast, thereby accelerating insurgency activities in the region. Furthermore, Paresh Baruah, the leader of the United Liberation Front of Asom (Independent), who continues to pursue the secessionist goal of separating Assam, is believed to be taking safe haven and operating from China. Additionally, reports suggest that for many decades, China’s People’s Liberation Army has been offering military training to Naga and Mizo rebel groups in Kunming. These instances demonstrate the constant efforts China is seeking to indirectly support insurgent activities within India through military training, arms trafficking and financial support.

Moreover, China’s economic investments around India's NER through its BRI have constantly evoked strategic concerns in New Delhi. The nature of Chinese investments has involved extensive infrastructure development in neighbouring countries like Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar (Refer to the Red Icons in the Map below). In Myanmar, China is constructing the Kyauk Phyu Deep Sea Port and a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Rakhine State, which is only 65 nautical miles away from the India-backed and invested Sittwe port, also lies in the same region and borders the Indian state of Mizoram. Once this SEZ is completed, it can possibly outshadow New Delhi’s investments because of its larger capacity, and will provide China with a competitive maritime presence in the Indian Ocean Region. Furthermore, the recent announcement of a Chinese-backed hydropower project on the lower reaches of the Brahmaputra River in Nepal has also caused serious apprehensions within India’s strategic community, and is estimated to pose significant risks to the region’s water security. Given that the project is expected to impact the flow of water coming into the Indian states of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam, Chinese construction of the dam could lead to potential flood risks, exacerbate water scarcity, and severely affect the agricultural practices of local communities.

Therefore, China’s strategic interventions in Myanmar, Nepal, and Bangladesh are not isolated developments but are deeply intertwined with India’s Northeastern security and geopolitical calculus. Beijing’s influence over key transport and energy routes, raises concerns about security vulnerabilities along India’s eastern flank. In Nepal, Chinese-funded hydropower projects and infrastructure expansion provide Beijing with leverage in a country that shares deep socio-cultural and trade ties with India’s Northeast. Meanwhile, in Bangladesh, China’s growing defense partnerships and infrastructure investments, including ports and energy sectors, have created a strategic environment that could potentially curtail India’s regional ambitions. This evolving strategic landscape in Bangladesh not only challenges India’s regional influence but also complements China’s broader efforts to expand its soft power footprint.

At the same time, China has also increasingly leveraged cultural diplomacy to deepen its engagement in India’s Northeast, particularly in states like Arunachal Pradesh, where historical, linguistic and Buddhist ties with Tibet have created avenues for influence. Recognizing this, China has sought to capitalize on these cultural and ethnic connections to extend its influence through media campaigns and tourism promotions. For example, China's "Visit China" initiative has been directed at Northeast India, encouraging local communities to visit Tibet, as part of a broader strategy to foster people-to-people relations. In addition, since 2009, China has been issuing "stapled visas" to residents of Arunachal Pradesh, indicating a unique stance on their citizenship status. Moreover, China's media influence has also targeted the region, with efforts to destabilize the fragile Northeast region's integrity. A case in point, according to a report,  is a YouTube video posted by a Chinese-speaking account named Jostom, titled "Manipur India known as 'small China'." The video, which used auto-generated captions in Hindi or English while the narrator spoke in Mandarin, suggested that Manipuris share ethnic ties with the Jingpo and Monbo people of China. It further claimed that Manipuris were descendants of the Chinese, with a stronger sense of belonging to China and a deep yearning for a "home" in China.

Furthermore, China is indirectly exploiting India's NER economy through its extensive economic influence. Cheap Chinese goods—ranging from garments and electronics to automobiles—have been flooding the region, not through direct trade routes, but via third-party countries, particularly Myanmar. India shares two official border trade points with Myanmar, one in Manipur and another in Arunachal Pradesh, each with markets on both sides. The problem lies in the fact that markets on the Myanmar side have much larger capacities, and most of the products sold there are manufactured in China. As a result, a large influx of low-cost Chinese goods has entered India’s Northeast Region (NER), both legally through trade points and illegally via the porous border, as Made-in-India products struggle to compete on price. This has severely impacted the region’s Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs). Moreover, the overwhelming availability of these products has also led local consumers to favor Chinese goods over Indian alternatives.

The Geo-Strategic Relevance of Northeast India for New Delhi’s Regional Strategy:

China’s geopolitical incursions into India’s Northeastern periphery have thus presented a dual challenge, threatening both domestic security and New Delhi’s broader regional ambitions. In light of such challenges, India’s AEP, an evolution of the Look East Policy, has become a critical framework to counterbalance China’s overall presence in the region. Since the early 2000s, India has intensified infrastructure development in the NER through domestic initiatives and cross-border collaborations. Such avenues have also seen renewed focus with multifocal developmental strategies that aim to address the Northeast’s socio-economic development and tie it to its broader foreign policy-oriented regional initiatives. 

