CHINESE ROCKET FORCE STRATEGIES UNDER BMD SHIELD

Introduction

The way geopolitical flux has evolved in the Indo-Pacific region or even China creating a war-like situation with the Ladakh Standoff since 2020, a possibility of border war being waged by Xi Jinping against India cannot be ruled out. In such a scenario, the war may start with strikes from People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) on India’s strategic locations. PLARF is the custodian of both conventional and nuclear tipped missiles. China follows a no first use (NFU) doctrine for its nuclear weapons. As a result, whatever modification is made to its doctrine, it has to be in accordance with the evolving defence strategies of US and Russia, as China feels insecure since its number of nuclear warheads is quite low. China’s strategic thinking regarding missiles is to exponentially increase nuclear and conventional capabilities in order to increase the overall combat effectiveness of the PLARF through modernization. The possibility of China waging a war is quite remote, as its economy is not doing well; but considering Xi’s similarities with Mao’s thinking, the possibility of him going for a war against India cannot be completely ruled out.

Contemporary PLARF missiles

The Second Artillery Corps which was formed in 1966 has evolved into a mature missile force. China has Dongfeng (DF)-5 missile in its arsenal, as it is equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) abilities. It was inducted into service in 1981. The DF-5 can be installed in a fixed launcher while no requirement exists for a complex launcher/trailer which can be modified structurally to bear that weight. For the Chinese, successive variants of the DF-5B and DF-5C are considered critical to penetrate Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) which is the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) of the US. During the 1990s, China had a small quantity of conventional tipped missiles. But since PLARF was formed in 2015, this number has grown rapidly over the years as China continues to test missiles, enhance capacities of old missiles and develop its missile defence system.

In terms of its nuclear tipped missiles, the Chinese started deploying DF-21 missiles in 1991 as well as conventional short-range ballistic missiles like the DF-11 and DF-15 missiles in 1992 and 1990 respectively. A lot of improvement has been observed since the Chinese started to deploy their improved variants called DF-21A, DF-21C and DF-21D. The DF-21A is a nuclear tipped missile which was deployed in 1996. DF-21C is a conventional tipped missile and DF-21D is a conventional tipped anti-ship missile which was deployed in 2006. Once this loop of deployment was completed, the PLARF again deployed improved missiles like the DF-31 in 2006 and DF-31A in 2007, as well as conventional tipped missiles such as the DF-16 in 2011. The DF-31A is a solid fuelled missile with an intercontinental range of 11700 kms and has the ability to bypass US missile defences using MIRV technology. It has the capacity to change orbit at very high altitudes using the special vector propulsion device; this allows it to evade US missile defences. The DF-31A has improved accuracy, survivable capacity as well as penetration abilities. It has the capability to be quick in its dispersion using a motorized transporter erector launcher after a threat surfaces, while also having the ability to hide inside tunnels. As an active operational missile, the DF-31A had been deployed while the enhanced DF-31B was being developed.

In 2016, the DF-26 was inducted as a conventional tipped missile. It has a range of 4000 kms and it is called ‘Guam Killer’ as it can target the US base in Guam. DF-41 is another Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) currently in the development phase. It has a range of 12000km to 15000km. DF-41 is reportedly capable of being mounted with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles. In China’s view, the DF-41 missile is the best answer to the missile defences of the US due to the sheer number of guided nuclear warheads, their decoy capacity (to confuse missile defences), manoeuvrability and strong penetrating capability. Also, the DF-41 uses a mobile launching platform that could be hidden or deployed even through railways and roads. Before 2019, China had secretly deployed the hypersonic missile DF-27 which has a range of 5000-8000 kms. It is unclear whether the DF-27 is a dual use (conventional and nuclear) or either of the two. In 2019, the DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle was formally inducted. A hypersonic glide vehicle combines speed and manoeuvrability to evade air defences and is a conventional and nuclear tipped missile with a range of 1800-2500 kms.

PLARF can potentially be used in a war with India as the initial salvo to supress communication, command and control through launch of conventional tipped missiles. The then Chief of Army Staff Naravane had cautioned that infrastructure such as command and control centres, airfields, depots and strategic communication nodes will be the first to be attacked with precision targeting. He further explained that in the second wave of attacks, low-flying autonomous drones will target artillery guns, missile bases and tank concentrations. Lastly, rocket and missile attacks will be used to reduce conventional capabilities and soften targets. Nonetheless, although China has state-of-the-art-technology with the PLARF, PLA Strategic Support Force and the entire unmanned AI backed war machine (humanoids, tanks, etc), it cannot substitute the actual troops on the ground if and when the PLA decides to wage a war of occupation with India.

