SHIFTING PRIORITIES, EMERGING COMPULSIONS

The recent border patrolling ‘arrangement’ between India and China, announced just ahead of the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia has sparked cautious optimism among strategic analysts in both countries, as well as around the world. Although the specifics of the agreement remain unclear, the timing of the arrangement, leading to a long-awaited bilateral meeting between Prime Minister Modi and President Xi, indicate a range of shifting priorities for both New Delhi and Beijing since the Galwan clash of 2020.

The breakthrough comes after a four-year long impasse, during which bilateral tensions and restricted access for border patrolling appeared to be the new normal along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The recent announcement came from India’s Foreign Secretary, Vikram Misri, a former ambassador to China, regarding the patrolling arrangement at Depsang and Demchok—the two key remaining friction points – wherein New Delhi and Beijing now have seemingly completed their disengagement process, returning to the pre-2020 situation.  Despite this ‘thaw’, the effectiveness and longevity of the agreed arrangement, as both sides continue to have diverging perceptions of the ongoing border dispute, remains challenged without understanding the nuances connected to the timing of the arrangement and motivations behind the same.

Indian Diplomacy at Work

Ever since the disengagement of troops from all friction points, agreed upon during corps commander meetings, except Demchok and Depsang by September 2022, there had been no substantial progress with regards to easing off the border dispute. However, with a renewed mandate to power for the Modi government in June, New Delhi doubled-down on its efforts to re-initiate negotiations with a reinvigorated attention continuing on its existing dialogues and foreign policy tactics. This renewed focus was presumably based on the fact that the Modi led-government in Delhi had increased bandwidth as well as experience of managing current troubled relations with Beijing, particularly owing to Modi-Xi camaraderie in the past - an aspect also recognised by Chinese analysts who closely follow India-China relations.

As a result, a notable uptick in bilateral engagement since July suggested that an agreement on restoration of status quo ante over critical friction points may indeed be taking shape. Two important discussions between India’s External Affairs Minister (EAM) S. Jaishankar and China’s top diplomat Wang Yi, resulted in generating optimism regarding the future prospects of bilateral relations. Subsequently, intense negotiations during the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India–China Border Affairs (WMCC), which unusually met twice in the span of one month, further cemented that both countries were on the path of easing tensions at the border, paving the way for greater trust-building measures.

Adding to such anticipations, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar’s optimistic remarks in September, highlighting that 75 percent of the border disengagement issues had been resolved, further solidifying that diplomatic efforts were making substantial progress. For many observers, particularly within the Indian trade and business communities, the Foreign Minister’s statement generated significant hope despite the EAM’s consistent emphasis on linking the poor state of bilateral relations directly with the ongoing border dispute.

Projection of Indian Interests and Incentives

In addition to diplomatic talks, media reports citing Indian Commerce Ministry officials as well as India's Economic Survey suggesting in July that opening up of foreign investments from Beijing was in India’s economic interest, added to the ongoing discourse that a breakthrough on the security front was eminent for resuming bilateral discussions. Such prospects, which would be mutually benefitting both economies, would have also provided India’s diplomatic channels the opportunity to highlight the importance of easing border tensions for restarting any discussions on non-border-related issues.

Amidst these developments taking place over the span of four months  the bilateral meeting between PM Modi and President Xi in Kazan during the BRICS Summit - immediately post-announcement of the border arrangement - highlighted the much-awaited approval from the top-most leadership for these efforts. Although both leaders had met previously at multilateral forums, they had not engaged in formal bilateral discussions over the past four years. The groundwork and incentives for a bilateral meeting in Kazan were designed to align with the announcement of a working arrangement pertaining to the border dispute. This development has granted New Delhi the opportunity to declare a diplomatic win in its longstanding stalemate with Beijing, thereby asserting itself as a geopolitically independent player that has the capacity and capability to resolve conflicts with Beijing without third party intervention. At the same time, it also allowed China to project its intensions of resolving escalating military tensions through diplomatic means. 

Evolving Chinese Concerns and Constraints

As opposed to the Indian side, Beijing has preferred to downplay the border dispute and contested India’s position of establishing peace and tranquility as a prelude for any other engagements. A low-profile announcement of this arrangement during the daily press briefing of China’s foreign ministry also indicated the continuation of this approach. However, the latest arrangement seems to suggest that China aligned with India’s position to some extent with several domestic and external factors that may have compelled Beijing to reach a common agreement with New Delhi.

One of the major factors influencing China’s shift in its position could potentially be its increased military activities vis-à-vis Taiwan in recent months, especially since Lai Ching-Te came to power. Lai’s assertive stance against China, reflected from his recent 10/10 speech, has attracted counter-offensive strategies from Beijing, thereby escalating tensions across the strait. With Lai being perceived by China as a hardliner — more so than his predecessor Tsai Ing-wen — such aggressive reactionary military drills will likely intensify in the coming years, thus increasing the risk of sudden escalation. Keeping this in mind, China would like to avoid having two hot borders on either side and thus, has shown more readiness for restoring the pre-2020 status quo ante. Hence, disengagement at the LAC offers more resources for China to deal with the immediate Taiwan challenge.

On the domestic front, China’s dwindling economic situation and the recent stimulus package indicate a slight shift in Xi’s approach of prioritising security over economy. With urgent economic issues at hand, some sort of rapprochement with its most influential neighbour can signal the leadership’s commitment towards the domestic audience in managing economic headwinds. Moreover, Chinese exports are more relevant than ever as its export-led growth model has proven to be a saving grace in times of weak domestic consumption. However, western markets have increasingly become hostile for Chinese products due to overcapacity concerns which may affect China’s exports and investments prospects in the future. In such a scenario, border disengagement can potentially open up Indian markets more freely for Chinese companies as India’s pre-condition of border peace and tranquility has been met, to some extent. Such a possibility of quid pro quo actions by India may have motivated the Chinese to retract its forces. 

Furthermore, this preliminary arrangement, as argued by some Chinese scholars, prevents the US from projecting China and India against each other. China views India as a part of US Indo-Pacific strategy that is aimed at containing China, and thus, hopes that this border patrolling arrangement can potentially push India away from the US-led bloc. The announcement of this arrangement on the eve of the BRICS summit, which is increasingly being perceived as a forum led by China and Russia, may have been motivated by this wishful thinking. This has become more crucial for China owing to a possibility of worsening US-China rivalry post-US elections in November, in which case, China hopes to get some breathing room by improving its relations with India.

Implementation Remains Questionable

Even though the current arrangement is only a small step in restoring normalcy in relations, it signifies a willingness on both sides to reach common ground while maintaining their respective interests. Having said so, to presume that this would potentially lead to re-opening of Indian markets for Chinese investments, would be a preemptive misjudgment. New Delhi’s security concerns vis-a-vis Beijing’s economic inroads pre-dates the border transgressions in 2020 and continue to persist despite a strategic thaw at the borders. Finance Minister Sitharaman’s recent remarks about continuing restrictions on investments from neighbouring countries is reflective of this fact.

In sum, while the timing and optics of the announcement has achieved limited success in invigorating hope for normalcy in relations, lack of mutual trust will be a major impediment in implementing this arrangement on the ground. Moreover, economic advantages and the need for better image projection globally, have largely guided both countries towards reaching a temporary settlement at the LAC, which can put the longevity and effectiveness of the arrangement in jeopardy if the said incentives do not materialise well in the near future.  

Image Source: PTI