Summary
To many external observers, the Chinese notion of democracy is contradictory to the country’s one-party political system and its limited space for dissent. Nonetheless, the Chinese party-state has consistently portrayed itself as a system that embodies democratic values, albeit in a form tailored to its own political and cultural context.
Democracy, as a political concept, has evolved in different ways and means across historical periods, cultures, and political systems. In Western liberal connotations, it is often defined by competitive elections, institutional checks and balances, and a robust framework of individual rights and freedoms. By contrast, within China, the concept of democracy has long been conceptualized through the lens of governance efficiency, social stability and national development.
To many external observers, the Chinese notion of democracy is contradictory and at odds with the country’s one-party political system and its limited space for dissent. Nonetheless, the Chinese party-state has consistently portrayed itself as a system that embodies democratic values, including rule of law and electoral mechanisms, albeit in a form tailored to its own political and cultural context. This narrative has been strategically cultivated by the Communist Party of China (CPC) and widely disseminated through its state-controlled media.
Party idealogues have also argued that democracy should not be seen as a rigid, one-size-fits-all formula but rather as a flexible framework that must adapt to a country’s specific historical trajectory and socio-political realities. Through this lens, the Party presents its governance system as an evolved and effective form of democracy, one that emphasizes outcomes over procedures and collective well-being over political pluralism. This conceptual repositioning has also sought to legitimize the Chinese model as a credible and perhaps even superior alternative to liberal democratic systems.
This democracy narrative, however, operates under the guise of a Party-state system that is fundamentally rooted in centralized political control and constrained political participation. While the Party-State system projects the language and symbols of democracy both within the Party and the nation-state, it does so through a tightly managed framework that has consistently prioritized state authority over electoral contest.
The Evolution of Democratic Notion in China
China’s engagement with the concept of democracy, both in theory and practice, can be traced back to the late Qing Dynasty. The collapse of imperial rule in 1911 ushered the Republic of China into a short-lived and turbulent experiment with representative governance that was ultimately plagued by factionalism and fragile institutions. These early attempts at democratic governance were widely seen as failures, reinforcing scepticism about the applicability of Western-style democracy to Chinese society.
Following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the CPC categorically rejected liberal democratic models, venturing into building a one-party socialist state grounded in Marxist-Leninist ideology. During the Mao Zedong era, the emphasis was placed on the concept of ‘people’s democracy’, a model rhetorically centred on mass participation but practically characterized by centralized authority, ideological conformity and large-scale mobilization campaigns.
After Mao’s passing, China’s democratic trajectory underwent a significant shift, leading to a redefinition of what constituted as ‘Chinese democracy’. Under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, the emphasis moved toward pragmatic governance and sweeping economic reforms. Political liberalization, while present, was not the primary objective but rather a secondary consideration within a broader agenda of collective modernization. However, Deng’s era also laid important groundwork for a governance mechanism that prioritized political stability and performance-based legitimacy over institutional pluralism. Among Deng Xiaoping’s many political reforms within the Party, the replacement of Mao’s one-man rule with an unwritten but rigorously observed norm of collective leadership was perhaps the most important in the Party’s ongoing tussle with the idea of democracy. This principle became the cornerstone of the Party’s governance model for the following three decades. Through this, Deng emphasized the need for centralized control that derived its legitimacy from within the Party, drawing on the earlier but largely unrealized concept of Democratic Centralism put forth by his predecessor. For Deng and the leaders he appointed, this model was intended to permit limited internal debate while preventing the return of one-man rule, even as the principle of collective leadership itself remained deeply embedded in the Party’s core governance philosophy.
At its core, Democratic Centralism has long served as the fundamental organizational principle of Communist Parties, rooted in Leninist theory. It combines two elements: democracy, which allows internal debate and participation among party members, and centralism, which means that once decisions are made by the central leadership, they are binding on all members and must be strictly followed to maintain unity and discipline.
