SECURITY ARCHITECTURES FOR MIDDLE POWERS

Introducing Security Architectures

A security architecture, according to contemporary connotations, is a technical term that has been originally, largely associated with the world of information technology (IT). It constitutes as a terminology from the world of IT wherein systems are organised in an orderly framework to ensure seamless execution of processes with minimal imprecision. Security architectures generally form the background of systems’ dependencies on software/hardware that enforce the security of systems, which are integral to their smooth functioning. In the world of contemporary geopolitics, a security architecture is synonymous primarily with defence multilateralism, yet may also form the very basis of the entire defence and defence-related national security framework of a country. The fundamental configuration of a multilateral framework intends to accomplish the well-defined aims, goals, and objectives of its members and other adjunct entities with bestowed interests vis- à-vis the space of national and other forms of security may be conclusive to a security architecture. A security architecture is deemed by most scholars to be largely regional, and limited in scope and accountability to a specific region that entails the broader security and security-related parameters.

Ryo Sahashi, Associate Professor from the University of Tokyo Institute for Future Initiatives, defines a security architecture as “Taking the distribution of power in a given region as the fundamental component, the overall structure of interrelationships between alliances, functional cooperation, and regional cooperation formed among the main actors who have common interests in regional security in order to achieve clear objectives.”. The emphasis on inclusive institutions (which consider the interests of lesser countries), exclusionary behaviour owing to strategic dilemmas, and hedging which may apply to a regional security architecture do not go amiss in a paper from December 2011.

Another definition of a security architecture is “A system of norms, practices, relationships, alliances and institutions constructed or developed by nations to address, enhance or ensure international and/or regional security. It is often based on sub-regions.”. This definition was put forward by Dr. Christophe Snedden of the U.S.-based Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS). In his definition, the emphasis on regions is highlighted and an argument is put forth that  security  architectures  are  devised  on  the  basis  of  sub-regions  ahead  of  regions.

A multilateral framework is meant to foster cooperation between like-minded countries by providing a platform for healthy debates leading to meaningful and actionable imperatives. Security architectures devised on the basis of multilateral frameworks tend to forge organised structures and layers with attuned centralisation. National security encompasses a security architecture that may involve traditional and non-traditional domains such as the regular military forces, as well as measures accorded to the evolving security threats of the cyber and information warfare, space as a field for the purpose of engaging in war, satellite-based warfare, the electromagnetic spectrum, and other areas of warfare.

A security architecture may not necessarily involve a host of actors. For instance, the Peoples’ Republic of China’s (PRC) maritime-naval outlays in the Indian Ocean may yet encompass an unofficial security architecture by itself. China is increasingly determining the state of Asian security as a unitary actor, and compelling several other states, including India, to react in earnest.

China adheres to a set of aptly-worded principles and appellations that form a ‘security architecture’ of its own through its ‘Active Defense’, ‘Near Seas Defense’, ‘Far Seas Protection’, ‘Wolf   Warrior   Diplomacy’,   ‘Aggressive   Diplomacy’,   and   many   others.

Several policymakers, academicians, researchers, scholars, journalists, and others invested in the field of academia work day-in day-out to devise security frameworks and concise architectures that aim to address the consternating issues and problems that plague their countries. This domain may be national, land-based, maritime, or even involving new and emerging domains such as ultramodern  warfare  conducted  via  the  cyber,  space,  and  electromagnetic  media.

Devising Security Architecture for Middle Powers in Asia - India, Japan, and South Korea

Three of the strategically forthright middle powers in Asia are Japan, South Korea, and India. To devise a security architecture for middle powers in Asia would require the coalescing of the increasingly common set of interests between these three countries, and several more with stakes in the region. For countries such as India, Japan, and South Korea, the intertwining of strategic aims, goals, and objectives in itself expresses a yearning to establish a rigid and vigorous security architecture   meant   to   cater   to   the   very   interests   described   previously.

