STRATEGIC SILENCE AND SUBTLE SHIFTS

Amid renewed tensions between India and Pakistan following the Pahalgam terrorist attacks in India-administered Kashmir, and India’s subsequent missile strikes in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir under “Operation Sindoor", New Delhi remains focused on securing its western front. Even as India concentrates on countering threats along its western front, developments in its eastern neighbourhood are evolving in parallel, and with strategic consequence. The political transition in Bangladesh, in particular, is reshaping the regional calculus in ways that elevate strategic concerns and warrant close observation.

Since the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s regime in August 2024, bilateral relations between Dhaka and New Delhi have significantly deteriorated. Anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh has surged to an all-time high, and the interim government’s foreign policy posture has shifted markedly. While the Hasina administration was careful to consider India’s strategic concerns, the current regime has shown a willingness to overlook, if not outright cross, New Delhi’s red lines. Notably, amid the recent escalation between India and Pakistan, Dhaka's interim leadership offered little in the way of support for New Delhi, limiting itself to generic diplo-speak. Instead, its concurrent diplomatic overtures toward Islamabad signal a subtle but significant recalibration in Dhaka’s foreign policy priorities. This evolving posture suggests a broader strategic realignment that could reshape regional dynamics and affect long-term stability in South Asia geopolitics. In light of these developments, it is imperative for New Delhi to reassess its eastern neighbourhood strategy and proactively respond to the shifting geopolitical landscape.  

Dhaka’s overtures towards Pakistan: Pre and Post Pahalgam

Since August 2024, Dhaka has increasingly drifted from New Delhi’s strategic orbit. Under the interim leadership of Prof. Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh has actively re-engaged with Pakistan, marking a notable diplomatic shift. For instance, after a 15-year hiatus, the two countries have agreed to resume operations of their respective Foreign Office Consulates and direct trade, showing a clear signal of warming ties. In fact, Pakistani leaders, including the Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, have described Bangladesh as a “long-lost brother”, rhetoric that has been met with a warm response from Dhaka. These moves suggest a deliberate effort to move beyond the historical baggage of 1971 and cultivate a renewed bilateral relationship. Despite being well aware of India’s sensitivities regarding Pakistan, the Yunus government has not hesitated to re-engage with its long-standing rival, signaling a significant shift in regional dynamics.

Notably, in the wake of the Pahalgam terrorist attacks, which was claimed by The Resistance Front, a proxy group affiliated with the Pakistan-based terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Bangladesh’s interim government issued a generic condemnation of terrorism without referencing Pakistan. The cautious language reflects Dhaka’s reluctance to directly implicate Islamabad. Moreover, when India subsequently launched Operation Sindoor, a counter-terrorism operation targeting terror infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir, the response from Bangladesh was even more telling: complete silence. This marked a stark contrast to the past, when Dhaka had been a consistent partner in India’s counter-terrorism efforts. For instance,in the wake of the 2016 Uri attack, the then Home Minister condemned Islamabad’s actions and affirmed that Dhaka would never allow its soil to be used by Pakistan against India.

The absence of any statement reflects a significant departure from the collaborative security relationship that flourished under the Awami League. Had these events occurred during Sheikh Hasina’s tenure, Dhaka would likely have expressed solidarity with India and endorsed its right to self-defense. The current posture highlights a broader strategic shift under the interim leadership, raising questions about the future trajectory of India-Bangladesh security cooperation.

Further underscoring this shift, Bangladesh’s Foreign Affairs Advisor, Touhid Hossain, maintained communication with Pakistani officials during the heightened India-Pakistan tensions. Although the dialogue was claimed to be initiated by Islamabad, the outreach and Dhaka’s receptiveness suggest a deliberate Pakistani effort to deepen ties with Bangladesh’s interim leadership, possibly exploiting its domestic instability to forge a strategic counterweight to India in the region. At a time of shifting regional alignments, this evolving Dhaka-Islamabad engagement signals a recalibration of South Asia’s diplomatic landscape, one India cannot afford to ignore. 

