WOMEN’S EMANCIPATION AND NATIONAL REJUVENATION

The concept of gender equality in contemporary China is a strategic policy tool in the service of advancing national rejuvenation. The state’s official discourse on women’s emancipation is complex and contends with the problems that arise from having an ageing population, slowing domestic economic growth, and lingering ramifications of the Covid-19 pandemic. In this setting, women’s emancipation is instrumentalised as a symbol of progress, as long as this progress is achieved within the confines of China’s existing social and political system. This framing is also reflected in China’s most recent White Paper for Women’s Development, which was released in September 2025. While state narratives praise “women’s empowerment,” they frequently reframe empowerment in terms of gender-essentialist norms of motherhood, filial piety, social stability, and tradition in order to advance the goal of “national rejuvenation.”

Examining Dominant State Narratives

The State Council’s new White Paper celebrates advancements in the health, labour, and education sectors, while highlighting the contributions of women in both economic and social spheres. The multiple references it makes to the institution of family and the social norms that accompany it are noteworthy. The paper subtly maintains that a woman’s social worth and her achievements are still linked to her familial responsibilities, portraying these as essential to women’s emancipation. The paper also highlights the importance of women’s rights in the “promotion of family ties, values, and traditions,” calling on women to “use their distinctive role in society and family” to promote “national rejuvenation.” The paper turns women and their bodies into a nation-building project closely monitored by the government.

The same approach claims that women “hold up half the sky,” as is repeatedly echoed by top leaders like Xi Jinping. In reality, their involvement in public discourse and political leadership is only a fraction of male participation in politics and public life. According to the Statistical Monitoring Report of the National Program for Women’s Development (2021–2030), women make up only 26.5% of deputies to the 14^th National People’s Congress (NPC), which is only a slight increase from previous years and in no way a figure worth celebrating. The disconnect between the state’s narrative of “widespread participation” and the dearth of proactive measures to ensure equal representation of women in political leadership roles culminates in the absence of female leaders in the 24-member Politburo.

Women’s Bodies as Instruments of State Policy

An analysis of the White Paper also reveals how women’s empowerment is instrumentalised within a state policy framework that combines pro-natalist and Confucian morality with gender equality. For instance, the report boasts of a decrease in maternal mortality to 15.1 per 100,000 and a 99.9% hospital delivery rate as advancements in maternal health and reproductive care for Chinese women. These numbers are meant to highlight the Party’s commitment to a safe and effective maternity system through programs like the Action Plan for Reproductive Health Promotion (2023-2025) and the Action Plan for Maternal and Child Health Improvement (2021-2025).

Such figures take a very selective view of women’s health. The Party places far more emphasis on maternal and infant health, while women’s overall mental and physical health, as well as their reproductive autonomy, are sidelined. The idea of women’s bodies as a demographic asset is further institutionalised in the report’s “Women and Family Building” section. The report notes that in 2023, women’s federations across all levels of governance recognised 1.64 million “Most Beautiful Families” and 33,000 “Five-Virtue Families” nationwide. This canonisation of “beautiful families,” aimed at promoting the ideal of a “socialist family civilisation” institutionalises state-endorsed norms of moral conduct and domestic virtue. It establishes a hegemonic narrative that an ideal family is a heteronormative one, aligned with government ideals. The symbolic status given to these families, therefore, becomes the ideal of morality to be replicated by women in their private lives. Thus, women’s emancipation runs the risk of increasingly being defined in State-centric terms.

Furthermore, the perception that an emancipated woman is simultaneously patriotic, economically independent, and maternal is reinforced by the state’s push for women to combine their personal goals with the Party’s objective of social stability. Although this approach is not exclusive to China, it is a reflection of gender essentialism. Confining women to their biologically and socially constructed roles has emerged as a contested global issue, as numerous states adopt policy frameworks that equate women’s social value with motherhood and family formation.