Presently, the headline threat of the challenges posed by the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) in the terrestrial and maritime domains needs to be urgently dealt with. As far as disputing countries are concerned, this also impacts their allies and partners wary of growing Chinese influence. Unfortunately, the rise of Chinese influence supplemented by Beijing coercively stamping its authority worldwide is fast assuming a negative persona. Other challenges that justify a demand for security architectures include concerns over the irrational behaviors of non-state actors that exist in the form of maritime pirates, transnational terrorist groups, crime syndicates, and state- sanctioned threats. For middle powers, convergent interests are becoming a staple. Middle powers form part of a unique community of influential powers in size, capacity and capability, with relatively advanced social, political, economic, demographic and several such parameters in comparison to backward and lesser developed countries. They are defined by a prevailing and warranted halo of optimism which is meant to lay the path ahead for them in the upcoming decades, and in their prime.

As concerning this is, the activism on display by middle powers in the multilateral fora is a welcome change from recalcitrant hegemons such as China and even the United States to a certain extent. Middle powers are also more inclined towards promoting peace in conflict-stricken regions than burly hegemons such as a militarily antagonistic China. Devising a security architecture for middle powers is, hence, a priority as their increased interactions leading to actions and results in contingent areas and problem-solving for the challenges manifest can prove to be decisive.

International relations, characterised by the dominant theory of realism vis-à-vis a state’s independence in the anarchical international system, form the basis for multilateralism and, henceforth, all-encompassing target-driven security architectures. Middle powers can rightly balance the finer tenets of hard realism with benign principles, and unleash the requisite measures to counter countries like China.

Keeping the above in mind, a security architecture for middle powers in Asia focussed on the security-infringing parlays of China will have to prioritise deeper cooperation. Meetings at designated levels such as summit meetings, working groups, interaction seminars/webinars, dialogues, meaningful discussions and debates platforms will comprise what essentially forms a security architecture, or, at the very least, the workings of a multilateral organisation committed to accomplishing the overarching security goals of it members. Additionally, the appointment of observer states will have to be prudently envisaged and implemented, as observer states can bide their    time    while    envisaging    future    involvement    and    integration.

A security architecture for middle powers will prioritise their capacities and capabilities, in the maritime domain in particular, given that the Indo-Pacific is primarily a maritime area of geostrategic relevance. It will be necessary to assess and estimate the underlying potential within the security inventory of middle powers to further activities that pertain to the security interests of the participating actors. A Global Times editorial suggests that problem-solving capabilities are integral to the duties of a security architecture and this advice serves to actually deal, on several fronts, with China itself. Efficiency paradigms of a security-driven architecture should also be considered,  as  should  professionalism,  honesty,  oneness,  and  good  conduct.

A staunch commitment at the highest levels between middle powers with shared interests must be emphasized in any security architecture, while the interests of the member states should be, for all intents and purposes, cooperative within the established framework. This commitment will go a long way in eschewing the bullying nature of China, as evinced from the withdrawal of Australia due to Chinese coercion, as a potential member in the early days of QUAD in 2007.

Exploring  the  Maritime  Elements  vis-à-vis  Security  Architectures  in  Asia

The maritime domain has much to do with security architectures in the face of the increasing frictions posed by modern warfare in the ongoing century. The inclusion of the diverse set of characteristics pertaining to the domain of security that reflect the overarching national security of a maritime nation in any normative security architecture is a given.  Maritime security, and expanded economic cooperation both via and as a result of the maritime domain through the trade of precious commodities such as non-renewable energy; dealing with the threats posed in the maritime domain such as sea-driven piracy, maritime crimes such as armed robbery and drug trafficking to name just two, and seaborne terrorism such as attacks on plying oil vessels, container ships and cruise liners are some of the fundamental themes that will infuse the maritime element of a security architecture.

