With regard to terrorist attacks, investigations by intelligence agencies are limited to answering questions at the tactical-operational level on who was the mastermind and how was it executed, it does not answer the ‘why’ part of the question. This task is left to highly skilled all-domain strategic experts who may have to depend on their intuition, more than rational knowledge. This opinion piece, explores the China factor in India’s war against terrorism emanating from Pakistan, and argues that the recent terrorist attack in Pahalgam (Kashmir) makes little sense for both China and Pakistan given their strategic and economic cooperation. Geopolitical factors, such as the gaining importance of the Indian Ocean region in the era of great power competition may have a role, although establishing such a role in concrete terms may be an analytical challenge.

Pakistan’s use of terrorism as part of its statecraft is a well-recognized phenomenon and India has so far demonstrated its resolve and strategic patience in dealing with this menace, which according to former Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon is a problem that cannot be solved. The recent killing of 27 civilians at Pahalgam on 22 April, has committed India to take unprecedented punitive diplomatic measures and threaten use of military force. Pakistan’s state sponsored terrorism over the years has been a disastrous policy and makes no sense from a strategic perspective. Pakistan’s leadership, following the recent terrorist attack in Kashmir, has admitted officially, that the State of Pakistan has a history of supporting terrorist organizations and that it has engaged in this ‘dirty work’ at the behest of the United States and United Kingdom for decades. The only rationale that supports Pakistan’s quest to fight over Kashmir are the river waters flowing into Pakistan – Pakistan’s Jugular Vein, with support for the heroic struggle of Kashmiri Muslims against the Indian State being just a hogwash.

With India deciding to hold in abeyance the long-standing Indus Water Treaty (1960) – one of the most successful water sharing endeavors in the world – one wonders what strategic objectives did Pakistan aim to achieve with the terror operation in Pahalgam, given the abysmal security and economic situation within Pakistan. On 02 May, National Investigation Agency's (NIA) preliminary report on the terror attack pointed to an operational nexus between Pakistan's intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). Two terrorists central to the attack, identified as Hashmi Musa (alias Suleman) and Ali Bhai (alias Talha Bhai), were confirmed Pakistani nationals and Pakistan’s involvement was established by extensive forensic and electronic data gathering. This terror attack suggests a significant improvement in the modus operandi of the terrorists who have, perhaps, successfully breached human and technological intelligence capability of Indian forces.

Yet, investigations by NIA are limited to answering questions at the tactical-operational level on who was the mastermind and how was it executed. It does not answer the ‘why’ part of the question. This task is left to highly skilled all-domain strategic experts who have to depend on their intuition. According to Professor Srikanth Kondapalli, “in 2009 the Indian Armed Forces began to shift towards a two-front war under nuclear threshold and since then we started deploying S-400 ballistic missile defense system somewhere between Pakistan and China; secondly, we also have a strike corps on China and strike corps on Pakistan, these are meant for taking the war into the territory of China or Pakistan, instead of being on defensive we are planning for an offensive campaign with these measures; the current Pahalgam incident suggests that China does not like the Indian preparation, so China wants to contain India to the South Asia box and there is a grand plan that China and Pakistan are hatching”. Although plausible, this hypothesis does not acknowledge the two-front war situation challenging Pakistan in its north-Southwest and China in East Asia.

China's Perspective

China has long-held that it is not in favour of creating a two-front war situation for itself in its southern flank by developing antagonistic relations with India. China chose a thaw in its relations with India coinciding with Trump administrations return to power which was expected to accelerate US pivot to Asia policy. Also, China’s plan to restrict India to South Asia, if true, is counter-productive as witnessed by India’s increasing defense and security partnership with the US in recent years. On 02 May, the United States approved a potential 131 million USD military equipment sale to India aimed at significantly enhancing its maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific.

While China may have the intention and some influence in retarding India’s growth given its economic superiority, China cannot determine India’s rise and such an influence is only of recent origin. It is, however, true that when former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visited China in the 1980’s, Deng Xiaoping mentioned that India and China cannot rise simultaneously in Asia. After Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination in 1991 until 2014, India was administered by weak coalition governments, which some call as the lost decades, and was also the period when India missed the opportunity to be part of the global supply chain which catapulted East Asia economies. According to India’s Foreign Minister S Jaishankar, “China was always—for not always, but for a long time—a strategic objective of the West… building them up as a society, praising their… achievements, history, and running us down was equally a strategic compulsion.”

