THE ENDLESS SEARCH FOR LOYALTY

The Standing Committee of the 14^th National People’s Congress has removed Li Shangfu and Qin Gang from their state positions, confirming suspicions of a purge of top officials in the military and diplomatic corps of the Party-State. All eyes now turn to the 3^rd Plenum of the Central Committee, where the Party centre is likely to remove Qin and Li as full members of the Central Committee as well.  The third Plenum is typically an occasion for announcing economic policy adjustments, and the removal (or absence) of Qin and Li from the same will  strongly reiterate to all Party members that security and stability are necessary premises for economic growth and development. Importantly, it will once again remind them how swiftly the Party will act to protect its national image, no matter the seniority of the members under investigation.

Hence, the fall of several high-profile leaders since July,— less than one year after their appointments at the Party Congress in October 2022 and People’s Congress in March 2023— must be viewed as a powerful reminder that personnel management tools like the anti-corruption campaign and system of promotions, appointments and transfers continue to be deployed across the Party, state and military, targeting rival factions and loyalists in the pursuit of absolute loyalty. The latest purge suggests that Xi Jinping’s search for reliable appointments is having to increasingly contend with the difficulty of appointing officials who are loyal and clean. For China, the trade-offs of making personnel appointments on the basis of interpersonal relations and loyalty are showing serious implications for national security. More consequently, for Xi, such purges diminish the authority of policy implementers and attracts speculation of political instability from international media and observers of Chinese politics.

Personnel Management under Xi

Purges are a staple feature of elite politics in China. However, the removal of Qin Gang and Li Shangfu, less than a year after their promotion at the 20^th Party Congress, reflects poorly on Xi’s methodology of appointing officials especially given the absence of a consensus-based decision-making process for appointments and the much-publicised fact that Xi Jinping personally interviewed candidates for top jobs.

Qin Gang’s rise to becoming a Full member of the Central Committee as well as Foreign Minister of China and State Councillor in less than six months has been largely attributed to his interactions with Xi Jinping as his chief protocol officer in charge of managing all Xi’s foreign visits. Similarly, Li Shangfu’s promotions since 2013 — chief of staff of the newly-created (by Xi Jinping) PLA Strategic Support Force in 2015, director of the reorganised (by Xi Jinping) CMC Equipment Development Department in 2017, full membership to the Central Committee in 2017 and ultimately the Central Military Commission (CMC) in October 2022 — were sanctioned by Xi.

Their removal after such direct interventions by Xi to appoint them indicates that vetting mechanisms in the Party are relaxed for Xi’s preferred candidates and officials are reluctant to scrutinise appointments made by him. A prime example is the fact that Qin Gang’s alleged affair appeared to have escaped the scrutiny that top officials in China are usually subjected to. The reasons for Qin Gang and Li Shangfu’s dismissals illustrate the disastrous implications for national security that result from personnel appointments made on the basis of personal connections, perceived loyalty and a single individual’s judgement of character and capability.

The Limited Efficacy of Anti-Corruption Campaigns

It is no coincidence that the anti-corruption campaign took on renewed momentum just as officials in China’s military and diplomatic corps began to disappear. In February, Standing Committee member and head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), Li Xi announced that the CCDI would strengthen supervision of “No.1” figures and identify major security risks. This was followed by the establishment of an email address by the PLA Equipment Development Department in March, for people to send tips about illegal procurement cases. By May, it was reported that Liu Guangbin, Deputy Commander (now former) of the PLA Rocket Forces (PLARF) was being investigated. In the days after a Politburo study session in July where Xi Jinping reiterated the importance of strengthening supervision of military expenditure, the Commander and Political Commissar of the PLA Rocket Forces (now former) Li Yuchao and Xu Zhongbo, were also probed for corruption.

The case of Li Shangfu, Li Yuchao, Xu Zhongbo and others reveal that corruption remains deep rooted and involves officials at every level of the military. The repeated campaigns to purge corruption from the military have not produced the desired results, either in terms of eliminating corruption or instilling combat readiness and absolute loyalty. Some sources report that more than 1,000 individuals are being investigated, including high-level executives, from four major central military enterprises. So far, 36 central Party and government officials have been investigated and punished in 2023. In terms of combat readiness, a recent field assessment of the combat readiness of the PLA Rocket Forces has revealed staffing problems and sub-optimal dispersion of troops of certain brigades. Most importantly, the supposed leak of sensitive military information about China’s nuclear and missile forces is troubling for Xi’s quest for absolute loyalty from commanders and troops.

Implications for National Security

The purge of so many high-level officials in the PLA in such a short span of time can also suggest a much more serious reason for the dismissal of officials. The release of a report by the China Aerospace Studies Institute of the Air University in the US revealed sensitive information about the functions, composition and operations of the PLA’s Rocket Force. According to some observers, the information came from within the PLARF. Although this is speculative, taken in combination with Qin Gangs alleged affair, the potential risk of blackmail is a serious security risk facing China’s national security. It could have major implications for China’s nuclear deterrence, warfighting capability and Xi Jinping’s control of the military.

Perhaps owing to the potential security risks that the leaks present, China’s discipline inspection and state security agencies have initiated a massive campaign to warn cadres and the public against foreign infiltration and leaks of confidential information. The Ministry of State Security has launched a public campaign to enlist members of the public to provide information about espionage activities. Chen Yixin, Minister of State Security, in an article published in June called for a severe crackdown on efforts to steal state secrets as China begins the legislative process of revising the State Secrets law, expanding existing provisions to ensure the security of state secrets. These developments perhaps indicate the heightened concern about sensitive military and diplomatic activities exposed by the purged officials.

Xi’s third term has so far been marked by instability in the top leadership of China’s most outward facing ministries. These changes could insert uncertainty in China’s relations with the outside world, undermining the authority of officials who engage with their foreign counterparts. It has reiterated that Xi Jinping is central to all personnel and policy decisions and officials in the Party and State only serve to execute his vision.