Other tenets of a security architecture-pioneered maritime component would be joint naval exercises at a premier level between navies meant to foster maritime cooperation and work towards assuaging maritime ills, synergies between coast guards as demostrated by the Sahyog- Hyeoblyeog exercises between India and South Korea, and trade of maritime equipment to meet mutually beneficial goals. For example, Japan and India’s long-pending deal for the US-2i Shinmaywa maritime Search And Rescue (SAR) aircraft can only be given a further impetus through a security architecture for middle powers catering to established common goals in maritime security. Multilateral organisations that have succeeded at the highest level tend to even maintain combined units from their armed forces to attend to emerging and emergency security situations. These units can even be trained through specialised practical and physical education to ensure preparedness against rampant threats.

The maritime element in the conduct of international relations has been afforded considerable primacy in the arena of multilateral cooperation. ASEAN organises the ASEAN Maritime Forum and the expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum to further discussions on maritime issues, especially those pertaining to security. Bilaterally, India and Japan organise the Maritime Affairs Dialogue. Japan organises several dialogues centred on maritime security with like-minded countries such as the Philippines and Singapore, to whom it also offers military support. India organises the Track-I Goa Maritime Conclave and the Track-1.5 Goa Maritime Symposium with like-minded invitees to deliberate maritime issues. India has also been a mainstay in the Indian Navy-prepared IONS and the IOR-focussed IORA, and conducts the annual MILAN congregation to improve mutual understanding between partner navies.

Historically, South Korea was responsible for the formation of the Asian and Pacific Council (ASCAP) in 1966. The ASCAP was conceived to secure the nine members of the organisation from external perils. The ASCAP was declared defunct in 1975 due to differences between members. In 2006, Japan was instrumental in positioning the Regional Cooperation Agreement for combatting piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAAP) as a mechanism to steer anti-piracy cooperation and efforts. The United States is firmly allied with East and Southeast Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand bilaterally in a security dimension since the end of World War II, with a maritime bent of mind. The ideal approach has been that of collective security, which states that security challenges and threats are to be met in unison by all parties involved were security threats to be posed to even one of the parties in agreement. The security ideals of common, cooperative, collective, and comprehensive security will also have to be figured in to a security architecture as an outlining principle to cultivate a well-oiled machine.

China  as  an  area  of  interest  to  the  India-Japan-South  Korea  trilateral

China poses a unique threat, challenge, and a problem for any emerging security architecture involving India, Japan, and South Korea and thus prevails as a strong area of interest owing to the shift in the Indo-Pacific balance of power. While the trio may be careful in not antagonising China too much, the threat posed by the former is manifest in regions of interest to the former. For India, China is a geopolitical, geo-economic, and a geostrategic challenge across various terrains, while Japan and South Korea have been pressed into action in their neighbourhood to curb Chinese assertions. A security architecture that aims to incorporate growing concerns of the trilateral in respect of Chinese exertions across the entire Indo-Pacific, will have to encompass the multidimensionalism of China as an active and a self-interested security actor. Security models must be rationally devised to balance Chinese coercion against the interests, mutual or individual, of the three aforementioned middle powers. The experiences of middle powers in security- focussed multilateral organisations such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) will hold the key to future security architectures that are intended to curb the advances of the Chinese dragon.

India’s equation with China encompasses longstanding border and territorial disputes to also involving a high-stakes, fast-paced competition with its Communist neighbour as an emerging superpower. To this end, India can act as a mediatory power in any new security architecture while Japan’s own negative perceptions of China, too, can play a major role in this regard. A natural complementation of interests and a longstanding friendship with both Japan and South Korea can help India achieve dexterity, traction, and influence with regard to China, in the still-developing Indo-Pacific. Japan and China have been battling it out in the Bay of Bengal (BoB) region which is an Indian sea area. Closer home (that is the proximate central Indian Ocean as compared to the distant western IOR), the immediacy of the Chinese threat to Japan can also not be ignored, thus providing Japan with added incentive to deal forthrightly with Chinese maritime agendas.  India’s Indo-Pacific ambitions, presence, vision and strategy can enlighten Japan and South Korea to the overarching Chinese presence in the Indo-Pacific, particularly the Indian Ocean. Dubious, ill-intentioned Chinese maritime-naval deployments, in the BoB for example, pose new security challenges to India (and Japan, resulting from wide-ranging infrastructure-connectivity and official aid assistance interests, to a considerable extent). A focal security architecture must aim to specifically address Chinese geo-economic strategies, backed by a mild security presence that could balloon in the wake of conflicts and consternation, from their very core. This can be prudently assisted by expanding Japanese and South Korean interests in the Indian Ocean that posit India   as   the   very   fulcrum   of   the   world’s   third-largest   water-body.