Pakistan in China’s Strategic Calculus

While China gives highest priority to Pakistan in its foreign policy, Pakistan understands the Pakistan-China relationship to be the cornerstone of its foreign policy. A Joint Statement issued following Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s first official visit to China after taking office on 1-2 November 2022 states, “both sides expressed satisfaction with the close cooperation, trust and communication between the armed forces of the two countries. Underscoring that stronger strategic defense and security cooperation between China and Pakistan is an important factor of peace and stability in the region, the two sides agreed to maintain high-level military-to-military visits and exchanges and deepen cooperation in areas of training, joint exercises and military technology”. In exchange for Pakistan’s commitment to the one-China Policy and support on issues of Taiwan, South China Sea, Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Tibet, China supports Pakistan’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, security, and promotes its socio-economic development and prosperity.

The China-Pakistan All-Weather Strategic Cooperative Partnership is now understood as a choice by history, which transcends geopolitical interests and is an important positive factor for regional peace, stability and development. In China’s strategic thinking, a transformation unseen in a century is accelerating and in this regard the China-Pakistan relation remains of strategic significance with attempts to disrupt or undermine it underway. China sees terror attacks against its interests in Pakistan as an attempt by hostile powers who are aligned against its rising global influence and geo-political initiatives such as the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). According to General (R) Tariq Khan, it is obvious that there will be resistance to CPEC given its strategic scope – “China is connecting Asia, Africa and Europe through the Belt and Road initiative and CPEC is the gateway, so there is no geographical entity in the world which provides this gateway other than CPEC”. Attacks against Chinese personnel intensified since 2018, a time when US officials declared the return of an era of great power competition. In addition to Pakistani security personnel, China is contemplating deployment of its own security personnel in Pakistan.

China’s national interest, and Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are now inextricably linked to the extent that China may resort to direct means to secure its interests in Pakistan. China’s policy is to see to that the issue of terrorism in Pakistan is not politicized by hostile powers and protect Pakistan from military intervention. China has banked on Pakistan to address the problem of terrorism and other domestic issues, without realizing that neither the government nor the Pakistan Army is in control of the situation within Pakistan and in many ways part of the problem. Both internally and externally, Pakistan seems to be paying the cost of deepening ties with China and exposing itself to geopolitical risks.

In fact, Pakistan’s sovereignty is questionable with its inability to maintain control over its borders and prevent terrorists activities. Pakistan’s state capacity has been hollowed out by draconian spending cuts and arbitrary taxes to be eligible for economic bailouts. Islamabad now owes China more than 67 billion USD which equals 19.6 percent of its economy, and is one of top three recipients of China’s development funding, with China spending 21.3 billion USD in 22 years to support Pakistan’s budget alone. According to Khalid Mansoor, Former Minister, CPEC Authority, China remained committed to investment in Pakistan’s energy sector despite Pakistan’s inability to repay and establish the basis on which the agreements were made, and for China it is an investment in a trade route from its Eastern flanks. In sum, Pakistan is integral to China’s grand strategy and the CPEC initiative is a geopolitical initiative.

Testing China’s Resolve

Terrorism is a special military strategy, which is based on surprise, deniability and control of escalation. Pakistan, given its national power has come to put this strategy to good use against militarily superior India. Yet, the strategic aim of any particular terror attack is difficult to discern. While China does not admit it in public, in fact, it is disappointed with Pakistan, and failed in its risk assessments. More that anything, it is the strategic location of Pakistan that is foremost in China’s grand strategy. In this regard, India’s war against terror networks in Pakistan will need to factor in China’s role both directly and indirectly. The China-Pakistan relationship is now operating under severe contradictions and the internal situation within Pakistan along with India’s well-considered strategic approach and military plan will only intensify this contradiction. China is on the verge of realizing a major strategic error and India must accelerate this process by not succumbing to international politics, and public opinion at home. In other words, India, as in the past, must not become a proxy for great powers but move ahead to be one in the 21st century.

Author

Dr Sundaram Rajasimman lectures at Sichuan International Studies University, Chongqing, People’s Republic of China and is associated with Baize Institute for Strategic Studies (Southwest University of Political Science and Law, Chongqing). He holds a PhD from Jilin University (Changchun, PRC), M.Phil. from Center for East Asian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi), and Masters in Defense and Strategic Studies from Madras University (Chennai). He has held research appointments at Institute of Defence and Strategic Analysis (IDSA), Center for Air Power Studies (CAPS), and National Security Research Foundation (National Security Council, Government of India). He specializes in strategic culture, art and science of war, modern war history and political thought & philosophy. At present he is completing a book length work on Naval Power to be published by Lancer Publications in May, 2025.

Subscribe now to our newsletter !

Get a daily dose of local and national news from China, top trends in Chinese social media and what it means for India and the region at large.

Please enter your name.
Looks good.
Please enter a valid email address.
Looks good.
Please accept the terms to continue.