BRAHMAPUTRA AFTER INDUS: CHINA’S UPSTREAM ADVANTAGE OR STRATEGIC MYTH?

A rumour, now debunked after going viral, that China will block the Brahmaputra and Sutlej rivers if India does not restore the suspended Indus Water Treaty (IWT), touches upon deep-rooted strategic concerns in India. Fears of a “water bomb” by China have circulated long before the recent disinformation spread on social media, referring to Beijing’s ability to unilaterally alter the flow of water unannounced from the upper reaches of the Brahmputra. Moreover, the unstable nature of New Delhi's relations with Beijing has also done little to allay concerns that China will use its position as an upper riparian state for political gains during times of political crisis.

In the days following the terror attack in Pahalgam, India’s decision to put the IWT in abeyance prompted a variety of responses from Chinese strategic and social media communities who framed the decision as destabilizing while also hinting at leveraging China's advantageous position as an upper riparian state. 

Challenging the Water Bomb Theory

Despite the interlinked and inseparable nature of cross-border water resources in South Asia, the dynamics of India-Pakistan and India-China transboundary water politics are structurally different. The IWT is a formal, legally binding treaty underwritten by the World Bank, giving India institutional controls over the water sharing agreement. By contrast, India and China have no such treaty on the Brahmaputra or other transboundary rivers; only an Memorandum of Understanding. The MoU has been a casualty of India-China border clashes, with Beijing unilaterally suspending the agreement during the Dhoklam crisis. Such disruptions to limited institutional cooperation over water resources, coupled with clashes over a disputed border, have compelled New Delhi to anticipate and prepare for any surprises China’s gray zone tactics may produce. 

Though China is the upstream state of the Brahmaputra, and is believed to hold the geographical advantage, the hydrological equation is not entirely in its favour. The Brahmaputra originates in China’s Tibet Autonomous Region, where it is known as the Yarlung Tsangpo, and flows into India through Arunachal Pradesh before descending into Assam and eventually entering Bangladesh. 

Geographically, most of the Brahmaputra’s volume is generated after it enters India in Arunachal Pradesh, diminishing China’s potential to weaponize it. Unlike the Indus, the Brahmaputra is a rain-fed river that swells during the Indian monsoon season, making any Chinese attempt at manipulating the flow of river water downstream both hydrologically limited and politically risky. The average annual precipitation in Nuxia, Tibet is 416 mm, 10% of the annual rainfall in parts of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh which receives over 4,500 mm of rain. Furthermore, the river’s steep gradient as it drops from the Tibetan Plateau into the plains of Arunachal Pradesh makes the idea of large-scale water storage or diversion logistically difficult. Any such attempt would require extraordinary engineering efforts, including tunnelling across some of the most geologically unstable terrain in the world. India’s concerns are therefore less about Beijing’s control over the flow of water and more about the large-scale dam construction that is vulnerable to seismic activities. 

While fears of China weaponizing the Brahmaputra through diversion are largely overstated, China’s real leverage lies in dam-building, timing of water release and the politicization of data flows. As a result, India’s awareness of these risks and their catastrophic consequences have prompted preparations in the form of dam constructions downstream and flood control measures. Moreover, awareness of mitigating constraints imposed by upstream actions, like lack of data sharing during political crises, has increased significantly among government officials, community leaders and other stakeholders in impacted regions.

India’s Lower Riparian Countermeasures

A major part of India’s counter strategy towards China’s upper riparian actions and associated risks has taken the form of a dam-for-dam approach. For instance, China’s proposed Medong county dam, which is only one of many in Tibet, has resulted in New Delhi building several dams to minimise the effects of any unannounced release of water by China. The Upper Siang dam in Arunachal Pradesh is one such project explicitly constructed to protect against any upstream action or accident. This concern was also echoed by Arunachal Pradesh’s Deputy Chief Minister, Chowna Mein, who warned that if China were to release excess water, it could submerge the entire Siang region, the Brahmaputra Valley, and even Guwahati’s Saraighat Bridge. To mitigate such risks, he noted, the Indian government had decided to construct the Siang Dam, not only for electricity generation but also to regulate and manage potential water surges originating from the Chinese side.

Additionally, as far as China’s Brahmaputra actions to force India to undo its abeyance of the IWT are concerned, it is unlikely that Beijing sees any value in leveraging its upper riparian status solely for Pakistan's benefit. As India and China search for stability and normalcy in their troubled bilateral relationship, issues like hydrological data sharing have already been offered up as ways to build trust and restore normalcy. Jeopardising this newly found stability in India-China relations is unappealing, especially as it brings no real material benefits and diplomatic wins for China. Rather, Beijing’s involvement in the ongoing India-Pakistan conflict will be restricted to rhetoric that reinforces its support for Islamabad.

With the ongoing India-Pakistan conflict bringing the issue of transboundary river waters into focus as an instrument of diplomacy, China’s potential actions as an upper riparian of the Brahmaputra are worth evaluating. Although Beijing may have geographical and infrastructural cards to play vis-a-vis India, and has done so during times of political uncertainty, the impact of such actions relating to the Brahmaputra is blunted by a variety of factors. In any case, India is increasingly prepared and attuned to such manoeuvres by Beijing. Moreover, fears that China may “water bomb” India or coerce it to reconsider its Indus Water Treaty actions are perhaps overblown. As the India-Pakistan conflict unfolds, India will have to remain watchful of China’s actions and mitigate any potential hydrological strategies it deploys, however unlikely they may be.