Gendered Governance and Digital Policing

A pattern of gendered governance can be observed in the 30-day “divorce cooling-off period,” as introduced in Article 1077 of China’s Civil Code in 2021. Although the policy has been criticised for being unfair to women stuck in abusive relationships, it was justified by the state as a way to prevent hasty divorces and maintain family stability. In response to this law, women are increasingly speaking out on social media sites like Xiaohongshu, raising concerns about the gendered policies enforced by the State. On Xiaohongshu, one user wrote under a post that was celebrating the Global Leaders’ Meeting on Women summit in Beijing,  “I hope this meeting is not just for show but addresses real issues that concern women, such as abolishing the divorce cooling-off period and criminalising domestic violence.” Another commented under the same post, “Domestic violence is intentional injury, abolish the cooling-off period!” These comments were met with hundreds of likes from like-minded users who demanded real action be taken to ensure that women’s safety is not disregarded for the sake of maintaining normative families. From a policy perspective, the cooling-off period is in line with the government’s overarching effort to maintain “beautiful families.”

Additionally, the state’s control of these digital spaces constrains feminist discourse on women’s rights and policies related to women’s development. A contradiction inherent to China’s digital governance is the conflict between the state’s goal to maintain a “positive energy” online and the ability of social media to provide a safe space for critical debates. By penalising discourse that “exaggerates family disputes” or “advocates preference for sons over daughters,” the White Paper praises the Party’s effort in “creating a clean cyberspace.” Although this policing of the internet is presented as a defence against gender discrimination, it also restricts conversations on sexual harassment and systemic injustice. In September 2025, WeChat permanently deleted feminist blogger Jiang Chan’s account, which had over 40,000 followers. Around the same time, Weibo suspended over 1,300 accounts for similar reasons. Even measured critiques of marriage law or reproductive policy were swiftly censored. This emphasis on maintaining “positive energy” deprives Chinese citizens of an important platform where they can establish supportive communities that are vital for their progress.

In conclusion, the Chinese government’s vision of gender equality in 2025 is extremely complex. The official discourse on the part of the State reflects a framing of the essentialist roles of women as childbearers and primary caregivers who are supposed to fulfil these roles as a service to the nation. Women’s rights are recognised and celebrated, but only if they adhere to traditional ideals and further national policy goals. The state-supported discourse of “positive energy” and “national rejuvenation” sidelines enduring questions on social media that challenge the dominant framework applied by the state to shape the discourse on women’s rights and development. 

The concept of gender equality in contemporary China is a strategic policy tool in the service of advancing national rejuvenation. The state’s official discourse on women’s emancipation is complex and contends with the problems that arise from having an ageing population, slowing domestic economic growth, and lingering ramifications of the Covid-19 pandemic. In this setting, women’s emancipation is instrumentalised as a symbol of progress, as long as this progress is achieved within the confines of China’s existing social and political system. This framing is also reflected in China’s most recent White Paper for Women’s Development, which was released in September 2025. While state narratives praise “women’s empowerment,” they frequently reframe empowerment in terms of gender-essentialist norms of motherhood, filial piety, social stability, and tradition in order to advance the goal of “national rejuvenation.”

Examining Dominant State Narratives

The State Council’s new White Paper celebrates advancements in the health, labour, and education sectors, while highlighting the contributions of women in both economic and social spheres. The multiple references it makes to the institution of family and the social norms that accompany it are noteworthy. The paper subtly maintains that a woman’s social worth and her achievements are still linked to her familial responsibilities, portraying these as essential to women’s emancipation. The paper also highlights the importance of women’s rights in the “promotion of family ties, values, and traditions,” calling on women to “use their distinctive role in society and family” to promote “national rejuvenation.” The paper turns women and their bodies into a nation-building project closely monitored by the government.

The same approach claims that women “hold up half the sky,” as is repeatedly echoed by top leaders like Xi Jinping. In reality, their involvement in public discourse and political leadership is only a fraction of male participation in politics and public life. According to the Statistical Monitoring Report of the National Program for Women’s Development (2021–2030), women make up only 26.5% of deputies to the 14^th National People’s Congress (NPC), which is only a slight increase from previous years and in no way a figure worth celebrating. The disconnect between the state’s narrative of “widespread participation” and the dearth of proactive measures to ensure equal representation of women in political leadership roles culminates in the absence of female leaders in the 24-member Politburo.