Implications of PLARF for India and the Indian preparedness

China’s majority of missile bases are located in east China. Defence analyst Nitin Gadkari opines that Kunming Base 62 is the closest PLARF base to New Delhi (at 2500 km) based on the analysis of deployment of missile bases. It falls within the Southern Theatre Command. The nearest PLARF base that falls under the Western Theatre Command is at Lanzhou, about 3000 km from the Indian capital. The distances would preclude the use of Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBM)s from their current location, leaving only the use of Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM)s and the Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM)s. Base 64 at Lanzhou is known to have at least one MRBM DF 21B/21C brigade and may be a LACM brigade at Hanzhong. 

A study done by Harvard University in March 2020 suggests that PLARF would require  220 ballistic missiles to keep one airfield shut for 24 hours. This is unlikely to make any difference to Indian Armed Forces (IAF) operational capacity since it has a large number of other operational airfields. For the PLAAF to attack just three airfields, over 600 ballistic missiles will be required per day for attacking the runway and taxi track alone. In such a scenario, China’s stock of around 1200 MRBMs/SRBMs will be over in less than two days, with a little impact on other major target systems like C2 centres or air defence units. It means that whatever damage takes place to the runway of an IAF air base, it is expected to be repaired in a short duration using fibreglass mats.

The exclusive land-based PLARF ballistic and cruise missiles are more than 1250. The conventional missile strategy of China accepts that with a finite number and high cost of such missiles, the kind of targets which would be appropriate for a missile strike are not many. Also, another problem is that all Chinese missiles have severe accuracy problems. For example, accuracy which is technically known as Circular Error Probable (CEP) of missiles like DF-21C is 40-50 metre, DF-26 is 150-450 metre, DF-15 is 200-300 metres, DF-21A is 50 metre, DF-11 is 600 metre and DF-12 is 30-50 metre. So, damage done to IAF runways will be limited and ineffective. In September 2021, India’s former Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) Bipin Rawat had said that India will develop a rocket force of its own. Through this, he indirectly indicated the need to bridge the missile asymmetry between India and China. Since 2015, the project of developing Pralay missiles was sanctioned. This missile is powered by a solid fuelled rocket motor and has a quasi-ballistic flight path along with Manoeuvrable Re-entry Vehicles (MaRV) in order to overcome BMD. So, Pralay can evade the Chinese BMD which is traditionally meant for interception of nuclear tipped missiles. SRBM Pralay could be mounted with 350 to 700 kg high explosive preformed fragmentation conventional warhead with a range of 150-500 kms. Pralay has a very good accuracy of 33 feet and so it will be useful for conventional counterforce strikes inside China’s Western Theatre Command and Eastern Theatre Command. Pralay is designed to target radar and communication systems, command and control as well as fuel depot and blast pens at airbases. Pralay in some ways is equal (for competition) to the Chinese DF-12 missile. Last year in December 2022, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) cleared the proposal to build 120 Pralay ballistic missiles, meant to be deployed along the borders with Pakistan and China. In May 2023, another order of 250 missiles was given.

Nirbhay cruise missile – a conventional tipped missile which has a range of 1000 kms -is also taking shape for deployment. On October 1 2020, this missile was deployed on the Line of Actual Control. But during a flight test, it did not perform as expected, leading to a shift in the induction plan. Another missile Shaurya has a conventional role and is a hypersonic missile with a speed of MACH 7.5. The range of Shaurya missile varies depending on the size and weight of the warhead. Theoretically, it has a range of 750 kms although without nuclear capacity. After some further testing in the years to come, it is officially expected to be inducted in the Indian Armed Forces. The newer variant of the Shaurya missile being developed has a higher range of 1800 kms depending upon size and weight of the warhead. The conventional tipped cruise missile Brahmos has already been deployed in the requisite numbers and is operational with all three services. For India to set up a rocket force, it could work on the principle of jointness. However, this is unlikely to happen because conventional tipped missiles are more likely to be used for service specific requirements by the Army, Air Force and Navy on the recommendation of the target selection done by the Chief of Staff Committee.

CHINA’S BMD SYSTEM

The PLARF is the custodian of not only nuclear and conventional tipped missiles but also the BMD. The government of China launched its missile defence program in 1964. However, real progress was observed only in the 1980s with high-speed missiles and advanced phased array radar system. But it was only in 2010 that the Chinese really showed their capability to intercept an incoming ballistic missile. Any country that has a BMD capability defines the role for its BMD on the basis of threats posed by its adversary. For example, the US had decided that BMD will be deployed over continental US for its own protection and its overseas forces defending its allies. This BMD is helpful for the US against a smaller number of nuclear tipped missiles which can be launched from a country like China. So, it is difficult to deter them by the usual cost-benefit analysis which has been observed as effective in the case of nuclear deterrence.

However, China views missile defence in a completely different way. For China, missile defence is to give a potent nuclear first strike advantage against India. Thus, China requires missile defence to cover all operationally critical places (to fight a war), all missile units as well as the C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) centres. This is done to threaten a retaliation that is characterized as a decapitating strike. Along with these, countermeasures are required to undermine the defensive capability of the adversary. The strategic experts inside China conceive an explicit connection between American BMD abilities as well as its aspiration to observe space dominance and control. The Chinese have also maintained that the ultimate aim for the US is to station ballistic missile defences in outer space which results in weaponizing space. The Chinese define a space weapon as not only a space-based weapon but a weapon that can also lock on any target in outer space such as satellites. Because the US BMD does have the ability to lock on targets which are at an altitude of 100 kms, it can be described as a space weapon and hence the BMD is conceived by China as a stepping stone for space weaponization.