The scope of cooperation between India, Japan, and South Korea to consider Chinese prevalence in the Indo-Pacific can be further complemented by existing minilaterals. One such mini-lateral bloc, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or QUAD), a group of four countries (the United States of America, Japan, India, and Australia), is lacking the membership of South Korea. The QUAD also aims to balance Beijing by employing the minilateral medium effectively and synergising the interests of its member-countries in consideration of the Chinese challenge. Terrence Roehrig recommends South Korean involvement in the QUAD through a maritime working group that focusses on maritime security. Roehrig also believes that a naval component of the QUAD can help battle climate change. South Korean democracy and a general like-mindedness runs synonymous to the QUAD’s foundations and future. Coupled with the Indo-Pacific strategy of the United States and Indian Ocean-interested parties such as the European Union (EU), the QUAD will aim to constitute and enforce an especially maritime security architecture of its own to preserve Freedom of Navigation (FoN) in China-neighbouring seas. In wake of the Russia-Ukraine war and fast-changing geopolitical equations, including the potential emergence of a Russia-India-China trilateral to balance the West, Indo-Pacific minilateralism is finding itself at the centre. Middle powers such as India, Japan, and South Korea are primed for geostrategic supremacy given the immense potential that lies in cultivating a sturdy relationship away from and well beyond bilateral inadequacies (Japan-South Korea relations). Maritime security cooperation is now a necessity to not just combat traditional and non-traditional threats but aspects such as food security, energy security, and bilateral/mutual trade gaining prominence among export-oriented economies are all but dependent on comprehensive maritime security. Thus, an India-Japan-South Korea middle power security architecture that is more prominently focussed maritime security, and consequently, China, will serve to assuage several concerns   with   regard   to   the   utility   of   the   maritime   domain.

Conclusion

For a security architecture that envisages cooperation between middle powers such as India, Japan, South Korea, several other influential regional ‘middle powers’ such as Russia and Indonesia, the aforesaid domains matter considerably. Add to them, the security apparatus of Asia is largely being diverted to address matters of the strategic Indo-Pacific area on the globe. The Indo-Pacific region lies at the heart of Asia and in the Pacific, covering approximately 30 percent of the total surface area of planet Earth, when it is construed as including the Indian Ocean Region (which stretches from West Asia to the Western Pacific) and the Western Pacific Ocean region. With the region fast emerging as the twenty-first century’s most significant theater for conflicts and wars of the future inclusive of those not just limited to China but also involving non-state actors and terrorists groups, a security architecture for influential middle powers with definitive stakes in the progress and development of the region from the purview of security is a necessity.

Attention being accorded to the Indo-Pacific region as a whole is immense in present academia, and arguably numero uno as far as the strategic impact of global regions and the prevailing and evolving security scenarios are concerned. Several nations have announced wide-ranging measures such as visions, concepts, and introductory policy provisions for the Indo-Pacific that are gaining remarkable traction among academicians, researchers, scholars, and even serving policymakers. In this respect, the Indo-Pacific region necessitates security architectures between middle powers that are devised on stated principles and policy endeavors. To improvise upon the stated policy dimension of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” to which countries have rendered visions, guidelines, policies, and reports, a security architecture attuned to them will have to outline principles and enforce them through actionable imperatives. India, Japan, and South Korea seem well poised to lead the way towards the formulation of such an architecture since they’re both best placed in and well-versed with the Indo-Pacific. Such an architecture will go a long way in rescinding the ‘Asian Paradox’.