This two-fold strategy of domestic development and regional integration is a deliberate effort on New Delhi’s part to embed the NER into India's broader regional framework through two measures. First, New Delhi is aggressively pursuing infrastructure development in the region, not merely through the development of the region for domestic integration but also as a strategic necessity (Refer to the Green icons in the Map below). Since 2014, 1824 kms of new railway tracks have been laid, along with 478 flyovers and passes to enhance regional connectivity. Currently, three capitals in the Northeast- Assam, Tripura and Arunachal Pradesh- are connected by rail, with the remaining capitals undergoing railway line construction as part of New Delhi’s broader policy of connecting all NE’s states' capitals by rail, road and air routes. 

Fig 1- Infrastructure projects in and around NER. 

(The map is prepared by the authors, using QGIS and Google Earth. In Fig 1, the red icons denote China’s investments along the Northeast periphery, the green icons represent India’s domestic and collaborative projects with neighboring countries, and the blue icons indicate Japan's investments in India’s Northeast region. Please note: The authors couldn’t embed the names of all the projects due to space constraints. For more information about the map, click here.)

As of October 2024, 64% of the completed rail tracks have been electrified and the rest is expected to be completed by December 2025. In the Union Budget 2025-26, India allocated Rs 2.65 lakh crore to construct new railway lines, track renewals, road safety improvements, and better passenger amenities in NER. Of this, Rs 10,440 Crore will specifically be used for the development of railway infrastructure. Moreover, in FY 2024-25 alone, the Central government has allocated Rs 19,338 Crore for the construction of national highways across all Northeastern states to ensure smooth connectivity with the rest of the country. Furthermore, New Delhi has also launched a Central-centered scheme called the North East Special Infrastructure Development Scheme in 2017 to focus on physical infrastructure projects ranging from water supply, power, and connectivity to social infrastructure such as education and health. Between 2021 and 2025, the Central government has sanctioned  90 projects under the NESIDS, worth ₹3417.68 crore. This highlights New Delhi’s commitment to integrate and enhance connectivity in the NER. 

India's proactive approach to developing its Northeast region for greater regional integration is also evident in its pursuit of third-party partnerships. Japan's substantial investment of over 231 billion yen (till June 2022) exemplifies this approach (Refer to the blue icons in the Map above). These investments, both in terms of financial aid and strategic investments, are a case in point where Japan is extending grants and bilateral Official Development Assistance loans for the construction of numerous National Highways, forest management projects, sewage projects, water supply systems, schools for the Scheduled Tribe and minority communities in the region, and more. By leveraging investments and third-party collaborations, New Delhi aims to transform the Northeast into a vital economic and geopolitical bridge between the Indian heartland and its eastern neighbours.

The second dimension of this strategy lies in utilising these infrastructure projects not just as domestic initiatives but extending them for broader regional benefits as well. By integrating and expanding them into cross-border trade networks and connectivity frameworks, New Delhi seeks to not only develop the region, but also to position it as the all-important gateway for its AEP. For example, the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport Transit Project, a key flagship initiative to give India’s Mizoram an ocean outlet to the Indian Ocean via Myanmar, consists of three parts, with the final leg involving the transportation of goods from the Sittwe port via Paletwa (Myanmar) to Mizoram by road. Furthermore, projects such as the Imphal-Mandalay-Muse Trilateral Highway Project connecting Manipur with Thailand via highways in Myanmar aim to connect India’s north-easternmost state with Thailand’s Mae Sot, thereby enhancing people-to-people relations and greater economic activities across the trade route. This highlights New Delhi's efforts to align its domestic infrastructure development with broader AEP projects, aiming to boost the overall infrastructure development and economic growth of the NER.

Additionally, India is collaborating with Bangladesh to develop several infrastructure projects, such as the Inland Water Transport on the National Waterway-2 (Brahmaputra River), the Khulna-Mongla port rail line and the Agartala-Akhaura cross border railway line. The inland water transport will give India's Assam an outlet to the Bay of Bengal via the Indo-Bangladesh Protocol Route. The two rail projects are expected to boost movement of people and transportation of goods between Bangladesh and India’s NER, particularly through Tripura, enhancing regional connectivity. Since the inauguration of the Agartala-Akhaura Rail line last year, residents in Tripura can now travel to Kolkata via the existing rail line in Dhaka in just 12 hours instead of the usual 38 hours. These projects will address the historical grievances of the region's landlockedness and underdevelopment, while simultaneously strengthening the bilateral relations and boosting tourism between the two countries, thereby elevating New Delhi’s influence in the region. 

Furthermore, India has implemented several strategic measures to counter China's use of cultural diplomacy to undermine the integrity of India's Northeast Region (NER). The Ministry of Tourism has launched initiatives such as Swadesh Darshan 2.0, the International Tourism Mart, and the PRASHAD scheme, all aimed at encouraging mainland Indians to visit the Northeast. These programs are designed to bridge the cultural divide between the people of NER and those from the rest of India. In addition, the central and state governments have collaborated to organize major cultural festivals throughout the region, including the Hornbill Festival in Nagaland and the Losar Festival in Arunachal Pradesh. These events have seen a notable rise in domestic attendance, signaling the success of these initiatives in fostering cultural integration. If sustained, these could counter China's attempts to exploit ethnic and Buddhist connections to destabilize the region, promoting greater unity and cohesion within India's Northeast.