In 2007, China conducted an anti-satellite test and BMD test in 2010. For China, BMD is for preventing any kind of potential undermining of its credible nuclear deterrent. Also, one requires checkmating solutions for the adversary by undermining its ability to be able to defend itself. One such technology demonstrator was the Chinese BMD ability of mid-course interception  tested in 2010. This test was done involving HQ-19 surface to air missile that had been mounted with an exo-atmospheric kinetic kill vehicle. China’s missile defences have seen improvement as a result of the cooperation with Russian S-400. For example, the HQ-19, a derivative of the HQ-9 anti-missile system, can intercept for a range of 500 kms. ASAT HQ-19 is also appropriate for medium ranges as well as low earth orbit satellite, but it does not ensure high altitude intercepts.

Missile defence of China also consists of longer-range early warning mechanism, intercepting mechanism as well as command management mechanism. China’s test of the mid-range missile defences is not so good in performance especially when compared with the US missile defence system called ‘Patriot’. China’s technological abilities, in comparison to the US ground based midcourse defence system, THAAD and the Aegis standard missile system, remains unknown. China does not have advanced technology like that of the US and Russia when it comes to R&D for missile defence technology. Also, China does not have as many military bases as the US where they could install and test their missile defences (especially the radar). In the latter part of 2001, the US declared that it had decided to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The US also made clear its desire to go ahead with BMD in order to cater for the new threat. In the meantime, China had been cautious about the American and Russian approach with respect to the ABM treaty. The irony was that despite China protesting all iterations of American BMD, it had been working on missile defence (R&D) post its 1964 nuclear test. In 1965, a plan in China had put an outline for missile development. For a long period, China closed down its BMD program because the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972. But in 2002, when the US unilaterally withdrew from the ABM Treaty, China restarted work on its BMD program, as the US too had started working on BMD.

Implications of Chinese BMD on India

With the announcement of a successful ground-based interceptor missile test by China during the mid-course phase (a ballistic missile using space as a medium of travel) in April 2023, it stated that it was not meant to be against any country. However, considering China’s past actions, it is necessary to look into Chinese advances in ground-based missile defence. This Chinese ground-based missile defence ability is supported to a great extent by a set of fire control as well as radars. The real time interception was most probably done with a HQ-19. HQ-19 was tested for the first time in February 2018. HQ-19 can at the least do interception of missile targets in mid-course phase such as India’s AGNI-III which has a range of 3000 kms. At best, the HQ-19 can intercept ICBMs.

Although attaining a successful interception of an ICBM, the Chinese require further testing. These missile defence systems provide China with a nuclear first strike option vis-à-vis India. Though China does ostensibly project a NFU policy, in the case of war, this declared policy can be changed to First Use. A missile defence system like the HQ-19 also prevents any major damage for China by allowing easy first use of Chinese nuclear weapons with respect to India. If the Chinese initiate a nuclear attack on India, then India will retaliate with its second-strike capability, that is when the HQ-19 can intercept the incoming Indian nuclear tipped missiles. This could limit the damage to some extent for China of its counterforce and countervalue assets. To counter all such threats, India has to fully focus on its second phase of the BMD which will enable it to have a long-range interception capability.

Conclusion

PLARF lacks the adequate conventional strike power as it does not have a large stockpile of conventional tipped missiles (some of them are meant to cater for Taiwan) in order to acquire sufficient edge to operationally put off a large number of IAF airfields. It lacks adequate power also because there is no possibility of observing an ICBM for dual task (conventional tipped too). This is because the economic value of a conventional tipped ICBM is not observed like  a nuclear-tipped ICBM. The Chinese BMD system, like Indian BMD, is quite rudimentary. Hence, when both India and China have officially announced an NFU of their nuclear weapons, so BMD which is primarily meant to cater for nuclear tipped missiles may not be working perfectly for interception of conventional tipped missiles, especially missiles like Pralay which have the ability to manoeuvre their flight path during the last stages of its flight. In case of a protracted India-China War over ten days, the missile inventory of the PLARF can get over very quickly. India has always tried to ensure longer war-time survival of its defence forces by ensuring sufficient force dispersion. That is, force is dispersed across all three vectors - army, air force and navy and that too in multiple locations making it almost difficult for Chinese strategic plans if and when they attempt to eliminate India’s strategic reach towards Chinese targets. As a corollary, it should be highlighted that considering India’s missile capability growth in terms of the current deployment efforts of Pralay missiles and development of Shaurya and Nirbhay missiles, India shall not worry about the PLARF.

Image source: XInhua