Galwan incident in 2020 became a turning point in India China relations. After four years of tough negotiations, an agreement was signed on 21 October 2024 (called Agreement hereafter) between India and China on two places namely Depsang and Demchok. Depsang lies to the North of Galwan and Demchok to the South of Pangong Tso in Eastern Ladakh.  A run up to the Agreement is necessary to understand the implications of the Agreement. 

 (Re)Understanding Galwan and Its Aftermath

The Galwan incident was a result of the PLA diverting a large number of troops that had concentrated for an exercise opposite Eastern Ladakh in 2020, violating all agreements signed between India and China till then on the boundary management. India responded with a mirror deployment. That led to face-offs in Eastern Ladakh culminating in casualties on both sides in Galwan on 15 June 2020. Post that incident, for the first-time, high-level military commanders on both sides started negotiating. After 21 rounds of talks, which were joined by representatives of foreign ministries on both sides, troops pulled back from four points namely Galwan, Patrolling Point (PP) 15, 17 and Northern Bank of Pangong Tso in September 2022. A temporary moratorium on patrolling was agreed upon in these areas. This part disengagement was considered as stabilising the situation by China and it expected everything to be back to normal in bilateral relations. India’s position was that Depsang and Demchok are still to be resolved as part of the first step. Those two locations, namely Depsang and Demchok, were the subject of the Agreement. With this Agreement, patrolling has been restored in both these places to the pre-2020 levels.

In some meetings held under the Chatham House Rule between India and China, it was stated that PLA carried out the operations in Eastern Ladakh in 2020, as it felt that it now has the capability to move up to China’s 1959 claim line. This was a unilateral action and  not in conformity with the understanding that India and China will improve their bilateral relations in other areas like economy and people to people contacts provided peace and tranquility is maintained on the Line of Actual control (LAC).  There are other likely reasons for the Galwan incident. Whatever the reason may be, the strategy of the PLA seems to have been to push the envelope on the boundary question. If the reaction from India had been passive, it could have pushed further. India digging in its heel during negotiations made achievement of PLA’s aims further difficult. 

Having got into an impasse in Galwan, PLA was forced to remain deployed in the icy heights of Eastern Ladakh unlike hitherto fore, which created palpable discomfort in them. However, PLA saw an opportunity in this adverse condition and took measures to improve its logistics sustenance capabilities and capacities in high altitude areas and enhance the PLA troops’ capability to fight in such terrain for long periods. PLA had identified five incapables of its commanders and was trying to improve the commanders’ capabilities even earlier. The Galwan incident gave the PLA an opportunity to do so. PLA also adopted the strategy of customising its equipment for High Altitude Warfare. It inducted Type 15 tanks, CH4 drones, ZTL 11 Infantry Combat Vehicles and PCL series of  artillery guns. Post the Galwan incident, the number of exercises that PLA carried out in high altitude areas increased considerably. China has improved the airfields, created heliports, constructed many roads and improved its communication facilities to enhance its warfighting capability.  

To improve joint operations capability, the PLA Airforce carried out an exercise to integrate its air defence capability with that of the ground forces.  PLA created accommodation in high altitudes for a large quantity of troops including oxygen chambers. The maintenance of large number of troops was primarily done by road and rail. Induction of modern logistic capabilities such as employment of drones were introduced. All these activities have been noticed not only across Eastern Ladakh but also all along 3488 Kms of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). 

Likely Future: Navigating a Fragile Peace

During the negotiations of the last four years, there has been a feeling that PLA is the one that is stalling progress on the talks. It appears that political pressure has pushed the PLA to concur with the Agreement. Having gained access to the areas near the LAC, PLA will be unwilling to let go of the advantage. Combining that with the infrastructure development, PLA seeks to gain a strategic advantage along the LAC. It makes sense for the PLA to improve her posture along the LAC and keep India and its armed forces under pressure. This will allow the PLA to ensure that the Southwest Frontier of China is secure while it can concentrate on South China Sea and Taiwan. 

The official reaction to the Agreement from China has been positive as expected. China’s Ministry of National Defence Spokesperson stated that, “China and India have reached resolutions on issues concerning the border areas through diplomatic and military channels.” Furthermore, it was stated that “The troops on the ground of the two militaries are making progress in implementing the resolutions in an orderly manner”.  The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said that “China commends the progress made and will continue working with India for the sound implementation of these resolutions”. However, the reaction from the Chinese public has been mixed. While Song Zhongping, a defence commentator, seemed to be supportive of the Agreement, there were other voices that were not so positive.  

Nonetheless, the Agreement is likely to maintain peace and tranquility along the LAC —at least for some time.  However, the nebulous nature of the LAC makes it vulnerable to face offs and escalation thereof, at any point in time. While a major conflict between India and China is unlikely in the near future, face offs may continue to occur on the LAC. The recently concluded Special Representatives talks and other mechanisms are precisely to avoid that from happening. 

China will continue to push for normalisation in other aspects of the bilateral relationship like economy and people to people contacts stating that the boundary issue has stabilised. India is likely to negotiate on lifting of the temporary moratorium on patrolling as mentioned above and for the next step of de-escalation wherein the troops on either side need to pull back further. Once that is achieved, the de-induction of additional troops that came into the Eastern Ladakh area to their peacetime locations will come up for discussion. 

One can expect a long road of difficult negotiations ahead between India and China.

 

Image Source: ANI

Author

Lt Gen Narasimhan PVSM, AVSM*,VSM, is an Infantry Officer who served in the Indian Army for 40 years and worked extensively on the India China border. He served as the Defence Attaché in the Embassy of India in China for three years. Prior to going to China, he qualified in the Chinese language with distinction. He has been an avid China watcher for the last 24 years. Narasimhan is a former Member of the National Security Advisory Board. And, during his three tenures on the board, he worked on China and India’s national security issues pertaining to defence. Narasimhan was the first Director General, Centre for Contemporary China Studies, a policy oriented inter-ministerial think tank of Government of India, embedded in the Ministry of External Affairs, for five years. He is presently an Adjunct Distinguished Fellow with Gateway House, Mumbai, Non-Resident Senior Associate with CSIS, Washington DC, Adjunct Professor with the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru and Emeritus Resource Faculty with Rashtriya Raksha University, India. He has done graduation in Mathematics, Post-Graduation in Defence Studies and PhD in India-China Relations.

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