INDIA IN JAPAN’S QUAD PARADIGM

There is no denying that the Quad has security aspects in it, but interestingly enough, there is a widespread notion in Japan that the Quad is not about security. Also, there is a speculation that India is not willing to call the Quad a security-related initiative. Although this iteration might not be considered right, it might suggest that the Quad has a big potential as well as its limit. From a Japanese perspective, the Quad has a number of points.

First, the Quad is a leading partnership to achieve a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). Second, the Quad is a partnership to engage India with the US alliance network in the region. Japan and Australia are US allies, and today the Japan-Australia partnership is a quasi-alliance - the only weak link is with India. The Quad is not an alliance and an “Asian NATO” is almost an illusion. India will remain autonomous. However, synergy of the US alliance network and India’s engagement should be pursued. 

Third, the four countries are major responsible players in the Indo-Pacific and share the common interest in upholding the rules-based international order. India will remain a revisionist power, but its strategic orientation seems to be shifting. 

And fourth, all of the Quad partners are maritime countries. This part of the world is a large seascape and the connecting power of the sea is their common asset. Japan officially defines itself as a maritime country and depends heavily on maritime trade for its own survival. Maritime security is prioritized in Japan’s national security thinking. Maritime security cooperation will remain an essential part of the Quad partnership from the Japanese point of view.

Each Quad member has its own FOIP vision. Alignment of the respective visions is the basis of the Quad cooperation. Japan’s new plan for FOIP, which was launched by Prime Minister Kishida in India in March, has four pillars: first, principles for peace and rules for prosperity; second, addressing challenges in an Indo-Pacific way; third, multi-layered connectivity; and fourth, extending efforts for security and safe use of the ‘Sea’ to the ‘Air.’

Different from the previous version, the fourth pillar of the new plan explicitly includes maritime security, referring to military joint training and to some legal frameworks for military operational cooperation. As the respective visions are always evolving, constant coordination is indispensable.

For maritime security, the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) needs more attention. It was launched by the Quad Leaders’ Statement of 2022 in order to respond to humanitarian and natural disasters and also to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Its main focus is on the Indian Ocean, South east Asia and the Pacific Islands. It should be promoted as information sharing is the basis of cooperation, particularly for early warning and swift response. There are a number of challenges for the IPMDA: common objectives, interoperability, cost efficiency, and policy coordination.

First, menus for MDA can be abundant. It will not be just about IUU fishing, humanitarian crises, and climate change as in the Quad statement, but also about other challenges such as smuggling, submarines’ operations, and even air search and rescue. If the scope of MDA is widened, it will complicate the entire system and make it expensive.

Second, interoperability. Each country has its own maritime safety and security system. Relevant organizations must be well connected to achieve “near-real-time” information sharing. It is not just about hardware.

Third, cost efficiency. If existing commercial technology is used, it can be less expensive, but it depends on the concept of the entire system.

Fourth, policy coordination. The threat perceptions of the Quad members must be well coordinated considering that the threat perceptions of these four countries are not necessarily the same, particularly in the cases of China, Iran and North Korea. In this regard, IUU fishing should be more highlighted as a serious security matter because 95% of illegal fishing in the Indo-Pacific are said to be done by the Chinese, and presumably there are a number of maritime militias among them. Taking advantage of its large number and equipment, it is expected to engage in recruitments, and the integration of the maritime militia into the military chain of command is in progress in China. The Joint Readout of the most recent Quad Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in New York expressed serious concern about “the dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militia vessels.”

The Quad is thought to originate in the Tsunami Core Group for the coordination of relief efforts in the aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami disaster in Indonesia. If so, the Quad has been a practical and action-oriented initiative since its outset. There are three points here.

First, the Quad should establish its permanent secretariat. A number of different working groups and initiatives are already in operation. Those programs should be well coordinated in order to generate synergy under a single command post.

Second, the relief effort for the 2004 disaster was multilateral. Likewise, maintenance of the rules-based international order requires multilateral efforts. The principles the Quad upholds cannot be achieved by these four countries alone. The partnership should be expanded to other responsible players. Quad-plus should be pursued.

 Finally, Quad cooperation must not be taken for granted. While its official launch of the Quad is 2017, it took 13 years after the Tsunami Core Group. Strong political leadership of the four countries is critical for the Quad to proceed. For all these points, India’s larger engagement and cooperation will be much appreciated.