THE MISSING GAPS OF SINO-PACIFIC ISLANDS RELATIONS

Countless column inches continue to be expended documenting China’s ambitions in the Pacific Islands region. Much of this analysis adopts a security focus and has been penned by those working in the security, defence or foreign policy spaces. Concerns largely centre on China’s inking of security deals with select Pacific Islands countries and its development financing, particularly for infrastructure projects. This has been accompanied by unease in some quarters around China’s debt trap diplomacy. The Belt and Road Initiative – the BRI, an expansive infrastructure initiative designed to boost trade and connectivity across Asia, Europe and Africa – has occupied a significant amount of popular attention.  Alarmism seems to go hand in glove with almost all mainstream analysis of Pacific geopolitics. Nuanced commentary about China’s investment in the Pacific Islands region – an exception when it comes to documenting regional happenings – has helped to provide a more accurate picture of contemporary Sino-Pacific Islands’ relations. 

China’s Evolving Partnership with Pacific Island Countries

In the past few years, bullish visions of China’s regional aspirations have dissipated as its own domestic economic realities have become clear. There has been a significant fall in China’s development spending in the Pacific since 2016. Observers have noted that this is linked to a decrease in Chinese loans across the region, although this has also been a global phenomenon.  Expectations around the BRI in the Pacific have also been tempered as various projects have stalled with commentators observing that “half-finished Chinese skyscrapers stand in disrepair” in various Pacific Island countries.    

Just as consideration of China’s economic position and the impact this is having on its international affairs has been slow to be considered in much of the discussion, missing too has been almost any assessment of island views on the geopolitical competition playing out in the region. Rudimentary analysis often assumes that Pacific Islands governments speak with a unified voice and represent the will of the (majority) of their populations, which, in reality, are highly contestable propositions. Consideration also needs to be given to the region’s heterogeneity. All too often Pacific Islands are regarded as undifferentiated. Contrary to these popular beliefs, attitudes towards China, the West and geopolitics vary markedly between what are highly diverse states shaped by factors including colonial and post-colonial history, longstanding bilateral relations and contemporary politics. This makes it impossible to ascribe a unitary Pacific view towards China or any other country.

The diversity of positions held by island states has been clearly evidenced by the manoeuvrings of Pacific countries around diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Five years ago, Taiwan could count six Pacific Island countries as allies. This has since halved, with only three Pacific Island nations recognising Taiwan. Earlier this year, Nauru changed their diplomatic recognition to People’s Republic of China (PRC). This followed the same switch by Solomon Islands and Kiribati in 2019. Vacillation in allegiances has been linked to the anticipated economic benefits that will flow from officially recognising PRC, although for the West - the more immediate concern has been the aforementioned penning of security pacts between China and individual island countries.      

Local Reactions to China’s Engagement

An absence of popular local analysis in the Pacific region is not all that surprising given how difficult it can be to access such viewpoints. Research that has been undertaken to capture Pacific perceptions of China's influence in the region has largely been confined to scholars and tertiary students from select countries. The voices of a more mainstream cohort are missing. Most Pacific Islands populations are disengaged from issues of national or regional policy concern; an observation it must be said that rings true of most developed nations. Rather, in the face of often poor to non-existent delivery of government services, the prime focus for many Pacific islands’ peoples remains the day-to-day struggle to make ends meet. This is also to be expected in developing countries characterised by few economic opportunities, low levels of educational attainment and dispersed and remote populations where engagement with, and an understanding of, the role of the state is limited. This characterisation is particularly true of Melanesian countries such as Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu.     

The author’s own exposure to the grounded views of Pacific populations stems from an extensive period living in Melanesia, including residing in urban settlement communities of Honiara, the capital of Solomon Islands, while undertaking doctoral fieldwork. Casual conversations with unemployed young men, the subjects of the author’s research, disclosed an often-bemused attitude towards geopolitical manoeuvrings, interlocuters’ primary concern being the transactional nature of international affairs. This saw the measure of success of any relationship gauged by the spoils that could be extracted: roads, stadiums, health clinics and the like. Although past association was also important. In Solomon Islands, for example, an anti-Asian sentiment predates the country’s independence in 1978 A contemporary resistance to the Asian community, and the dominant role they play in the country’s economy and politics, unites a vast number of Solomon Islander citizens. This sees the singling out of the country’s Asian populace in times of civil unrest – most recently in 2021 -  with participants in acts of disorder instinctively equating riotous behaviour with targeting Asian-owned stores and/or Honiara’s Chinatown. There are no signs yet that these negative attitudes have changed following Solomon Islands’ recognition of China in 2019 and China’s accompanying investments, particularly in infrastructure for the 2023 Pacific Games.   

As discussed, an important focus of recent geopolitics has been in the security space. In some Pacific Island states this most tangibly manifests, and is most popularly understood, as ‘technical assistance’ provided to local security forces, particularly police. Again, drawing on Solomon Islands as an example, Australia, a long-term ally of America, has spent the best part of three decades and hundreds of millions of dollars training and equipping local police. The results of this have never been comprehensively assessed, although no one would dispute that the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force faces capability challenges in policing most of the country. China has joined in the parade of police engagement in Solomon Islands, including martial arts training for the children of local officers. Much to Australia’s chagrin, other Pacific countries also host Chinese police officers, with Kiribati recently announcing their presence. More substantive efforts by China to negotiate a Pacific-wide policing co-operation arrangement have not yet borne fruit. This vying between countries regarding training has led some commentators to facetiously observe that “they’ll find a Pacific police force training on the moon”.

Shorthand characterisations and generalisations abound when it comes to much of the contemporary analysis around China’s growing role in the Pacific region, the consequences of their engagement and present-day geopolitical competition. The risks of such an approach are manifest, including reducing Pacific Island countries to mere pawns in a great power rivalry, possessing minimal agency of their own. To really understand the status and trajectory of Pacific geopolitical manoeuvrings, a greater appreciation is required of how bilateral relationships play out on the ground, including the incorporation of local voices and viewpoints and a focus on the often-unreported consequences of state engagement.