FROM LOYALTY TO LIABILITY

Last week, China’s defence ministry spokesperson Wu Qian announced the suspension of Admiral Miao Hua from his position as the director of the political work department in the Chinese army. More importantly, his suspension marks the removal of the second Central Military Commission (CMC) member of the 20^th Party Congress after former defence minister Li Shangfu. Miao Hua was considered one of the many loyalists placed by Xi Jinping around him since 2012 and thus, his removal highlights fault lines in Xi’s appointment system, particularly for senior level positions. While Xi has often preferred loyalty as an important criterion for these appointments, it appears to have come at the cost of merit and efficiency considering purges of senior PLA officials in the last two years.

However, Miao Hua’s case is different from other PLA purges since Miao was responsible for enforcing party ideology within the military and had less to do directly with enhancing combat capabilities or war preparedness. He was charged with “serious violations of discipline”, which has become a common phrase for corruption cases. As a director of CMC political work department, he was also instrumental in appointments and promotions of senior PLA officials which has been a major cause of worry for Xi in the last few years. Although actual charges against Miao are yet to be disclosed, he is more likely to have been charged for his involvement in buying and selling off of higher positions across PLA departments. As Xi continues to purge higher military officials who were involved in corrupt activities either during their appointments or while performing their duties, Miao Hua’s suspension, as the head of military appointments system, appears to be a logical extension of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign as he aims to ensure “…. that the barrels of the guns must always be in the hands of those who are loyal and dependable to the party”. 

Connection Does not Ensure Efficiency

Miao Hua has served a majority of his career in Fujian in the PLA since 1969. Despite beginning his career as a soldier and platoon leader in the 1970s, he was soon transferred to positions which looked after management of Party affairs within the military. Between early 1980s to 2010, Miao served at various positions such as political instructor, political commissar as well as director of political work in 31^st Group Army based in Fujian. His long tenure in Fujian coincided with Xi Jinping’s early career between 1985 to 2002 where he built connections with military officials through his positions at Ningde and Fuzhou military subdistricts as well as deputy director of National Defence Mobilisation Commission in Fujian and Nanjing Military Region. This explains Miao Hua’s sudden rise as political commissar of the PLA Navy in 2014 despite his vast experience in the PLA. 

Owing to his connections with Xi, Miao was included in the elite 7-member CMC in 2017 as the director of the political work department which he continued to serve until last week. However, with his suspension and potential expulsion from the Party in the coming months, it once again highlighted that connection with Xi only ensures loyalty to him and not to the Party and military organisations. Moreover, with Miao’s suspension, all major appointments made by him or even his close associates will be under scrutiny. For instance, Miao Hua had built connections with current defence minister Dong Jun during 2014-17 when Dong was deputy chief of staff in the PLA Navy. Now, with rumoured reports about his investigation under corruption charges, this can well be just the beginning of widespread investigations of officials connected with or appointed by Miao Hua.

PLA Navy Under Scanner 

Until now, Xi’s anti-corruption drive in the PLA was highly focused on the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF) due to their close connection with Xi’s modernisation goals. In the last two years, over 10 General-level officials have been purged from the PLA, PLARF and CMC Equipment Development Department. However, now with the suspension of Miao Hua who was the only non-army/rocket force official in the CMC, China analysts suggest that this focus may shift to the PLA Navy. Moreover, reports about Dong Jun’s investigation and suspected investigations of Admiral Wang Renhua, PLA Navy political commissar Admiral Yuan Huazhi and his predecessor Admiral Qin Shengxiang have further strengthened this argument.

However, this judgement would be premature given that none of these investigations are publicly announced yet. With respect to Miao Hua’s case, he did not have sufficient experience in the PLA Navy to be able to build his own network and thus, his suspension does not clearly indicate the shift. Moreover, in the case of Dong Jun, it would be too soon to ascertain any charges as he was last seen in public domain just a few days ago at the 11^th ASEAN Defence Ministers’ meeting plus. Nonetheless, with Miao Hua’s suspension likely to place all his appointments under scanner, this may result in more scrutiny of PLA arms other than Rocket Force.   

Implications for PLA Modernisation

Unlike suspended PLARF and PLAAF officials in the last two years, Miao Hua was not directly connected with China’s military modernisation programme. Thus, his removal is less likely to impact modernisation drive but may affect overall morale of PLA officials responsible for modernisation as senior officials may be viewed with suspicion by their subordinates, creating gaps across chains of command. While the removal of Miao Hua and many of Xi’s close associates in the past show Xi’s willingness to reduce corruption even at the cost of his own image, it also indicates Xi’s growing mistrust in PLA officials which may compel him to slow down the progress of modernisation efforts. 

The case of Miao Hua also reveals that the issue of corruption is not limited to particular departments within the PLA but more widespread as many appointments by Miao may have been subject to corruption across departments. Similarly, positions held by officials charged for corruption are becoming increasingly important as even top military decision makers in the CMC are also under scrutiny. Moreover, Xi’s reluctance to replace Li Shangfu in the CMC and now with Miao Hua’s suspension, CMC’s decision-making ability may weaken significantly which can affect Xi’s modernisation goals. In fact, given CMC’s second Vice Chairman He Weidong’s experience in eastern provinces and a possible connection with Miao Hua, it would not be surprising if He comes under anti-corruption scrutiny in the future, thereby further eroding the credibility and affecting Xi’s trust in the CMC.

Miao Hua’s suspension, as the head of the political work department, also weakens party-military relations which is the foundation and cornerstone of China’s military framework. The fact that even Miao’s immediate predecessor Zhang Yang was suspended in 2017 for corruption charges further highlights Xi’s failure in enforcing Party ideology in the PLA. This can have more profound implications beyond China’s military modernisation as all Chinese leaders including Xi have emphasised on maintaining the PLA as ‘Party’s army’. Thus, while Xi’s anti-corruption drive continues to target armament and procurement systems within the military, enforcing Party ideology amongst soldiers will remain a critical aspect for him. This may force Xi to introduce significant reforms in the PLA's recruitment procedure to ensure appointment of officials who are not only loyal to him but also strictly adhere to Party ideology and are efficient.