Women’s Bodies as Instruments of State Policy

An analysis of the White Paper also reveals how women’s empowerment is instrumentalised within a state policy framework that combines pro-natalist and Confucian morality with gender equality. For instance, the report boasts of a decrease in maternal mortality to 15.1 per 100,000 and a 99.9% hospital delivery rate as advancements in maternal health and reproductive care for Chinese women. These numbers are meant to highlight the Party’s commitment to a safe and effective maternity system through programs like the Action Plan for Reproductive Health Promotion (2023-2025) and the Action Plan for Maternal and Child Health Improvement (2021-2025).

Such figures take a very selective view of women’s health. The Party places far more emphasis on maternal and infant health, while women’s overall mental and physical health, as well as their reproductive autonomy, are sidelined. The idea of women’s bodies as a demographic asset is further institutionalised in the report’s “Women and Family Building” section. The report notes that in 2023, women’s federations across all levels of governance recognised 1.64 million “Most Beautiful Families” and 33,000 “Five-Virtue Families” nationwide. This canonisation of “beautiful families,” aimed at promoting the ideal of a “socialist family civilisation” institutionalises state-endorsed norms of moral conduct and domestic virtue. It establishes a hegemonic narrative that an ideal family is a heteronormative one, aligned with government ideals. The symbolic status given to these families, therefore, becomes the ideal of morality to be replicated by women in their private lives. Thus, women’s emancipation runs the risk of increasingly being defined in State-centric terms.

Furthermore, the perception that an emancipated woman is simultaneously patriotic, economically independent, and maternal is reinforced by the state’s push for women to combine their personal goals with the Party’s objective of social stability. Although this approach is not exclusive to China, it is a reflection of gender essentialism. Confining women to their biologically and socially constructed roles has emerged as a contested global issue, as numerous states adopt policy frameworks that equate women’s social value with motherhood and family formation.

Gendered Governance and Digital Policing

A pattern of gendered governance can be observed in the 30-day “divorce cooling-off period,” as introduced in Article 1077 of China’s Civil Code in 2021. Although the policy has been criticised for being unfair to women stuck in abusive relationships, it was justified by the state as a way to prevent hasty divorces and maintain family stability. In response to this law, women are increasingly speaking out on social media sites like Xiaohongshu, raising concerns about the gendered policies enforced by the State. On Xiaohongshu, one user wrote under a post that was celebrating the Global Leaders’ Meeting on Women summit in Beijing,  “I hope this meeting is not just for show but addresses real issues that concern women, such as abolishing the divorce cooling-off period and criminalising domestic violence.” Another commented under the same post, “Domestic violence is intentional injury, abolish the cooling-off period!” These comments were met with hundreds of likes from like-minded users who demanded real action be taken to ensure that women’s safety is not disregarded for the sake of maintaining normative families. From a policy perspective, the cooling-off period is in line with the government’s overarching effort to maintain “beautiful families.”

Additionally, the state’s control of these digital spaces constrains feminist discourse on women’s rights and policies related to women’s development. A contradiction inherent to China’s digital governance is the conflict between the state’s goal to maintain a “positive energy” online and the ability of social media to provide a safe space for critical debates. By penalising discourse that “exaggerates family disputes” or “advocates preference for sons over daughters,” the White Paper praises the Party’s effort in “creating a clean cyberspace.” Although this policing of the internet is presented as a defence against gender discrimination, it also restricts conversations on sexual harassment and systemic injustice. In September 2025, WeChat permanently deleted feminist blogger Jiang Chan’s account, which had over 40,000 followers. Around the same time, Weibo suspended over 1,300 accounts for similar reasons. Even measured critiques of marriage law or reproductive policy were swiftly censored. This emphasis on maintaining “positive energy” deprives Chinese citizens of an important platform where they can establish supportive communities that are vital for their progress.