However, alongside these cultural efforts, India is also aiming to address economic challenges posed by the influx of cheap Chinese products, which threaten to dominate the local economy. To combat this, the government has launched initiatives to attract foreign investment, with Japan showing interest in developing the bamboo industry in the region. Additionally, schemes like the North East Industrial Development Scheme (NEIDS), PM VISHWAKARMA, and industrialization programs have been introduced to foster the growth of MSMEs and support local businesses. Despite these efforts, the implementation of these schemes has faced hurdles, including low business participation, complex application processes, and infrastructure limitations in the region. These economic measures, if effectively executed, could complement the cultural initiatives, helping to ensure the region’s stability and resilience against external economic pressures.

To achieve these goals of boosting NER’s economy and countering China’s influence efforts to disrupt New Delhi’s regional policies, the key will lie in focused infrastructure development in the region. Without enhancing the region's infrastructure and integrating it into its border regional ambitions, New Delhi will struggle to solidify its regional strategic goals, since every significant cross-border project under the AEP involves land connectivity. Therefore, the success of AEP hinges not just on external engagements, but also on fully integrating the NER into a regional economic framework that benefits and enhances the socio-economic statuses of the local communities involved. Without this synergy, the NER risks remaining a strategic concern rather than an economic gateway to Southeast Asia.

The Dynamics of New Delhi’s Strategic Response: 

China’s assertive influence in and around India’s Northeast periphery underscores the pressing need for a revised regional development and security strategy. A significant part of this strategy also rests on New Delhi institutionalizing a Trilateral Security Mechanism between India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh. This requires a nuanced diplomatic approach to ensure cross-border security operations against Indian insurgent groups along the Indo-Myanmar and Indo-Bangla border regions are carried out effectively. Such operations are to be conducted with the full consent and cooperation of both governments, respecting their sovereignty while addressing mutual security concerns. Moreover, India’s security establishment must strengthen intelligence-sharing mechanisms with Myanmar’s military-led government while leveraging strategic engagements with Thailand and Bangladesh. By focusing on investing in advanced technologies, enhancing training programs, and establishing a dedicated Cyber Command, India can better address emerging security threats. This approach will also enhance intelligence capabilities, enabling more effective countermeasures against cyber threats and monitoring insurgent activities effectively.

Additionally, New Delhi’s NER policy would benefit from repackaging the AEP to prioritize connectivity between the NER and Southeast Asia. Despite efforts to develop domestic infrastructure, projects such as constructing rail tracks to connect all NER and national highways are progressing very slowly and have repeatedly missed expected deadlines. The challenges stem from the difficult terrain in NER, and the lengthy process of land acquisition. Moreover, while India successfully inaugurated the Sittwe Port in 2023, other components of the Kaladan project under the AEP initiative have faced repeated delays and remain stalled due to Myanmar's political instability. Without completing the remaining sections of the Kaladan project, India cannot fully utilize the port, thereby hindering its goal of providing the Northeast Region with direct access to the ocean. The Imphal-Mandalay-MaeSot Trilateral Highway Project has faced similar setbacks, further impeding progress. Hence, New Delhi needs to reorient the decade-long AEP initiatives in light of the evolving political tides in Myanmar and also the growing Chinese investment footprints around India’s NER periphery. This can be initiated through two key approaches: First, establishing a dedicated NER Indo-Pacific Strategy Task Force within the Ministry of External Affairs, which would formulate a comprehensive roadmap integrating NER-based connectivity with broader maritime and trade initiatives under the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Second, a proactive approach to renew its diplomatic engagements by negotiating with Bangladesh's interim government, as well as with Myanmar’s Tatmadaw and relevant ethnic armed organisations, in order to effectively resume the stalled infrastructure projects, would enhance New Delhi’s counterbalancing strategy against China’s growing influence in the region.

Moreover, by introducing economic incentives, such as financial support, subsidies, and low-interest loans, India can encourage domestic firms to invest in infrastructure, manufacturing, and services, thereby enhancing connectivity and fostering economic growth in the region. Additionally, promoting public-private partnerships (PPP) would aid Indian firms to collaborate with local governments and communities, ensuring that investments are sustainable and inclusive. Such strategic economic incentives will not only provide long-term opportunities for development of the region, but also balance out Beijing’s growing footprint in India’s northeastern states.

Hence, New Delhi’s economic policies should continue to remain committed to targeted investment frameworks. While road, rail, and digital connectivity projects under AEP are pivotal, they must be accompanied by targeted investment frameworks that benefit the local population and boost the region's overall economic purview, a prospect that can potentially eliminate historical grievances that have disrupted livelihoods for decades. The challenge is thus not merely to prevent China’s political and economic incursions but also to redefine India’s role as a stabilizing force in the Northeast. By aligning its AEP with the aspirations of its Northeastern states, New Delhi can ensure that this strategically vital region becomes an all-important bridge between its regional initiatives and global ambitions.