FIVE YEARS OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW

Hong Kong’s recent decision to outlaw two organisations – Hong Kong Parliament and Hong Kong Democratic Independence Union – on charges of aiming ‘to subvert state power’, underscores the continued crackdown on its pro-democracy institutions under the National Security Law (NSL). Enacted in 2020 in the wake of 2019 protests, the law has reshaped Hong Kong’s political culture as it reinforces Beijing’s strategy to curtail any expression of dissent. The NSL was originally presented by Chinese authorities as a targeted measure against a small minority that threatened national security. However, its provisions relating to criminalizing secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces were defined vaguely to encompass any manifestation of opposition, thereby ensuring Beijing maintains final authority on Hong Kong affairs.

Hong Kong citizens, under the ‘one country, two systems’ principle, were promised a “high degree of autonomy” in both economic and political domain to retain its democratic elements post-1997. But, as June 2025 marked the fifth anniversary of the NSL, one of its last major democratic parties - the League of Social Democrats announced its disbandment owing to intense pressure by authorities, coupled with several arrests over alleged attempts to disrupt the upcoming legislative council elections. These incidents signal that political discontent expressed through both formal and informal methods has been constrained, framed by authorities as necessary for ensuring security and stability. Moreover, the establishment of a permanent Office for Safeguarding National Security under the law with Beijing-appointed personnel and a provision to appoint special judges to hear national-security cases, constitute an opaque system of enforcement insulated from local accountability. This has led to significant political and economic implications for Hong Kong, and thus, raised concerns about the long-term viability of the one country two systems framework.  

Shrinking Space for Dissent

While the National Security Law does not explicitly mention ‘political dissent’, several of its articles are worded broadly enough to target political speech, activism and dissent. Over the years, it has been observed that subversion charges under Article 22 have emerged as the principal mechanism for constraining political expression and opposition. For instance, the law’s first major implementation came in January 2021, when police arrested 53 opposition figures for strategizing legislative voting to paralyze the government functioning. Similarly, in another case, 47 defendants, including former lawmakers, activists and district councillors, were charged with subversion, with most denied bail. Their trial, held without a jury and presided over by government-approved judges, revealed a trend towards greater procedural centralization. Verdicts handed down in 2024 found many guilty, with some facing sentences of up to a decade.

Beyond the courtroom, the NSL has also altered regulations for medium of public expressions. Books by pro-democracy authors have vanished from libraries, while museums and universities have purged materials deemed politically sensitive. Monuments of dissent, such as the ‘Pillar of Shame’, a sculpture commemorating the victims of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre and seen as a symbol of freedom promised to Hong Kong, have been dismantled. Schools have been mandated to prioritize ‘patriotic education’ based on Xi Jinping Thought and teachers face dismissal for discussing topics deemed subversive. Even small symbolic acts such as holding candles on the 4th of June or posting protest slogans have been treated as potential security violations and can attract criminal charges.

With regards to press freedom, independent outlets such as Apple Daily and Stand News were forced to close after raids, arrests and asset freezes. The founder of Apple Daily – Jimmy Lai’s trial on charges of collusion with foreign forces and sedition is a glaring example of how Beijing views the role of non-state media outlets in Hong Kong. A survey conducted by Foreign Correspondents’ Club revealed that 65 percent of journalists have begun to self-censor their content, while 33 percent considered migrating from Hong Kong owing to growing restrictions. In fact, journalists in Hong Kong have been instructed to propagate “good Hong Kong stories” and suggest a punishment for failure to follow the guidelines. By 2025, according to local and international watchdogs, over 250 people had been arrested specifically under the NSL, with convictions carrying sentences averaging five to ten years. This has led to an environment where state concerns about security overrides citizens’ basic rights of freedom and expression.

The NSL’s Impact on Political Parties

The impact of NSL on organized political parties has also been significant, particularly for pro-democracy groups. The 2021 arrests of opposition leaders effectively dismantled the Democratic Party, Civic Party and other groups that had dominated the pro-democracy camp since the 1990s. Facing the risk of prosecution, most parties disbanded voluntarily or saw their members jailed or exiled.

Beijing and the Hong Kong government also moved to institutionalize this transformation through sweeping electoral reforms. In 2021, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) overhauled Hong Kong’s election system, reducing directly elected seats in the Legislative Council from half to less than a quarter and introducing a ‘patriot vetting’ process to ensure that only ‘loyal’ candidates could participate. A new Election Committee, dominated by pro-Beijing officials, including from NPC and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, was entrusted to screen all candidates for public office.

In the 2023 District Council elections - the first held under the new rules - only candidates vetted as ‘patriots’ were permitted to contest elections. As a result, voter turnout also plunged to historic lows from over 70 percent in 2019 to just 27.4 percent in 2023, reflecting structural constraints and growing public disengagement with a political system which is perceived as non-competitive. For Communist Party of China (CPC), this outcome fulfils the NSL’s deeper purpose to not merely suppress dissent but to re-engineer Hong Kong’s governance model towards ‘one-Party rule’. Under ‘patriots ruling Hong Kong’, the city’s institutions have been increasingly aligned with Beijing’s priorities. The legislature is now largely controlled by pro-Beijing forces, evident from the pro-establishment Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong alone winning 40 percent in 2023 local council elections.

The Future of Political Culture in Hong Kong

Meanwhile, the NSL’s extraterritorial provisions cast a shadow far beyond Hong Kong’s borders. Even activists living abroad have been issued arrest warrants and had bounties placed on suspects for subversion charges. Thus, what seemingly began as a response to unrest in 2020 has now extended from newsrooms to ballot boxes and even reached personal spaces of citizens.

More importantly, the question surrounding political culture in Hong Kong also have spillover effects for Hong Kong’s economic prospects. Concerns over political and legal stability and broad powers under the NSL have made international firms wary of disputes being adjudicated under a politically infused judiciary. As a result, till 2023, even Hong Kong’s Initial Public Offering activity had slumped with deal volumes and proceeds dropping sharply. Such hesitation reflects the broader unease among global investors over the long-term stability of Hong Kong’s economic institutions under the NSL. At the same time, the city’s financial activity has become increasingly tied to mainland Chinese firms and its integration with Greater Bay Area priorities, suggesting a structural shift from a global centre to a more regionally oriented hub. This dynamic has compelled Beijing to strike a delicate balance in seeking to preserve Hong Kong’s role as a financial gateway while ensuring that it poses no political risk.

Considering these implications of NSL in the past five years, it appears that the ‘high degree of autonomy’ promised to Hong Kong in the Sino-British Joint Declaration has been largely reduced to rhetoric. The institutions like judiciary and press that once protected dissent have either been re-engineered to curb it or have been severely constrained under the NSL. The law attempts to shape the future of Hong Kong that relies on a model of political conformity, with the question arising whether that transformation proves permanent which depends on Beijing’s evolving calculus of control.