This dual formulation, democracy as foundational but always subordinate to centralized control, established the boundaries of Chinese democracy, both, within the Party as well as in China at large. While Deng reasserted this principle with a new focus on stability and institutional reform, it remained evident that invoking democratic rights could not be used to challenge Party authority. Instead, democracy was seen as functional and internal, operating strictly within the framework of centralized leadership. Deng’s interpretation of democratic centralism thus reinforced the belief that legitimacy arose from centralized power, unity, and performance, rather than from political competition or public dissent.
One of the more consequential developments during this period was also the introduction of electoral practices at the village level, an early experiment in grassroots democracy aimed at improving administrative efficiency and local accountability without ceding control to multiparty competition. These limited reforms were not meant to democratize the political system in the Western sense, but rather to reinforce the legitimacy of the Party by enhancing governance responsiveness at the local level.
Successive administrations, particularly those of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, continued along this cautious path. While reaffirming the Party’s monopoly on political authority, they expanded consultative mechanisms and promoted the discourse around ‘intra-party democracy’ and ‘deliberative governance’, yet within the ideological boundaries set by Deng’s ‘Democratic Centralism’ understanding. These efforts were designed to ideologically contain democracy within parameters defined by the Party, all the while incorporating participatory elements under tightly controlled and non-adversarial forms.
It was within, or arguably in divergence from this trajectory, that Xi Jinping formally introduced the concept of ‘Whole-Process People’s Democracy’ in 2019. Framed as a mature, systematic and uniquely Chinese model, this concept has sought to position China’s political system as a form of democracy rooted in continuous public consultation and responsive governance rather than competitive politics and elections.
Defining Whole-Process People’s Democracy (全过程人民民主)
At its core, whole-process people’s democracy is designed to project an integration of both electoral and consultative democratic elements under the centralized leadership of the Party. It claims to facilitate public participation throughout all stages of governance, from policy formulation and legislative drafting to implementation and oversight, aiming to leave an impression of democracy being ‘real and effective’ by emphasizing outcomes over procedural formalities.
Although China does not permit multiparty competition, the Party argues that democracy can still be meaningfully realized through structured, non-competitive participation mechanisms. While direct elections exist only at the village level, they are tightly managed; candidates are pre-approved by Party officials, and the political environment ensures alignment with Party interests. This pre-screening process significantly undermines the competitive dimension that defines liberal democratic elections, raising fundamental questions about the legitimacy and authenticity of what is labelled as ‘Chinese-style democracy’. Nevertheless, the CPC justifies this model by asserting that governance effectiveness and social cohesion take precedence over political competition.
Consultative democracy forms another central pillar of China’s governance approach. Institutions such as the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) serve as platforms for input from various professional, social and ethnic groups. However, these forums, much like any other political entity in China, operate within clearly defined boundaries and under strict Party supervision. The intent is not to accommodate dissent, but to refine governance through feedback mechanisms that remain politically as well as ideologically safe.
Another claimed pillar of whole-process democracy is governance through consensus. Mechanisms such as public surveys petitions and structured feedback loops offer citizens limited avenues for engagement, but these processes are tightly managed to avoid political mobilization that could challenge the Party’s authority. Events like the annual Two Sessions, the meetings of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the CPPCC, exemplify China’s emphasis on deliberative policymaking over electoral competition. Yet, the absence of institutional checks and independent oversight in these processes further entrenches the Party’s control, revealing the limits of China’s authoritarian governance model under an illusioned democratic framework.
The process of whole-process people’s democracy has also been formalised through a framework built around four key dualities, each of which aims to distinguish China’s model from liberal democratic systems while reinforcing its internal logic. The first is the combination of process democracy and achievement democracy, where political legitimacy is derived not only from adherence to formal procedures but also from the effectiveness and outcomes of governance. The second duality intertwines procedural democracy with substantive democracy, emphasizing that while legal mechanisms and electoral processes remain important, they are equally complemented by the delivery of material benefits, social welfare and broader public satisfaction.
The third dimension lies in the interplay between direct and indirect democracy. In the Chinese context, this involves promoting grassroots participation through mechanisms such as local forums and community consultations, while reserving ultimate decision-making authority for representatives operating within the Party structure. Finally, whole-process people’s democracy has also sought to reconcile the tension between people’s democracy and state will, suggesting that genuine public participation should align with, rather than diverge from, national objectives as defined by the CPC.