Islamist Radicalization and Anti-India Rhetoric  

There is growing concern about the ideological and operational convergence between Islamist radical networks in Bangladesh and Pakistan, particularly in their shared use of anti-India rhetoric as a mobilizing force. While groups like Jamaat-e-Islami may differ in their national agendas, they are united by common ideological roots and transnational linkages that promote a pan-Islamist vision fundamentally opposed to India's secular and democratic framework. In Bangladesh, especially in the wake of the Awami League’s political decline, radical organizations, including Jamaat-e-Islami, have capitalized on rising nationalist and religious sentiments to expand their influence.

Of particular concern are reports that the interim government has released individuals previously imprisoned for jihadist activities. Adding to this, Bangladesh Election Commission’s recent decision to revoke the Awami League’s registration, effectively barring it from contesting future elections, marks a significant political shift. As the country heads toward the planned 2026 election, it is increasingly evident that any incoming government will prioritize two key demands resonating among the Bangladeshi populace: diversifying foreign policy engagement and reducing over-reliance on India. 

Complicating the political landscape further is the Bangladesh Nationalist Party’s (BNP) longstanding association with Jamaat-e-Islami, a factor that continues to influence internal and external politics. Adding to these apprehensions, Indian officials have alleged that Dr. Asif Nazrul, Legal Advisor to the interim government, met with Harun Izhar, chief of the Bangladesh module of LeT, accused of spearheading jihadist operations from Bangladeshi soil, within 24 hours of the Pahalgam incident. The meeting reportedly took place at the Ministry of Law premises, raising serious questions about the government’s willingness to distance itself from extremist elements. The presence of such individuals within official circles suggests, at the very least, a troubling degree of engagement, if not outright accommodation, by the interim authorities toward Islamist extremists.

At the same time, Pakistan-based Islamist groups, long accused of fostering cross-border terrorism, have found ideological resonance within certain radical circles in Dhaka. These linkages have existed for years, even during Sheikh Hasina's tenure; however, her administration maintained a firm stance against Islamist extremism. The current political shift, however, appears to have created a more permissive environment. This growing convergence has intensified the already prevalent anti-India rhetoric in the region. While such sentiments were also present under the Hasina government, often fueled by perceptions that New Delhi viewed Dhaka as a junior partner rather than an equal, they have now gained a sharper edge. India's decision to host Sheikh Hasina in New Delhi has further intensified such narratives. More concerningly, this ideological alignment raises the specter of coordinated radicalization efforts spanning national borders, with the potential to destabilize regional security. The mutual reinforcement of Islamist narratives in both Pakistan and Bangladesh presents a complex strategic challenge for India. It underscores the urgent need for New Delhi to reassess and adapt its counter-radicalization policies and diplomatic engagement across South Asia.

The Way Forward 

Recent high-level engagements between Dhaka and Islamabad indicate a significant shift in Bangladesh’s foreign policy orientation. This realignment is compounded by the increasingly porous boundaries between state and non-state actors within Bangladesh’s domestic political landscape. The resultant ambiguity and the perceived accommodation of hostile elements highlights a strategic recalibration in Dhaka’s policy posture. For India, this shift introduces heightened complexities on its eastern front. Beyond bilateral implications, these developments may have a larger impact on broader regional geopolitical dynamics and stability in South Asia.

For New Delhi, responding with a reactive posture could prove counterproductive. Instead, India would be better served by adopting a calibrated and adaptive strategy, one that safeguards its core interests while acknowledging and adjusting to the evolving regional dynamics. For Bangladesh, the focus must turn inward: to address domestic political vulnerabilities and avoid the temptation of externalizing internal challenges through provocative rhetoric. Both countries must recognize the depth of their mutual interdependence, rooted in economic integration, security cooperation, cultural affinity and strong people-to-people ties. Preserving and strengthening this cooperative framework will be essential not only for bilateral relations but also for ensuring broader regional stability.