CHINA’S CRACKDOWNS AND THE PERSISTENT SOUTHEAST ASIAN SCAM NETWORKS

On 14th November 2025, China’s Ministry of Public Security announced that Myanmar had repatriated more than 5,500 criminal suspects under a trilateral mechanism with Myanmar and Thailand. State media portrays the repatriate, along with Thailand’s approval of the extradition of alleged cybercrime boss She Zhijiang, as evidence of a new regional model for combating transnational crime. The announcement coincided with severe verdicts in China: courts in Guangdong and Zhejiang provinces issued multiple death sentences and long prison terms against members of the Bai and Ming families, groups long associated with telecom-fraud operations in Myanmar’s borderlands.

This latest crackdown followed a kidnapping case that went viral on Chinese social media, exposing the gap between the Party’s official narrative of comprehensive citizen protection and the reality of Chinese nationals still falling prey to criminal networks just beyond the borders. The speed and severity of the subsequent sentences reflect a state eager to contain public backlash and restore its authority after a moment of humiliation. In this context, the campaign functions less as a structural effort to dismantle cybercrime networks and more as a performative assertion of control aimed at reassuring Chinese nationals.

The Viral Kidnapping and the Domestic Backlash 

The immediate trigger for this enforcement surge was not a diplomatic initiative. It was the kidnapping of a Chinese actor in January 2023, Wang Xing, who was lured across the Myanmar–Thai border and nearly forced into a scam compound. Videos of his ordeal went viral on Weibo, Douyin, and Xiaohongshu, igniting a wave of domestic backlash. The shock was not that criminals had targeted a public figure; rather, it was Chinese-speaking gangs just beyond China’s borders who trafficked one of their own.

The Chinese public response was unusually sharp. Millions of comments went beyond condemning the perpetrators to questioning the state’s capacity and credibility: How can these scam compounds still exist after years of crackdowns? Why can’t China protect its own citizens? Moreover, netizens even questioned whether the scam syndicate received systemic support from the Chinese bureaucracy. This backlash created a rare domestic pressure point. Beijing has long framed its narrative on delivering safety at home and dignity abroad, with the Global Security Initiative as a key pillar. The viral kidnapping exposed a gap between that narrative and reality. It revealed that China's expansive claims of global governance had not prevented its own citizens from falling victim to a criminal industry dominated by Chinese-speaking networks just beyond its borders.

The government’s response was swift and visible. The Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs swiftly coordinated bilaterally with Myanmar and Thailand and also formed a trilateral mechanism to crackdown and extradite Chinese gangs running the cyberscam compounds in the Thai-Myanmar border regions. Since early 2023, Beijing has repatriated approximately 44,000 suspects in 2023 and over 53,000 in 2024, including several top leaders from the four notorious scam kingpin families—Bai, Wei, Liu, and Ming—now in Chinese custody. Repatriations from Myanmar and the extradition of She Zhijiang from Thailand were prominently publicized in state media. By doing this, Beijing is using law enforcement actions as a political instrument to reassure domestic citizens that the state remains in control. 

The Structural Realities Behind the Scam Economy

For more than a decade, northern Myanmar’s border regions - Shwe Kokko, Jinxin, Hengsheng, Dongfanghui, KK Park, Huanya and the Dongmei Zone - have been governed by local militias with their own political and economic systems. Many of the scam kingpins are Chinese nationals who fled domestic investigations years ago and established operations in these lawless borderlands with the cooperation of local armed groups. The scams themselves are diverse, encompassing telecom fraud, online gambling, romance scams, “pig-butchering” schemes, fake investment operations, and cryptocurrency-based fraud. These illicit activities are not merely tolerated by the militias; they are woven into the region’s political economy. Local armed groups rely on revenue from these enterprises, providing essential infrastructure such as electricity and internet, often sourced from Thailand, in exchange for financial support. This symbiotic relationship ensures that the scam syndicates are deeply embedded in the governance and economic structures of the borderlands, making them highly resilient to even the most high-profile law enforcement efforts. 

Moreover, the scam economy has proven highly adaptive. When China intensifies pressure in one region, networks relocate to other border regions within Myanmar, or to neighboring Laos, Cambodia, or Thailand. Enforcement campaigns may temporarily displace criminal activity, but rarely eliminate it. The persistence of these networks reflects the structural realities of the borderlands - autonomous militias, porous borders, and lucrative illicit economies - rather than the actions of individual criminals alone.

Additionally, China’s approach to cross-border cybercrime demonstrates the limits of its claims to lead regional security. Crackdowns escalate primarily when Chinese citizens are victimized or when incidents spark widespread domestic outrage, while cases involving foreign victims, such as Thai, Malaysian, Indian, or American nationals, receive far less urgent attention. This selective responsiveness highlights the gap between Beijing’s rhetoric under the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Governance Initiative (GGI), as well as the underlying motivations driving its actions. Although Chinese officials present each crackdown as evidence of progress in regional security governance, the operations remain reactive and inconsistent, aimed primarily at preserving domestic legitimacy rather than achieving sustained, systemic reform in the borderlands.

The Need for a Multilateral Approach

Despite widespread publicity around recent sentences and repatriations, China’s approach remains strategically limited. High-profile crackdowns project political resolve and reassure domestic citizens, particularly in the wake of incidents like the viral kidnapping, but they do little to curb the profitability or mobility of scam compounds, nor do they establish the regional mechanisms necessary to prevent new hubs from emerging. Scam networks operate transnationally, rely on encrypted digital finance, and are embedded in areas where state authority is weak or contested. In this context, unilateral enforcement - no matter how forceful - cannot achieve lasting disruption.

What is missing is a genuine multilateral strategy. No country, including China, can dismantle a criminal economy that is transnational by design and shielded by armed groups outside formal state control. By framing each crackdown as proof of leadership under the GSI or GGI, Beijing obscures the fact that structural vulnerabilities remain unaddressed.

A durable response would require sustained intelligence cooperation among China, ASEAN states, India, and other affected countries; standardized digital-evidence protocols; stable extradition and repatriation mechanisms independent of armed-group negotiations; coordinated oversight of crypto-based financial flows; protections for trafficked workers regardless of nationality; and governance reforms in Myanmar’s borderlands. Without such structural measures, the region will continue to oscillate between dramatic crackdowns and predictable resurgences - actions that restore Beijing’s domestic credibility while leaving the underlying system intact.

Image: ABC News