Taken together, these dualities form the core of what Xi Jinping has described as a ‘real and effective socialist democracy’, an ideological framework that claims to integrate broad-based participation with centralized authority. This model has also been actively promoted by the Party-state through media narratives, ideological campaigns and diplomatic messaging across the world. It is positioned not simply as a domestic solution, but as a globally relevant alternative, one that claims to offer stability, efficiency, and responsiveness in contrast to what Chinese officials and political scientists often portray as the chaos and dysfunction of liberal democracies.
Domestic and International Implications
Domestically, whole-process democracy serves as a political tool to legitimize continued one-party rule. By emphasizing performance legitimacy, measured through stability, growth and national rejuvenation the Party and Chinese state-media have consistently argued that its model reflects the people’s will more effectively than Western democracies which have been marked by polarization and gridlock. This redefinition has enabled the Party to neutralize internal calls for political liberalization by embedding participation within Party-led mechanisms.
Internationally, China has actively promoted whole-process people’s democracy as a governance model suited to the Global South. Through strategic partnerships and economic influence, Beijing has systematically advanced its governance model as an attractive alternative for developing nations. By integrating partner countries into large-scale infrastructure projects with extensive Chinese oversight, it has been argued that these developmental ventures embody democratic participation, since local stakeholders are involved in the planning and implementation phases. In this framing, the roots of a Chinese-style democracy have become an exercise of collective decision-making, thereby gaining greater legitimacy under the Party’s banner of ‘consultative governance’.
Beyond infrastructure, the Party has also invested significantly in actively training officials from developing nations in ‘consultative governance’. The Nyerere Leadership School run by the CPC in Africa, for instance, has been instrumental in shaping how African political elites perceive governance, reinforcing the idea that strong leadership and centralized decision-making are compatible with democratic legitimacy. Such tactics go on to suggest that China is not merely presenting an alternative against liberal democratic norms, but rather moving a step ahead and quietly reshaping how governance is practiced in the developing world.
Xi Jinping’s campaign for Whole-Process People’s Democracy thus represents an ideological reassertion of Party leadership rather than a structural democratization of the Chinese political system. It reflects a deliberate attempt to redefine democracy within the Party’s terms, integrating controlled participation, rule-by-law, and performance legitimacy into a singular framework. While presented as a novel model of democratic governance, it is in many ways a continuation and rhetorical refinement, of the CPC’s longstanding discourse on democratic governance.
At the heart of this model lies not only a domestic strategy for legitimizing one-party rule, but also a broader ideological ambition that has sought to challenge the normative dominance of liberal democracy, especially among the developing world. With greater contest brewing over political legitimacy, China is positioning whole-process people’s democracy as part of a larger contest over political values and governance paradigms.
As such, the debate surrounding China’s model is not just about institutions and political system, but as much about the future of what constitutes of democratic values themselves. Whether whole-process people’s democracy gains traction beyond China will depend not only on its governance outcomes, but on the extent to which other democratic countries are able to counter Beijing’s Democracy narrative.
Image Source: Associated Press
Author
Ratish Mehta
Ratish Mehta is a Senior Research Associate at the Organisation for Research on China and Asia (ORCA). He is a postgraduate in Global Studies from Ambedkar University, Delhi and works on gauging India’s regional and global political interests. His area of focus include understanding the value of narratives, rhetoric and ideology in State and non-State interactions, deconstructing political narratives in Global Affairs as well as focusing on India’s Foreign Policy interests in the Global South and South Asia. He was previously associated with The Pranab Mukherjee Foundation and has worked on projects such as Indo-Sino Relations, History of the Constituent Assembly of India and the Evolution of Democratic Institutions in India. His forthcoming projects at ORCA include a co-edited Special Issue on India’s Soft Power Diplomacy in South Asia, Tracing India’s Path as the Voice of the Global South and Deconstructing Beijing’s ‘Global’ Narratives.